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Preface
On Friday 13 November 2015, we tragically saw yet another co-ordinated
terrorist attack in a European capital city. Gunmen and suicide bombers in
Paris attacked a rock concert, a sports stadium, and various bars and restau-
rants, killing 130 people and injuring many more (BBC, 2015a). A two-minute
monologue by BBC TV political affairs presenter Andrew Neil condemning
the attacks subsequently went viral on social media. It was later translated
into French and made freely available on the BBC website in both languages
(BBC, 2015b). This intervention summed up common discursive responses to
such terrible events. The attackers, says Neil, are more in a long historical line
of “fascists, Nazis and Stalinists” who have attacked Europe and “democ-
racy” before. He proposes that France is a symbol of “civilisation” and cites
as evidence a long list of distinguished French citizens. This is mainly a roll
call of dead white men – including Sartre and Camus but not Simone de
Beauvoir – though Juliette Binoche, Zinedine Zidane and the pop group Daft
Punk do get a mention after coq au vin and before crème brûlée. He also
refers to France’s modern, up-to-date, progressive credentials: “cutting-edge
science”, modern medicine, “fearsome” security forces and nuclear power.
The attackers, meanwhile, are associated with a “death cult barbarity” and
“medieval squalor” that would “shame the Middle Ages”. The future, he
suggested, would be “won” by democracy and leave the terrorists as “dust”.
This temporal narrative, casting terrorists as “back in the past” and industrialised,
postcoloniser, liberal democratic countries like Britain and France as on an
inexorable and unbroken march towards an ever more civilised future is very
familiar and we will encounter it many times in the forthcoming pages. It
does not seem to be a discourse that is going away.
This book begins from the premise that identity is only possible as a func-
tion of difference. If someone is British, that is because they are not French or
American or Pakistani and so on. This account of identity tells us very little,
however, unless we flesh out the concrete empirical detail of the identities
individual subjects have by virtue of what they are not: what matters is not
the fact of these divisions but how they operate and with what consequences. I
suggest that for contemporary practices of thought, the identification of
“others” by means of temporal distinctions has become extremely important.
I examine the temporal distinctions that constitute a British, democratic,
national identity by positing an “other” that is barbaric, alien, despotic, vio-
lent and – most importantly – backward. This is what I refer to when I talk
about “democracy promotion” as a form of “foreign policy”, borrowing from
David Campbell’s influential terminology (Campbell, 1998).
The book has taken a long time to write. As I document in the Introduction, I
can date its earliest beginnings to 7 July 2005. It really began in long conversations
in my garden in Islamabad on hot evenings with British Council colleagues
about the strange business of democracy promotion in which we were now
engaged. I have been asking questions about democracy promotion for the last 11
years and counting. Figuring out what the important questions were, and even
being able to hazard some answers, has amply filled my time in the intervening
years.
First, I made the painful and gradual decision that I was in the wrong job
and, frankly, the wrong way of life altogether. Then, having decided that the
questions to which I needed answers were fundamentally political, I arrived at
University College London (UCL) to study for a master’s degree in the Poli-
tics Department. I later enrolled on the PhD programme thanks to the
unwavering support of David Hudson and Sherrill Stroschein, who may not
have completely shared my passion for Foucault, but seemed to agree that I
might have some questions that needed answers. Bit by painful bit I started to
notice just how curious the familiar day-to-day work I had been involved in
really was, and I managed to research and write the PhD thesis that was the
earliest version of this book. In contrast to the ever-accelerating life of the
academy, then, this has been “slow scholarship” (Berg and Seeber, 2016),
motivated – in the words of the great Edward Said – by “care and affection
rather than by profit and […] narrow specialisation” (Said, 1994: 82).
The puzzle that has been occupying me can be summed up as: why pro-
mote democracy in response to terrorist attacks in London andwhy in Pakistan?
Yet, a lot has happened since those attacks in July 2005. In the UK, we have
had three Prime Ministers since Tony Blair, as well as two general elections
and two changes of government. Pakistan has returned to civilian, electoral
democracy and is probably no longer thought of as the “most dangerous coun-
try in the world” as it was characterised in 2005. A “backlash against
democracy promotion” has been increasingly apparent as political violence in
Afghanistan and Iraq appeared to go from bad to worse (Carothers, 2006;
Bridoux and Russell, 2012). The language, if not all the discourses, of the
“war on terror” was consigned to history with the election of US President
Barack Obama. My undergraduates scarcely remember 11 September 2001.
Nevertheless, the answers to my initial puzzle help us with other pressing
questions that are still depressingly current: why (also) promote democracy –
or advocate democratic regime change – in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and
elsewhere? Why is democracy support understood to be an appropriate
answer to terrorist attacks in Tunisia (Zelin, 2015)? Why promote democracy
as a response to “radicalisation” in Park View High School in Birmingham
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(the school of the so-called “Trojan Horse” affair) (Hope, 2015), in the his-
tory curriculum (Evans, 2013; see Robinson, 2012: 100–109; Cannadine et al.,
2011; Bowen et al., 2012), and in the public duty for schools and universities
under the new Prevent agenda (HM Government, 2015)? We will see that
there is a logic to all of these decisions which is intimately related to a wide-
spread and taken-for-granted discourse about British history and the way it
constitutes British identity and its “others”.
The book focuses on a specific British context and history, attempting to
put at risk a narrative that suggests that the story of democracy was authored
here. However, I hope that the particular approach I take to democracy pro-
motion, foreign policy and genealogy will enable myriad other research
questions to be prised open and addressed. For example, other countries and
international entities are constituted through a discursive commitment to the
temporal and civilisational narrative of democracy, and conduct their foreign
policy and Foreign Policy accordingly. The United States and the European Union
are perhaps the most widely researched (Huber, 2015: 2), but the discursive
appeal of democracy is very wide, with India one of a number of new pro-
minent participants in both constitutive democracy promotion and conven-
tional Democracy Promotion (Mohan, 2007; Huber, 2015). It is not within
the scope of this book to look in detail at the precise ways in which demo-
cratic identities are produced and reproduced through the specific temporal
and historical narratives used in diverse locations. Nevertheless, the book
could certainly offer theoretical and methodological provocation for anyone
interested in taking up the questions of how and in what ways democratic
identities are promoted, and what and who is excluded in consequence.
Over many years, this book has been the product of an often intimate,
patient and radically ordinary experience of collaboration, talk, mutual sup-
port and sometimes rather intense emotion. I have long been grateful to Mark
Ferrigan for first introducing me to the ideas of Michel Foucault and other
French “theory”. I still use his explanations and examples with my students. I
am also grateful to all my friends and colleagues in Pakistan, and to Tomáš
Daňhel, for teaching me so much about this beautiful and fascinating country.
David and Sherrill were exceptionally kind and helpful to me as a bit of an unu-
sual postgraduate student. I am especially grateful to David, my primary super-
visor, for his patience, kindness, encouragement, time, tact and cups of tea, as well
as his insight, ideas and intellect. I would not have been able to write this book
without him.
My doctoral research was funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC). As a consequence, I was able to undertake an internship at the
UK’s National Archives, which considerably developed my research skills andwas
great fun, not least thanks to the support of Amanda Bevan and Liz Evans.
Many thanks are also due to innumerable helpful librarians and archivists at the
British Library and the House of Commons Library, as well as all the helpful staff
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International
Development who processed a huge number of Freedom of Information
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requests with incredible efficiency. I am grateful to Peter and Hafsa Sanders for
allowing me to use the image The Tracks of My Tears on the cover. Thanks also
for the following permissions: Ingram Pinn and The Financial Times for the
figure at the start of Chapter 2; Faber & Faber and Matt Charman for the epi-
graph to Chapter 1; The New York Review of Books and David Bromwich for
the epigraph to Chapter 3; and Kenan Malik and Atlantic Books for the
epigraph to Chapter 6.
I am deeply grateful to the School of Public Policy at UCL, especially
Jennifer Hudson, Richard Bellamy, David Coen, Neil Mitchell and Nicky
Henson, for awarding me the ESRC funding and for providing a stimulating
environment in which to work, especially the great Monday night PhD semi-
nars. Alex Hartman, Susan Gaines, and all the gang teaching Qualitative
Methods at the School of Public Policy have been a great pleasure to work
with, as have my students, who are always lively, interesting and thought-
provoking. The same can be said of my former students at King’s College
London, and I particularly thank Adrian Blau for being a great boss, critical
friend, and letting me loose on his undergraduates with all my French ideas.
I need to thank Louise Amoore, Victoria Browne, Graham Burchell,
Niheer Dasandi, James Dawson, Matthew Dennis, Hannah Elias, Kathryn
Fisher, Caroline Holmqvist, Viv Jabri, Patrick Jackson (and his brilliant
Methods workshop at the International Studies Association – North-East),
Laleh Khalili, Emily Linnemann, Aletta Norval (and her great summer
school at Essex), Emily Robinson, Doerthe Rosenow, Christine Sylvester,
Tony Taylor, an anonymous reviewer, and Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-
Williams as series editors of Interventions, for invaluable and insightful ques-
tions, suggestions and comments at various stages of the process. Lydia de
Cruz and her colleagues at Routledge have also been brilliant.
Also to thank for warmth, love, friendship, music, wine and great conversation
over the years have been Nick Evans, Marsha Healey, RichardMartini (also proof
reader extraordinaire), Gill Sampson, Nichola Frances, Michal Polák, Lizzy Toon,
Mike Grundmann, Andy Still, and especially Jenny, Nadeem and now little Noah
and Esme. I would also like to thank all my friends at Republic for their support
and understanding, especially Graham Smith. Particular thanks must go to Jill,
Carlos, Luke and Sophie who have welcomed me into their life and home
with unfailing love, support and occasional much-needed slave-driving. Luke
in particular has been a worthy opponent at Scrabble and someone with
whom I can always talk about ideas. I look forward to reading his PhD thesis
one day. I scarcely know what I would have done without the wonderful
Rachel Jones. Despite having troubles of her own, she has read more drafts
than I can count, listened to my incessant chatting on, asked great questions,
made brilliant jokes, cooked my tea, encouraged and looked after me. I thank
her from the bottom of my heart.
Finally, and above all, my parents have made everything possible from the
time they first taught me to read. They have put up with a lot, have given me
a lot in all sorts of ways, and I love them.
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Introduction
I had been living and working in Pakistan for nearly a year when I heard the
terrible news that a co-ordinated bombing attack on the London transport
system on 7 July 2005 had killed 56 people, including the bombers, and
injured more than 700. The bombing had been perpetrated by British citizens
on British soil, avowedly as a result of profound dissatisfaction with the poli-
cies of the British government. Nevertheless, the policy response to the attack
that most affected me was that government servants in Pakistan were asked
step up work on democracy promotion. This provokes two questions. First,
why was democracy seen to be the answer to terrorism in London? Second,
why should democracy be promoted not in Britain, but in Pakistan? This
book provides a detailed answer to these questions, examining the logic and
the modes of thinking that made such a response possible. It also shows why
they matter for the way democracy is thought about, not only by democracy
promoters in Pakistan, but also in Britain.
The book is about democracy promotion as a form of foreign policy. That
is to say, it understands democracy promotion not only as a set of practices
enacted by embassies and development agencies overseas, but also as a whole
complex of practices of thought that enable distinctions to be made between
who is “foreign” and who is not. It shows that a key element in contemporary
understandings of otherness is the acceptance or rejection of a certain, narrowly
specified form of liberal democracy.
This form of othering sets up democracy as emblematic of the modern,
developed self: in British political, policy and popular discourse, democracy is
understood as the outcome of a long progressive sweep of British history in
which multiple threats to it have been struggled against and overcome. It is in
encountering and constantly re-narrating these threats to democracy that the
British come to have a sense of an imagined, democratic community that
exists by virtue of what it is opposed to. Relatedly, democracy is understood
as the endpoint of history, the ultimate best way of managing human affairs,
which has been alighted upon through a long historical process in which
worse alternatives have been discarded in favour of better. The precise form
that democracy has to take, by this account, includes the familiar institutions
of liberal democracy as well as a notional delineation between a public and
private sphere implied by liberalism. Thus the borders between self and other,
past and future, masculine and feminine, and public and private are all
imbricated and mutually reinforcing.
This teleological version of history has been in circulation at least since
ideas about progress first became common currency during the Industrial
Revolution and a form of it was once known, after Whig politician Lord
Thomas Macaulay, as “the Whig version of history” (Butterfield, 1965).
Despite the pejorative implications of this name for evolutionary versions of
history, however, I argue that from Macaulay to Francis Fukuyama it has
been enormously influential in producing the practices of thought that inform
and constitute British identities and democratic practices. The practices of
thought that constitute teleological versions of history emerge and are con-
stantly redeployed in order to manage an uncertain present. This is not only
because if democracy is the end of history, then it is obvious that efforts must
be focused on promoting it, but also that democracy itself offers useful tools
for providing detailed knowledge about how to govern. If history can be
taken for granted as a logical progression towards democracy, it con-
comitantly offers a reassuring programme for action: threats to democracy
that emanate from other, threatening parts of the world can be contained and
domesticated by bringing those places up to date and enabling them to
progress through the same journey from a worse past to a better, more
democratic, more governable future.
However, the second crucial argument I make is that it is possible – and
politically preferable – to narrate alternative versions of history. In examining
the emergence and pervasiveness of teleological versions of history, I show by
my detailed research into the past that there is no necessarily progressive or
improving logic to history. On the contrary, from a curtailment of political
participation in the colonial era to the Partition of India and Pakistan to the
daily racist violence suffered by British Pakistanis, democracy promotion has
been fully implicated in messy, random and, above all, violent events. Rather,
our contemporary modes of governance have emerged through the ways that
various leaders, politicians, thinkers and policy makers have muddled through
the confusion of history, creating teleological narratives to help them. Tele-
ology is not the driving force of history, but rather emerges from the messi-
ness of historical events. In making this argument, I show that the historical
narrative that currently pervades practices of thought about British identity
and democracy promotion is contestable, and that therefore it might be
possible to think, act and live differently.
Teleological narratives, I suggest, are practices of thought: they are habits
of thinking, unreflexive modes of interpreting the world. Michel Foucault, who has
done so much to enable us to recognise the modes of thought we take for granted,
made the following remark about the importance of thought:
We must […] stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in
human life and in human relations as thought […] It is something that is
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often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is
always a little thought even in the most stupid institutions; there is always
thought even in silent habits. Criticism is a matter of flushing out that
thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident
as one believed.
(Foucault, 1988: 155)
This book is such a work of criticism.
To set the scene, I will next tell two stories about democracy, history and
threatening others. The first concerns Democracy Promotion in Pakistan; the
second is about a row provoked by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Both these
stories show how identities are produced and reproduced through continuous
narrations of a version of history that is haunted by a variety of undemocratic
others. They both demonstrate how practices of thought produce a commit-
ment to a democracy that is quite rigid in terms of the precise institutions
that are considered democratic: the familiar institutions of liberal democracy.
Finally, they both show how identity and democratic practice are grounded in
everyday life including perfectly ordinary practices of thought: a citizen
reading a newspaper or listening to a speech on the news; a civil servant
doing her job; a clergyman giving a lecture or sermon; a teacher, a newspaper,
a popular book or a television programme offering a version of history; a
believer taking her claims to a religious court or scholar.
The first story brings us back to the puzzle at the start of the chapter. Why was
democracy seen as a solution to “home-grown” terrorism? Andwhy in Pakistan?
To begin with, it was not clear who had committed mass murder in
London on 7 July 2005, but within the week the fact came out that the suicide
bombers had been British citizens. This was shocking news, because the
bombings had widely been reported as a war-like act that would have been
easier to understand if they had come from a foreign enemy, rather than from
young men who had “unmistakeably” Yorkshire accents (BBC, 2006b). In the
weeks and months that followed, moreover, it transpired that almost every-
thing about the attacks had been, in conventional terms, “domestic”, includ-
ing financing from a British bank loan, the technical know-how obtained
from websites hosted in Britain and the apparent motivation which seems to
have been directed against the actions of the British government (Bulley,
2008: 82; Townsend, 2006). It was therefore, on the face of it, strange that the
Foreign Secretary was tasked with engaging with the media (Bulley, 2008: 83)
and that people like me, working for the British government abroad, were
involved in the policy dimension of the reaction.
One way of explaining intervention in Pakistan (amongst myriad other
actions) as a logical concrete response to an attack by British-born bombers
in the British capital city is to suggest that there must have been something
foreign (Pakistani?) about the bombers, despite appearances. This would
explain the enormous amount of attention that was paid to “links” they had
in Pakistan (BBC, 2006b; Bulley, 2008: 82–83).
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In fact, various vague hints about possible trips to training camps or links
to Al-Qaeda leaders have largely been discredited (ibid.; Townsend, 2006),
and the Official Report of the London Bombings stated that “[t]heir indoc-
trination appears to have taken place away from places with known links to
extremism” (Home Office, 2006: 25). Nevertheless, the same report devotes
two pages to the question: “Were they directed from abroad?” These two
pages make much of the two and a half-month visit Mohammed Sidique
Khan and Shehzad Tanweer made to Pakistan in 2004–05, although again
this is acknowledged to be hardly “unusual”, given that 400,000 trips were
made to Pakistan by UK residents in 2004 (ibid.: 21). Likewise, media
reporting of the bombings was overwhelmingly framed by this supposed link
with Pakistan, to the extent that the Daily Telegraph ran a story about the
attack entitled “Pakistan wakes up to the hatred within”, as if the bombers
had indeed been Pakistani and not British (Rashid, 2005). This is emblematic
of the perplexity engendered by the discovery that terrorism could be “home-
grown”: it seemed no longer clear who was British and who was not. This,
then, appears to account for why Pakistan was the target of intervention: if
the threat was foreign, then it could be contained by intervention overseas.
Tony Blair, the then-Prime Minister, explained the importance of intervention
beyond the borders of the UK – as they are conventionally understood – in
order to prevent terrorism by stating that the bomber, Mohammed Sidique
Khan, “may have been born here. But his ideology wasn’t. And that is why it has to
be taken on, everywhere” (Blair, 2006). This is a move with two consequences.
First, by pinpointing the ideology of the bombers as foreign, he was exter-
iorising the problem. The argument could then logically follow, as Blair
(2007b) put it himself, that “what happens in Pakistan matters on the streets
of Britain”. This is how he attempted to legitimate the interventions in Pakistan
that I experienced first hand. Second, though, Blair was suggesting that just
because a person is “born here”, that does not mean that he or she is neces-
sarily wholly British. This disrupts the common-sense assumption that to be
“born here” – traditional jus soli – is the first and, perhaps, fundamental criter-
ion of belonging, of being British. The bombers, it is implied, were indeed in
some way foreign because they did not share a British “ideology”. The corollary
of this is that it is not possible to know who is British and who is foreign, who
belongs and who does not, from their appearance, or their accent, or their
passport. Rather, the border between the domestic and the foreign can only
be created and sustained by establishing what counts as an acceptably British
“ideology” or set of values.
So, why was democracy to be the means of making the streets of Britain safer by
intervening in Pakistan? To understand this, I need to begin by showing that an
acceptable “British ideology” was understood to entail a commitment to democ-
racy and to a narrative of national history that has involved facing down numerous
undemocratic others. This will lead to a discussion of how the promotion of this
ideology overseaswas understood to be useful in containing the threat of terrorism,
even as the distinction between home and overseas threatens to collapse.
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The question of what was meant by British values (or the ideology
informed by them) was the subject of a great deal of discussion in the media
and by politicians at the time and, importantly, this was accompanied by a set
of narratives about British history. For example, a leader in the Sunday
Express on 10 July 2005 encouraged reflection on “what values Britain has to
defend” against terrorism and suggested that an appropriate response would
be to strengthen “Western […] democratic values” against the threat that
“sharia law […] should take root in this country” by ensuring that all
schoolchildren and anyone seeking British citizenship should “be taught
about the evolution of democracy and the rule of law and the emergence of
religious tolerance from the Magna Carta through the Civil War, the Glorious
Revolution, the Great Reform Act and the fight to defend all those freedoms
in the cauldron of the Second World War” (Shipman, 2005). By this account,
one way of distinguishing the difference between someone who is, in some
sense, authentically British and someone who is foreign comes from their
understanding of an official historical narrative and a commitment to the
democratic values that emerge from the history that British people share.
This idea of Britishness as embodied by a commitment to democracy,
honed through a seamless process of evolution and fought for against multiple
others was echoed widely in the press and by politicians. It is, perhaps,
summed up by Donald Rumsfeld’s words reproduced in large print across a
double page in the Daily Telegraph: “For generations, tyrants, fascists and
terrorists have sought to carry out their violent designs upon the British
people, only to founder upon its unrelenting shores” (Daily Telegraph, 2005),
which resonate with the more than 400 mentions in national newspapers of
the London Blitz in connection with the attack in the three weeks following
the bombings. Moments of British history that would be widely familiar were
pressed into service in a narrative about Britishness as a history of struggle for
democracy against threatening and foreign others.
The question of why democracy in Pakistan would help make Britain safe
was also informed by understandings about the logic of history. If domestic
identity had been established through a progressive, evolutionary history, this
meant that other countries could likewise go through a similar version of
history and thereby modernise, progress and come up to date, thus becoming
domesticated and being made safe. This narrative of history as a necessary
progression from worse to better times is implicit in notions about “civilisa-
tion” that date back to colonial rule (Bowden, 2009), and to more recent
ideas about “development”.
The relationship of a narrative of civilisation and development to the
bombings is symbolised perhaps most vividly by a description on 10 July
2005, in the Sunday Telegraph. It paints a grizzly picture of St Pancras
Church in London with both Make Poverty History ribbons tied round its
pillars and blood splattered on its walls following the bombing of a crowded
bus in nearby Tavistock Square (Porter, 2005: 2). The ribbons were there
because the bombings were timed – seemingly deliberately – to coincide with
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the G8 summit in Gleneagles, which was focusing on issues of poverty and
development. These juxtapositions of the Make Poverty History campaign
and the G8 summit, on the one hand, with the destruction wrought by the
bombers, on the other, offered a useful way of understanding and condemning
the attacks. The “civilised” values of the G8, the UK government, the “Brit-
ish way of life” and the Make Poverty History campaign, were readily juxta-
posed with the “barbarism” of the terrorist display of violence, as well as the
barbarities of poverty, lack of development, bad governance and corruption
(Douzinas, 2008: 195). The present, civilised, developed condition of Britain
could be contrasted not only with the backward state the country would be in if
the terrorists were able to prevail, but also with the current underdeveloped
state of Pakistan, whence the danger of terrorism appeared to emanate.
Tony Blair, in his initial statement on the bombings, spoke in a language
informed by these temporalities: “It is particularly barbaric that this has
happened on a day when people are meeting to try to help the problems of
poverty […] our determination to defend our values is greater than their
determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people […] they will
never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other
civilised nations throughout the world” (Blair, 2005a). In March 2006, Blair
gave a speech that developed and extended the initial response to the bomb-
ings as the actions of “barbarians” against “civilised people”: he furthermore
suggested that “their [the terrorists’?] concept of governance is pre-feudal;
their positions on women and other faiths, reactionary and regressive”. The
“battle” being waged, by this account, is “between progress and reaction,
between those who embrace the modern world and those who reject its exis-
tence”. Once again, an unspoken version of history as a directional force that
moves countries and people forward in time from a worse past to a better
future is here evident in a number of temporal and historical formulations, in
which civilisation, modernity and progress are pitted against feudalism (a
specific feature of European history), barbarism and poverty. This is a version
of history that offers a useful potential solution in a crisis. Again, if terrorism
is the opposite of development, progress and civilisation, then one answer to
the problem is to domesticate foreign danger by enabling places like Pakistan
to come up to date.
The answer to the question of why democracy and why in Pakistan is now
much clearer. The values that emerge in his account as constitutive of “civi-
lisation”, “progress” and “modernity” are clearly spelled out by Blair as:
“religious tolerance, openness to others, to democracy, liberty and human
rights administered by secular courts” (Blair, 2006). These are recognisably
the values commonly associated with liberal democracy, and it is no coin-
cidence that “democracy” is invoked numerous times in this speech as the
opposite of “extremism” or “terrorism”. This then enables us to understand
why democracy was understood to be what the British government in Paki-
stan should be concentrating on in order to domesticate, or make safe, the
dangerous ideology that appeared to be threatening British citizens.
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A teleological narrative of history, then, was understood both to shore up
commitment to British values at home and to offer the means – through a devel-
opment that had been achieved at home and was much needed overseas – by
which threats to it could be challenged in Pakistan.
The second story is about a lecture given by the Archbishop of Canterbury
in 2008 in which he suggested that different legal traditions, including shari’ah
law, should be accommodated within the British legal system (Williams,
2008b). This was a measured and carefully argued speech, which drew upon
the vast literature that suggests that it is desirable to incorporate a range of
different voices into the democratic debate and conversation, and that this can
only occur if different modes of identity and commitment, and different
practical ways of making claims under the democratically constituted law, can
be included.
The Archbishop was shouted down in fury as switchboards at Canterbury
Cathedral, Lambeth Palace and the BBC were jammed by complaints
(Gadher et al., 2008) and a torrent of around 500 newspaper articles appeared
in the national press to dispute his views. Immediate condemnation came
from the Prime Minister, the Head of Commission for Racial Equality, clergy
from the Church of England and other churches, numerous MPs and even
some Muslim leaders and politicians (Petre and Porter, 2008).
This story, like the first, is also puzzling. The puzzle it poses is why a lec-
ture that carefully explored the possibility of making democratic law making
and enforcement more plural and inclusive was attacked in the very name of
democracy, and why it was widely interpreted as an existential threat to Brit-
ish values. Why were current configurations of democracy so passionately
defended against innovations that might make them more democratic? Why
were proposals for changes to the ways laws are democratically made and
applied understood as threatening and foreign?
The fundamentally alien nature of shari’ah law was asserted by none other
than the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, whose spokesman distanced him
from the Archbishop by suggesting that: “British laws would be based on
British values” (Butt, 2008). Although a commitment to the principles of
shari’ah law is part of the religious practice of millions of British citizens, its
foreignness was taken for granted to the extent that it was widely repeated
that anyone wishing to live under its provisions is welcome to “go and live in a
Muslim country”, establishing that British identity is premised on being those
things that a Muslim country is not (Khan, 2008b; see also Baig, 2008; Dia-
mond, 2008; Hartley-Brewer, 2008). The Sunday Times went so far as to
suggest that the Archbishop has committed “treason” – the ultimate in existential
threats to the nation – adding, in an echo of the SecondWorldWar narrative that
regularly animated discussions of the London bombings, that his views are
“appeasement to an alien set of values” (Marrin, 2008; see also The Times,
2008). Matthew d’Ancona (2008) put what is at stake here very clearly in the
Sunday Telegraph when he stated that: “we are at war with fundamentalist
Islam […] They seek […] the global imposition of sharia law.” Shari’ah law is
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primarily understood to be foreign because it is connected to the foreign
element of the London terrorists’ ideology that is to be feared.
There are two elements to this perceived threat. The first is that there is
some direct link between shari’ah law and terrorism itself. For example, the
Director of the Crown Prosecution Service is quoted as saying that a map of
“incidence of honour based violence”, which is allegedly tolerated by shari’ah
courts, and a map of “terrorist cells” would be “identical” (Seighart, 2008).
This is despite the fact that the Archbishop made it clear, in a BBC interview
prior to his lecture, that there could be no accommodation with “the most
repressive and retrograde elements” that characterise stereotypes of Islamic
law (Williams, 2008a). Meanwhile, the former Archbishop of Canterbury,
Lord Carey, aired concerns that heeding Rowan Williams’s suggestions
“would be dangerous and would encourage some Muslims to try to turn
Britain into an Islamic state” (Wynne-Jones, 2008). Thus the existential threat
of terrorism appeared to be aided and abetted directly by these suggestions.
More widespread, however, is the second element of the threat: that any
attempt to formalise systems of shari’ah law within the British system would in
and of itself turn Britain into an unrecognisably foreign country – particularly
insofar as it would impact negatively on women’s rights – and would support
the supposed aims of the terrorists by bringing about precisely what they
wanted to achieve through violent means. The populist tabloid Sun newspaper
was particularly keen to make this link. It condemned the speech on its front
page next to a photograph of the burning bus in Tavistock Square (Pascoe-
Watson, 2008), and claimed that the speech represented a “victory for terror-
ism” (Wilson and Pascoe-Watson, 2008). The implication is that the terrorists
of 7 July 2005 showed what a violent place a Britain with shari’ah law might
be like.
Given that ideas about shari’ah law were so bound up with the perceived
threat to British identity from a foreign ideology, it is not difficult to see
why the Archbishop’s lecture was decried specifically in terms of democracy,
even though his intention was precisely to expand and not foreclose British
democratic practice. That is because of the already-constituted understanding
of democracy as a quintessentially British achievement that is precisely what
has to be defended against terrorism. If terrorists are opposed to Britain and
to democracy and in favour of shari’ah law, then, it seems – despite the
Archbishop’s careful argument to the contrary – unthinkable that democracy
and shari’ah law could be compatible. Thus, what is put forward as the set of
values to be defended turns out to be the familiar status quo: the institutions
and values of liberal democracy. The Times asserts, for instance, that “[i]t is
fundamental to this democracy that there should be one law for everyone”,
adding that any accommodation with shari’ah law would “undermine the […]
strength of our parliamentary democracy” (The Times, 2008). Baroness
Warsi, then shadow minister for community cohesion and social action, sug-
gested that “[a]ll British citizens must be subject to British laws developed
through Parliament and the courts” (quoted in Petre and Porter, 2008).
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Meanwhile a European court of human rights decision from 2003 is widely quoted
as meaning that shari’ah law is “incompatible with European ideas of democ-
racy” (Dyer, 2008). It is not so much democracy as a contested idea in political
theory that is being defended, as a specific set of European institutions.
These institutions and their relation to Britishness is understood through a
similar set of narratives about civilisation and British history that we saw in
the first story about the London bombings above. Minette Marrin (2008) in
the Sunday Times puts it like this:
What is good and essential about this country is the [democratically
made] law itself. It has evolved over centuries from medieval barbarities
into something, for all its faults, that is civilised. Our law expresses and
maintains the best virtues of our society. Anyone who does not accept it
does not belong here.
Lord Carey (2008), writing in the popular tabloid the News of the World,
invokes “the laws of our land which have been so painfully honed by the
struggle for democracy and human rights”. The seamless, teleological version
of British history that is implied by these accounts of progression from a
medieval barbaric past to a democratic, modern present is spelled out by the
Daily Mail (2008a): “From Magna Carta to the Glorious Revolution, from the
Great Reform Act to the Suffragettes, one golden thread runs through our
nation’s history.” Yet again, then, we see a national identity and a commitment
to a specific set of democratic institutions being shored up by a progressive
narrative about British history.
Again, a specific narrative about British history intersects with a broader
understanding of the logic of history, as civilised, modern values are con-
trasted with the barbarities of an uncivilised past, symbolised by shari’ah law
(Wallis, 2008; Bunting, 2008; Seighart, 2008). Various breathless accounts of ston-
ings, floggings, beheadings, limb amputations and so on are regularly provided to
substantiate the out-dated modes of punishment the shari’ah allegedly sanctions
(Murray and Giannangeli, 2008; Daily Mail, 2008b; Howse, 2008). A narrative
about civilisation and the barbaric backwardness of shari’ah sits alongside a more
specific story about British history and provides a broader understanding of
history as offering a solution for parts of the world that are behind Britain in
time: they simply need to make an entrance into history and come up to date.
Temporal othering
Lene Hansen suggests that there are three main forms of “othering” that take
place in discourse and constitute a world of selves and others: spatial, tem-
poral and ethical (Hansen, 2006: 12). There is now a considerable amount of
work on the ways in which the discourses on terrorist attacks since 11 Sep-
tember 2001 have constituted spatial and ethical others. For example, Judith
Butler (2004) has shown how discourses about what it is to be a human, and
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thereby legitimately entitled to benefit from the provisions of universal human
rights, have produced classes of subjects who are ethically deemed less than
human: lives that are unliveable and deaths that are ungrievable. Richard
Jackson (2005) and Stuart Croft (2006) have both discussed the ways in which
the “war on terror” discourse has produced a spatially polarised world in
which particular states and individuals are constituted as “other” and thereby
the legitimate objects of various kinds of violent force and disciplinary power.
There is furthermore quite a wide and growing literature on time in Inter-
national Relations (Edkins, 2003; Hutchings, 2008; Puar, 2007; Jarvis, 2009;
Lundborg, 2012; Closs Stephens, 2013), which has helped build a detailed
understanding of how particular ways of thinking about time legitimate and
reinforce contemporary forms of power: linear, teleological time is a key tool
of sovereignty (Edkins 2003), for example, whilst understanding time as
homogeneous and empty helps us account for the persistence of the nation-
state (Closs Stephens, 2013). What is less common, however, is the analysis
that this book performs: how do particular ways of thinking about time con-
stitute the self and the other, the domestic and the foreign? With what effects?
One consequence of ignoring temporal dimensions of practices of othering
is a tendency to understand the world in terms of sets of selves and others
strung out in space. For example, Derek Gregory insists on understanding the
“war on terror” discourse of civilisation and barbarians in terms of a colonial
present. This then leads to an account of the work that discourse is doing in
terms of its production of enemies and subjects of power elsewhere in space,
in Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan:
“Their” space is often seen as the inverse of “our” space: a sort of nega-
tive in the photographic sense that “they” might “develop” into some-
thing like “us” but also the site of an absence, because “they” are seen
somehow to lack the positive tonalities that supposedly distinguish “us”.
(Gregory, 2004: 17)
However, both of the stories I narrated above enable us to see that there is a
prominent discourse about barbarians and civilisation in which “being civilised” is
a uniform endpoint to which any part of the worldmight aspire. The very idea of
“development” in “other” spaces is reliant on the idea that time and history are
forces that move forwards, towards the ultimate goal, or telos, of civilisation.
Acknowledging the temporal dimensions of othering, therefore, helps us to
understand discursive moves and practices that otherwise would be incom-
prehensible. Whilst spatially constituted others can perhaps be more readily
contained or subdued by conventional borders or by military force, tempo-
rally constituted others might be anywhere, might – frighteningly – be “born
here” and look like “us”, but might also bear within them the redemptive
possibility of coming up to date. They might therefore require and be better
served by more boring, more detailed, but no less important practices like
democracy promotion to domesticate them and make them safe.
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As Talal Asad (2003) has pointed out, ideas like “modernity” and “civili-
sation” are generally not descriptions of the present state of the world, but
rather future-oriented projects that guide and condition present action. This is
important particularly for the practices of thought that are concerned with
encountering and managing the “other” of civilisation, because there opens up an
historical trajectory into which others are understood to be able to enter.
Foucault (2005b: 194–197) suggests that the “other” of civilisation need not
be the barbarian – in our case, for instance, the unruly and ungovernable
terrorist – who is, by definition, always the violent opponent of civilisation, con-
temporaneous in time and bent on its destruction. Rather, civilisation’s other can
equally well be understood as the “savage”: that is, as a form of being that is fur-
ther back in time but can be domesticated through the civilising course of
history. In more contemporary language, the other of civilisation might be the
un(der)developed, who can benefit from progress and be brought up to date.
This is a narrative that is useful in the wake of catastrophe, because it
always leaves us with something to do. Hence a whole raft of practices that
will bring civilisation wherever it is lacking by means of better governance
can be instigated. Democracy promotion, then, regardless of its spatial loca-
tion, can be understood as a kind of civilising mission, whose logic is both to
control and contain the irredeemably foreign other – the barbarian, the
terrorist – but also to domesticate the savage through the civilising rituals of
liberal democracy.
Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy
When Tony Blair stated that “[t]hey may have been born here but their
ideology wasn’t. And that is why it must be taken on everywhere”, he per-
formatively re/produces the idea that Britishness is constituted through a
struggle against anti-democratic others. In doing this, he draws attention to
the fact that the borders of the nation are not primarily spatially located on
maps, in ports or airports or even immigration queues, but rather in the
everyday practices that enable us to establish and affirm what is “foreign”, in
order that we might know who “we” are. “We”, he suggests, are civilised, we
belong, because we are democrats.
This helps us to understand the reaction to the Archbishop of Canterbury.
If a commitment to liberal democracy is constitutive of the nation, then his
attempt to broaden the scope of what can be considered democratic is a
contestation of familiar bordering practices. In effect, he is attempting to shift
perceptions of what counts as foreign and he is doing so by proposing novel
forms of democracy. The condemnation he receives functions by means of a
repetition of more familiar bordering practices, which reassert a commitment
to liberal democracy as the primary mode through which we can distinguish
self from other, domestic/ated from foreign.
Importantly, then, we can now distinguish two separate but deeply inter-
twined meanings of democracy promotion, mapping onto David Campbell’s
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distinction between Foreign Policy and foreign policy, which is worth quoting
at some length:
The first is one in which foreign policy can be understood as referring to
all […] practices of differentiation, or modes of exclusion that constitute
their objects as foreign when dealing with them. In this sense, foreign
policy is divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the cate-
gories of identity and difference and applies to all confrontations between
a self and an other located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class,
gender or locale [… The] second understanding – Foreign Policy as state-
based and conventionally understood – is thus not as equally implicated
in the constitution of identity as the first understanding. Rather, Foreign
Policy serves to reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by
foreign policy and to contain challenges to that identity.
(Campbell, 1990: 271)
Democracy Promotion is the conventional, state-based attempt to build and
support the institutions of liberal democracy beyond conventional domestic
borders. It is the work that the British Council, the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (FCO) and, above all, the Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) undertake in countries like Pakistan when they promote
democracy and good governance. It can be understood to control and contain
threats to democratic countries by building allegiances to the same values and
institutions that ensure – according to Democratic Peace Theory – that
democracies do not fight each other (Russett, 1993: 4).
As Campbell demonstrates, however, a conventional, state-based Foreign
Policy that relies on spatial difference is merely one manifestation of, and
depends on, the much broader range of everyday practices by which the
border between the domestic and the foreign is established and reproduced.
Likewise, democracy promotion can be understood as the practices – including
but much exceeding Democracy Promotion – by which commitment to a
liberal democratic identity is established and threats to it can be understood
as foreign, suspicious and other. As we saw above, these practices are not
primarily concerned with spatial differences, but instead rely on everyday
practices including practices of thought that understand democracy as the
endpoint of a long, teleological history, popularised through the media,
political speech and history lessons.
How is an up-to-date democracy gendered?
This brings us to a question about what an appropriately “up-to-date” form
of democratic life might look like in a plural society and what amendments to
democratically decided laws might, or might not, be democratically proposed. In
the stories above, we saw that contemporary practices of thought tend to require a
commitment to the division between the public and private spheres which
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keeps religious practices private and maintains a public sphere that is under-
stood as the rational, secular and legitimate sphere of democratic law making.
The particular modes of governance that are understood to be civilised
have always been deeply bound up with the proper ordering of gender rela-
tions. As Gayatri Spivak has so influentially pointed out, the archetypal
“civilising mission” has long been decipherable as the process of “white men
saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1987). The Sun newspaper’s
headline in response to the Archbishop of Canterbury – “What a burkha!”
(Pascoe-Watson, 2008) – underlines the fact that civilisation is still thought
about in profoundly gendered terms and much of the concern about shari’ah
law both at the time of the London bombings and the Archbishop’s speech
was articulated around a perceived threat to the contemporary gendered
status quo. Britain, it was suggested, cannot be understood as a civilised place
if the specific rights of its women citizens are abrogated.
We therefore need to ask what precise gender relations are thought to be
civilised and how far they limit the practices associated with conventional
masculinities and femininities. The discourse of violent masculinities and
“imperilled women” associated with Islam and the “war on terror” has been
well documented (Razack, 2004; Abu-Lughod, 2002; Shepherd, 2006), and it
functions to set up as the paragon of civilised behaviours the gendered rela-
tions of the liberal democracies. However, as feminist scholars have suggested,
we need to ask what injustices are perpetuated and naturalised by the set of
“women’s rights” that are enshrined by liberal democracy. The Sun newspaper
helpfully makes this completely visible. Turning the page from its outraged
headline about the Archbishop of Canterbury, one is confronted – as every
day – with a photograph of a half-naked young woman, paraded there purely
for men’s gratification. More on “Page Three” in Chapter 6, but for now we
simply need to note that the position of women in the Western liberal
democracies is not likely to be universally hailed as perfect. Yet externalising
threats to women’s rights and identifying them with foreign, uncivilised cul-
tures that are still back in time, naturalises those hard-won rights that we do
have and asks us to consider ourselves lucky, eliding the possibility that other
ways of living might be thinkable.
However, the practices that constitute being a woman are not fixed and
inevitable. As Judith Butler’s (2006) influential work has made clear, just as
the border between nations is created not through any natural or physical
necessity, but rather through the constant practical assertion and reproduc-
tion of modes of belonging and exclusion, so the border between “male” and
“female” is made up of innumerable, detailed performative practices. This is,
of course, nowhere more evident than it is in the dress code. In Pakistan, as a
woman, it was incumbent upon me, in all modesty, to wear trousers. In the UK,
it was only in the last century that my grandmother’s generation broke with
norms of modesty and won me the right to do so. Indeed, almost none (if
any at all) of the practices that constitute being a woman – the deeds that
constitute the doer, as Butler puts it – are natural or inevitable.
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That being the case, it seems particularly curious that a given set of gen-
dered relations – including implied practical restrictions on the dress code,
especially the veil – is widely represented as intrinsic to a democratic way of
life, rather than a matter of democratic contestation.
Democracy promotion as it currently functions implies a particular resolu-
tion of the world into public and private spheres characteristic of liberalism.
This way of thinking about the world assumes that all people are autono-
mous, rational individuals who associate and cast their vote in the public
sphere. Caring work, religion, emotion and the forms of socialisation that
enable people to perform the culturally contingent roles of men and women
are understood to take place in private and domestic spaces and are therefore
not easily accommodated in the public sphere of democratic engagement, as
the Archbishop of Canterbury found out. Thus women – their roles, practices
and identities – are understood to be already constituted prior to democratic
engagement, so that the main scope for gender in democratic debate is how
the interests that emerge out of those practices can best be served and
accommodated. For example, a debate about how childcare provision can be
managed so that women can join the workforce is rather more common than
a debate about why caring work is considered to be a peculiarly feminine role.
The division between what counts as public and what private is both
incredibly important and pervasive and also extremely porous and fragile. Its
location has shifted considerably through history and continues to be a focus
of intense struggle (Gordon, 1991: 36). This observation, however, does not
make the existence of that division any less important. The discursive repro-
duction of the distinction should not be understood as describing the world
more or less accurately, but rather as enacting a separation that has concrete
effects. Such effects are apparent in the story about the Archbishop, for
example. The latter rightly claims that it is an “unsatisfactory account of
political reality in modern societies” to suggest that “[beyond the uniform
rule of law] all other relations, commitments or protocols of behaviour belong
exclusively to the realm of the private and of individual choice” (Williams,
2008b). However, the accuracy or otherwise of thinking about a clear divide
between the public and the private is less important than the way that this
notional boundary can be used to silence the Archbishop’s intervention. It is
the notional boundary that enables Matthew Parris to argue in The Times, for
instance, that “nowhere is our national discomfort with private laws more
intense, or more justified, than when dealing with religious groupings”
(Parris, 2008). The practices of thought that attempt to confine certain types
of activity to the private sphere and deny their relevance for democratic con-
testation matter because of the way the line can be used to sideline and silence
dissent. Thus matters of disagreement are relegated to a private sphere under-
stood to be beyond the reach of government even as practices of governing
are fully implicated in constructing and maintaining it.
The challenge throughout this book, then, is to show how the borders
between domestic and foreign, feminine and masculine, private and public,
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intersect and interact in order to account for the particular form of democracy
promotion that animates and limits political life.
Genealogy
This book is a genealogy. However, my approach to genealogical research is
somewhat different from most others, and therefore modestly innovative. I
provide an historical account not of an institution or a state of affairs, but
rather of an historical narrative itself. I will discuss my methodological
approach in some detail in Chapter 3, but for now it will be helpful to
orientate the reader by providing an outline.
In his attempts to disrupt and criticise sedimented patterns of thought,
Foucault was engaged throughout his life in the writing of history. Through
looking at history in detail, he suggests, we can see the “accidents, the minute
deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that
continue to exist and have value for us” (Foucault, 1991a: 81), thus enabling
us to see the contingency in what had seemed inevitable, the accidental in
what had seemed natural, the mutability of what had seemed eternal – and,
above all, the hidden power relations in what had seemed neutral. This
approach has been very influential in the study of politics and International
Relations (for example, Der Derian, 1991; Bartelson, 1995; Jackson, 2006;
Hansen, 2006; de Goede, 2005; and many others, as discussed in Miliken,
1999; and Vucetic, 2011), and has helped us understand a variety of practices
and policies – from the Marshall Plan to sovereignty to international
finance – in new ways.
When first working on writing the genealogy of Democracy Promotion,
though, I was deeply struck by how much this set of practices is already
talked about in historical terms. The taken-for-granted “official” history of
Democracy Promotion is a narrative (as I show in more detail in Chapter 3)
that assumes that Britain has been through an unbroken 1,000-year evolution
described above towards the liberal democratic institutions that govern our
lives. This evolutionary narrative implies that all countries should be able to
grow to democratic maturity naturally, but, regrettably, that countries like
Britain are understood to have been complicit in halting that natural evolu-
tion in parts of the world like present-day Pakistan. It was only – according
to this version of history – with the postwar movements for national self-
determination that Pakistan had any opportunity to enter into the normal
course of history and to begin to develop, normal evolution having been sty-
mied by the iniquities of colonialism. Moreover, the Cold War is thought to
have complicated Pakistan’s course through history by allowing short-term
support of dictatorial, but anti-Communist, regimes to crowd out a principled
commitment to allowing history to take its course. The story runs that it was
only by 1989 that it began to be widely understood that liberal democratic
capitalism was the one best way of running human affairs everywhere, at
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which point the moral imperative of allowing and enabling Pakistan to
become thoroughly democratic became irresistible. Thus the civilising, evolu-
tionary, inevitable story of the coming of democracy has come late and been
much hindered in Pakistan, whilst in Britain it has long been part of our
national story.
This much-repeated story of Democracy Promotion offers an intriguing
methodological opportunity in terms of how to select what “moments” to study.
To explain: a genealogy of an institution, a technology or a state of affairs – a
genealogy of the prison, say, or of the practices involved in contemporary
financial markets – would need to select such moments according to their
importance in accounting for the emergence of the institution or practices in
question. For example, moments of heightened debate about practices of
punishment or financial speculation would be sought in order to show how
certain alternatives came to be favoured over others. What is intriguing about
a genealogy of a history, on the other hand, is that the stories we tell of our-
selves already bear within them particular moments that are privileged and
thought of as constitutive of who we are today. The habitual story about
contemporary Britain as the endpoint of a struggle for democracy (along with
the story of its struggling and backward other, Pakistan) contains various such
privileged moments. These include the Age of Reform in the 1830s that seemed
to inaugurate the importance and spread of electoral politics; the beginning
of the age of “development” and decolonisation after the Second World War;
the end of the Cold War with its narrative of a victory for “democracy”; and
the so-called “war on terror” where democracy remains the value to be
defended against an enemy who appears to represent the barbarous, primitive
or medieval past. These are the four moments on which I have focused a
chapter each, as these were the moments signalled by the discourse itself as
constitutive of its own ancestry. I suggest, however, that we need to change
the story. By selecting these moments as the focus of my study, I have been
able to show that they already contain within them ways of narrating history
differently and disrupting the teleological narrative we take for granted.
Teleological narratives have – as it turns out – for a long time been modes
of making sense of and managing an uncertain world and providing a parti-
cular, taken-for-granted set of responses. Ideas about progress and civilisation
first enabled British civil servants in India in the times of Lord Macaulay to
make sense of an uncertain present and decide how to respond by means of
setting up representative institutions. Teleological narratives continued to
provide a frame of reference for understanding a seemingly complex and
relativistic world in 1989, in which history seemed far from having ended,
offering democracy promotion as a solution to the difficult problem of how to
contain new enemies as old ones disappeared.
These narratives may seem to provide useful guides for future action in the
face of present uncertainty, but they are not so helpful as a guide to what
happened in the past. The “evolution” of British history is, as I shall show,
easy to contest. The lack of inevitability or teleology in the detail of history is
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precisely the point, however. Historical research is a very useful mode of
enquiry that shows us, as we will see, not only why we think in teleologies, but
also what the (violent) consequences of teleologies are and how we might
think differently.
Data
As my aim has been to make practices of thought about history and democ-
racy decipherable, I have used a diverse range of sources that show the range
of thought available in British society. This includes the standard resources of
political history: secondary sources, government and parliamentary records,
political speeches, and books written about political issues. These texts are
included not because they describe government policy or political practices of
thought, but because they are involved in producing and reproducing them,
creating the options that are understood to be available. They also bear with
them sets of historically constituted assumptions and beliefs that can be ana-
lysed; therefore broader practices of thought can be ascertained from them.
This is not to say that the concrete practices, technologies and techniques of
democracy promotion can be read off from them in an uncomplicated way:
rather, they are crucial and privileged sites within an ongoing process of
struggle. For example, the privileging of the election as a key technology for
democracy in government policy documents does not tell us whether or not “free
and fair” elections are taking place in targeted countries like Pakistan. It does,
however, enable us to understand the particular rationality at work within
democracy promotion policy, including what counts as democracy and what
practices constitute “freeness” and “fairness”. They are, then, policy in action:
they can be said both to constitute and to be constituted by the discourses and
practices of democracy promotion, and are therefore key pieces of evidence in
an empirical study of such discourses and practices.
However, taking seriously the non-state-based nature of the practices of
thought that constitute identity, I have also worked with a wide range of
sources from what might be called popular culture. Important amongst these
were the newspapers that are understood by democracy promoters to play
such an important role in the list of institutions (a free press) that must be
present for democracy to be meaningful. However, I also examined plays,
cartoons, novels, television programming, films and photographs, discussing
in the pages below those that appeared to me to be most important and
exemplary of the practices of thought I have unearthed in my research.
These sorts of aesthetic representations are important for identity constitu-
tion because they not only exemplify, but also make available to a wide
audience, prevalent practices of thought in concrete ways. They make visible
and reproduce – but are also fully implicated in producing – the sets of choi-
ces and the possible forms of being and behaving that are understood to be
available in contemporary life (Bleiker, 2001). Thus, I suggest, by reading a
newspaper or watching a film, a subject (an ordinary citizen, for instance)
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does not so much see a picture of how others think and behave as understand
what possible modes of thinking and behaviour are available (what practices of
citizenship, how she might reflect on her vote and so forth). Again, then, these
are pieces of important empirical evidence that provide ways of deciphering
the concrete practices of everyday life in non-state-based locations.
Structure of the book
I begin in Chapter 1 by asking what it is that the UK – and by extension
other countries and organisations – do when they attempt to promote
democracy overseas. Starting from a description of the specific practices in
which Democracy Promotion is engaged, I go on to discuss some critiques of
these practices, which helpfully show that democracy promotion is – despite the
best intentions of its practitioners – almost entirely engaged in promoting the
institutions of liberal democracy. However, as the critical literature shows,
given that democracy is one of the most contested concepts in the history of
ideas, much is left out by this conceptualisation of democracy. The really
important question, though, is why democracy promotion’s practitioners are
unable to think differently, or more broadly, about democracy. Using Campbell’s
work on foreign policy, I provide a distinctive answer to that question, show-
ing that it is because commitments to the institutions of liberal democracy are
intrinsic to distinctions between domestic and foreign identities.
Chapter 2 takes up the problem of why and how democracy promotion is
needed. I argue that the difficulties of governing in an uncertain world mean
that knowledge of populations is required in order to manage them: populations
need to be both quantifiable and legible. I discuss the epistemological role of
the familiar representative and deliberative institutions of liberal democracy
to show that they are profoundly useful for the purposes of governing.
Chapter 3 looks in detail at how the narrative of democracy promotion
functions through the logic of temporal othering. It looks in detail at the
stories we tell of ourselves and shows what they are, how they work, why they
matter and what can be done in response. Beginning from the narrative about
an unbroken British history of progress towards democracy and its corollary,
the story of an interrupted and broken path of history in Pakistan, I show
that stories we tell of ourselves are ones about civilisation, development,
modernisation and the benevolent spread of democracy. I examine in parti-
cular detail the “official” history of democracy promotion that I take from
government and policy sources. This enables me to show precisely how it is
that they make possible and legitimise the democracy promotion practices
described in Chapters 1 and 2, by positing a “savage” other who must be
brought up to date, developed or modernised. I next explain my approach to
genealogy in detail. The official narrative consistently divides up the history
of democracy promotion into three distinct periods: first, colonial times, when
colonised countries were understood to have been blocked and denied in their
aspirations to democracy; second, independence in the context of the Cold
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War, when “Western” countries like Britain were sporadic and instrumental in
their support for fledgling democracy in decolonising countries because of
broader geo-political imperatives; and third, the post-Cold War era, in which
democracy is finally understood to be the one best form of governing. I show
how this periodisation intersects with other teleological narratives.
The final and crucial move in this chapter is to discuss Foucault’s Society
Must Be Defended and show how these lectures make my particular and
innovative approach to genealogy possible because of their emphasis on dis-
cerning and disrupting the historical narratives that provide guides to present
action. What we need to do, I propose, is to change the story of how we got
to where we are, and its accompanying assumptions about the nature of time,
in order to help us see better what to do next. Thus, I explain my decision to
engage in detailed historical investigation of precisely the moments that the
democracy promotion discourse points to as its own ancestry: colonial
reform, independence for Pakistan, and the end of the Cold War. It is these
moments that provide the starting points for the subsequent chapters, in
which I show that almost everything we take to be true about the history of
democracy promotion is mistaken, and that other stories are not only possible
and more plausible, but also politically preferable.
Chapter 4 then goes on to focus on the importance of the early colonial
period for the emergence of teleological narratives and their relation to
democracy promotion and identity constitution. It suggests that it was the
encounter with India that profoundly changed, on a number of levels, modes
of thinking about time and the forms of governing that were implied by them.
Modes of governing in the eighteenth century had stressed the organic and
accretive nature of time, in which wisdom was accumulated over the course of
many decades and the main challenge was to preserve it. However, the
uncertainty and epistemological confusion of governing in India made this
mode of governing impractical. In response, James Mill in the early nine-
teenth century proposed a radical break with a past in India that he saw as
barbarous. Macaulay and his contemporaries in India operated with a strange
hybrid of these two ways of thinking, reversing the historical narrative of
accumulated British wisdom in order to project a future for India that would
resemble the British past written forwards. This represented the beginning of
ideas about “progress” and it changed forever not only modes of governing in
India but also democratic practices at home.
Chapter 5 provides a link between the colonial and postcolonial periods in
what is now Pakistan. This chapter shows that the pivotal moment in the
story we tell ourselves about the end of colonial rule can be narrated quite
differently – as a story about continuity, rather than one of ruptural violence,
in which the institutions of liberal democracy are fully implicated in con-
stituting particular forms of national identity. I thus show that although lib-
eral democracy is commonly thought of as a remedy for violence and unequal
power relations, it is never innocent of them. I show that the notional division
between the public and private spheres that first emerged as part of the
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teleological rationality of governing in the early colonial era remains impor-
tant to this day in the creation and management of religious and gendered
identities, thus problematising the notion that decolonisation inaugurated a
new age of democracy and freedom that had been absent in colonial times.
Chapter 6 takes up the story of 1989, which is widely understood in the
democracy promotion literature as the inaugural period of democracy pro-
motion as we know it. However, I tell the story from an unfamiliar angle that
casts doubt on the official narrative. The publication by British writer Salman
Rushdie of an allegedly blasphemous book, The Satanic Verses, led to wide-
spread protests by Muslims around the world, including in Britain. This was a
time of confusion and uncertainty in which Muslims seemed to emerge for
the first time as an enemy, just as the threat of Communism seemed to be
receding. In the face of profound doubt about the future in a time of new and
bewildering threats, a teleological narrative about the end of history emerged
as a useful way of making sense of the contemporary world. I show that
stories about the end of history were less a description of the world in 1989,
than they were a continued means of managing the present and guiding
future action. Practices of temporal othering – through which anyone
opposed to the liberal democratic right to free speech was understood to be
foreign, primitive and despotic – emerged as fully complicit in violent prac-
tices that upheld a narrative of liberal democracy as the only possible future.
The preceding three chapters throw everything about the official history of
democracy promotion into doubt. Chapter 7 shows how the practices of
temporal othering, democracy promotion and teleology that emerge through
the challenge of colonial and postcolonial governance inform responses to the
London bombings, bringing the story back to where we began. I first show
the crude forms of temporal othering demonstrated in the tabloid press at the
time of the London bombings, and how the FCO attempted to disrupt them
with a photographic exhibition, The Art of Integration, which narrated an
alternative British history and a set of constitutive British practices in which
Muslims have long been fully and democratically involved. However, a cri-
tical close analysis of these photographs demonstrates that they are pro-
foundly conservative and complicit in democracy promotion. In the last
section of this final chapter, I offer an alternative way of thinking about how
the contemporary narrative of democracy can be disrupted. I provide a close
reading of Chris Morris’s 2010 film, Four Lions, which I argue provides a
more useful way into thinking about how we might live differently in our
concrete practices of thought.
I conclude by signposting some of the implications of this genealogy. If we
can no longer rely on the unspoken, taken-for-granted history of democracy
that constitutes our national identity, that provides a way of thinking about
our enemies and that offers a programme for the development of those benign
others thought to have been trapped in the past, we may feel that we are at a
loss for something to do. Should we still promote democracy, if democracy
promotion is a practice of inegalitarian power and, frequently, violence? I use
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Romand Coles’s work to suggest that we could make some room for man-
oeuvre by renegotiating the divide between public and private spheres to craft
an intimate and radically ordinary zone of democratic engagement (Hauerwas
and Coles, 2012). This is the sort of work that will take time: precisely the
sort of patient, slow time that is precluded by the teleological temporalities we
have encountered in the official history of democracy promotion. I sketch out
where these possibilities might be found in the multiple, radically ordinary
counter-narratives about history and identity that we encounter in this book,
and I propose that genealogy itself, with its slow, patient unearthing of
counter-narratives, is a crucial tool for thinking about democracy differently
and finding new democratic ways to live.
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1 What is democracy promotion?
– We must all be transparent. That is what we are. We are impartial, transparent,
bores.
– I can’t stop thinking about … voter registration.
– Oh my God, that is the saddest thing I’ve ever heard!
– And when we get bored of being able to vote, bored like Leeds, then we know
we are truly democratic?
(Charman, 2009: 6,46)
These are lines from The Observer, a play byMatt Charman staged in 2009 at the
National Theatre in London. Although fictionalised, it accurately encapsulates
many of the technologies and techniques of Democracy Promotion that are
likewise described by Thomas Carothers (2004: 83–89) in a more academic
description of election observation. A far cry from the drama of “regime change”
or military intervention, most of what we conventionally think about as Democ-
racy Promotion takes place through the humdrum, boring and monotonous
everyday practices and techniques of voter registration, election observation,
polling, statistics and counting. This exists, of course, alongside a plethora of
other technologies that enable and institutionalise particular forms of contesta-
tion, debate, participation, and the exercise of various rights and freedoms. What
they have in common is that they all function not at the idealised level of a noble
struggle for democracy, but rather through the detailed work of, for example,
interpreting statistics or getting to grips with the detail of a participatory budget.
Democracy is presented in the play as a means for distributing power, for
literally putting it into people’s hands in the form of a voting slip (Charman,
2009: 62). This is a parcelling out of power that international democracy
promoters, such as the ubiquitous election observers, merely oversee and in
which they do not personally participate, in keeping with the importance of
neutral and transparent procedures. However, the seemingly mundane and
impartial business of election observation soon turns out, in this story, to be
rather less objective than first thought. Interventions to encourage the regis-
tration of voters in one area and not another, the drawing of boundaries, the
positioning of polling stations, the hours during which voting is permitted
and the declarations and (contested) opinions not only of the election obser-
vers, but also of international journalists, all seem to have the potential to
render dramatic change possible.
As such, the seemingly neutral sets of rules and procedures turn out to have
been produced by a kind of power that exceeds that vested in the voting slip,
and which reproduces it in turn. During the play’s violent denouement, the
Western observation machine is shown to have been complicit in the unfold-
ing of a particular result through the manipulation of rules that exist to offer
neutrality and through the very maintenance of their impartial stance. Per-
haps most tellingly, whereas immense change had seemed possible through
the use of the election, by the end of the play the power relations between the
West and the small developing country, between elites and the poor, between
candidates and voters, seem to have been very little disrupted.
This dramatisation of the techniques of Democracy Promotion is useful
because of the way it stages and problematises five particular ways of thinking
about democracy and democracy promotion that are currently prevalent. First,
that democracy is an uncontroversially good thing. Second, that we know
what democracy is and what institutional form it should take. Third, that
Democracy Promotion needs to take place through the mobilisation of the
aspirations and desires of freely choosing people in target countries. Fourth,
that through the mobilisation of Democracy Promotion overseas, the mundane
and detailed practices of democracy in the Western countries of the democ-
racy promoters will likewise be re-infused with aspiration and desire. Finally,
that democracy promotion will render populations knowable and legible. In this
chapter, I will look a bit more closely at each of these ideas as they relate to
the existing policy and academic literature on democracy promotion.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I provide a summary of the
practices of Democracy Promotion in Pakistan and explain why they matter. In
doing so, I show, in common with other critics of Democracy Promotion, that
these practices are not neutral, but rather deeply implicated in international flows
of power, in particular by narrowing conceptions of democracy down to the
liberal democracy familiar in the West.1 Second, I discuss Milja Kurki’s sugges-
tion that democracy should be promoted “as a contested concept”. Third, I sug-
gest that we need to think carefully about why such a suggestion is unlikely to be
taken up. It is not, I argue, merely a question of policy makers deciding to
think more imaginatively about their methods of Democracy Promotion, as if that
were something they had somehow just forgotten to do. Rather, we need to
question the ways in which Democracy Promotion is deeply bound up in relations
of power that uphold the liberal democratic status quo at home and abroad.
Practices of Democracy Promotion: the power of the ballot paper
As Gayatri Spivak points out, democracy is one of those things that it is
impossible not to want (Spivak, 1995: 158). Whilst it is therefore by no means
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unusual to oppose wars purportedly conducted to install more “democratic”
regimes, it might appear to be in rather bad taste to question the efforts of those
development agencies, embassies and high commissions, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), local authorities and others who are working to
strengthen electoral commissions, ensure that elections are conducted freely
and fairly, combat corruption, support the protection of political and civil
rights, and enable the political participation of women and minority groups.
However, detailed attention should be paid to these practices not least
because of the way that power is mediated through them: a power that is not
only capable, as in The Observer, of manipulating results in a cynical (or
idealistic) way, but also a power that determines what we believe democracy
and freedom are, who has what rights, what forms and practices democracy
shall take and what the consequences will be for the kind of society we live in.
Since the publication of the World Bank’s report on Good Governance and
Development in 1992, the view that good governance is an intrinsic element of
the good and developed life has become increasingly widespread in international
development circles. In the intervening two decades, despite the uncertainties
and disappointments of Democracy Promotion Efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan
and elsewhere (Carothers, 2006; Bridoux and Russell, 2012), there has been
increasing consensus that “good governance” includes, although it is not
restricted to, “democracy” (UNDP, 2002; DFID, 2007b, 2008b). Democ-
racies, the contemporary accepted wisdom suggests, are not only highly
legitimate, but also richer, more competent, stronger, less likely to fight one
another, and their populations are “better educated, more prosperous, heal-
thier and happier” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2007; see also Hobson, 2008:
85–88). McFaul goes as far as to suggest that democracy is “an ideal system
of government” (McFaul, 2004: 148). Democracy, we are compellingly told, is
a “universal value” (Sen, 1999). In keeping with this tide of opinion, the United
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report
2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World concerned itself solely with
making the case for more democratic governance in the developing world
(UNDP, 2002). Democracy is promoted through donor conditionality, project
support, diplomacy and, notoriously, although exceptionally, military force
(McFaul, 2004: 156; UNDP, 2002; DFID, 2007b, 2012b), and a “right” to
democratic governance is proposed in international law (Franck, 1992; Sen,
1999: 5; Hobson, 2008: 85).
Most important for the British context was a Department for International
Development (DFID) White Paper, or policy document, published not long after
the London bombings, which entirely framed its plans for British development
spending in terms of commitments to “better governance” and discussed in
detail the various practices through which this might be achieved (DFID, 2006e,
2007b). This appeared alongside a White Paper from the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (FCO), which included “[s]ustainable development and poverty
reduction underpinned by human rights, democracy and good governance” as
one of nine “strategic priorities” for the UK (FCO, 2006: Chapter 3).
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In Pakistan, in the financial year 2008/09, DFID spent over £24 million, or just
over 20 per cent of their total programme, on “the governance sector” (DFID,
2010). This included by their own account a £12 million tranche of “poverty
reduction budget support”, a direct payment into the Pakistani government’s
budget, which was part of a longer project worth up to £85 million over three
years (DFID, 2006d). This was a very important investment for DFID in
both political and financial terms, contributing significantly to the “doubling
of aid” to Pakistan and signed off personally by the then Prime Minister,
Tony Blair, in 2006 during a visit to Pakistan (BBC, 2006c; DFID, 2008a: 8).
Under David Cameron’s government, DFID has a budget of £220 million to
spend on “government and civil society” (DFID, 2012b) in Pakistan, and the
“top priority” for this money is: “peace, stability and democracy – for exam-
ple, by helping another two million people (half of them women) to vote at
the next general election” (ibid.).
DFID explicitly claims that “[g]overnance is all about the use of power and
authority” (DFID, 2007b: 6). However, theway this claim is formulated betrays the
particular conception of power that is held within democracy promotion policy:
that power is something that people have and exercise (or do not), usually over
others. DFID discusses, for example, “the way power is held, used and pro-
jected in different contexts” and targets particular concern toward “those without
power and influence” (ibid.). Liberal democratic rationality relies on this way of
thinking about power: it is what enables a ballot paper to be thought of as “power
actually in their hands” (Charman, 2009: 62). As such, the task at hand is con-
ceived to be the better, more equitable, distribution of power (DFID, 2007b:
20). It is furthermore important to note that the techniques of democracy pro-
moters are conceptualised as entirely outside these power relations, seeking only
to intervene in the distribution of power, not to exercise that power itself.
This conception of power has much in common with what Foucault influen-
tially named the “repressive hypothesis”, which is to say, the hypothesis that
power mainly functions through exclusions, denials and prohibitions (Fou-
cault, 1981: 10–12). Foucault does not deny that power can and does operate
in this way: in the context of democracy promotion, a Foucauldian can
acknowledge that people are indeed denied resources and freedoms, excluded
from decision making, prohibited from joining political organisations and so
on. The important point for Foucault, though, is that power is much more
interesting, diffuse and productive than this, as we will see.
In the meantime, though, we need to note that DFID is, in the interests of
neutrality, quite explicit that it is not its role to prescribe any one particular set
of institutions or organisations that would constitute democratic governance:
Like all aspects of governance, democratic politics cannot be transplanted
to or imposed on a country from outside. Governance systems have many
different forms, depending on local culture, society and history. It is for
each country to design and implement its own democratic institutions.
(DFID, 2007b: 20)
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Furthermore, they suggest it is important to:
ensure that “governance” initiatives at the country level are based on a
much stronger, deeper and more nuanced understanding of context. This
will mean […] having no preconceptions about the “right sort of insti-
tutions” […] Donors will need to recognise […] different histories and
build on them, and reject simplistic ideas of building institutions that
“look like ours”.
(DFID, 2007b: 69)
The then British Foreign Secretary likewise argued, specifically in relation to
Pakistan, that Muslim countries do not want “a floor-plan for democratic
government” (Miliband, 2009) from the UK, and suggested that “democrati-
zation happens primarily because of local pressures and dynamics” (Mili-
band, 2008), whereas Sue Unsworth, academic and former Chief Governance
Adviser at DFID, talks about the crucial importance of the “local political
environment” and “home-grown ideas” (Unsworth, 2007: 27; and see also,
amongst others UNDP, 2002: 4; Smillie, 2007: 65; Carothers, 2004: 5, 20).
Nevertheless, as other critical scholars have pointed out (Robinson, 1996;
Abrahamsen, 2000; Ayers, 2006; Kurki, 2010, 2013), we regularly see sur-
prisingly specific sets of prescriptions given the emphasis placed on local
context. In the White Paper, DFID suggests that “democratic politics requires
representative institutions to which there are free and fair elections, freedom
of expression, a free media, freedom of association and inclusive citizenship”
(DFID, 2007b: 19). They also emphasise “the rule of law, accountability, fair
representation and effective participation and voice – and a set of values that
recognise individual and collective human rights and freedoms” (ibid.). The
FCO describes “democracy and good political governance” as “fair electoral
processes, effective parliamentary institutions, public participation in decision
making, independent judiciaries, and freedom of expression” (FCO, 2006: 56).
These prescriptions look remarkably like the familiar institutions of liberal
democracy.
Concomitantly, DFID spending on governance in Pakistan was likewise
fully implicated in promoting what are clearly liberal democratic institutions.
The rationale of the £12 million budget support credit (DFID, 2006d) was
not only to put money into the country’s public services contributing to
health, education and the like, but also to ensure that it is the government
itself that spends this money and that it is accountable for it, ideally to its
own people. Thus, although the documentation for this sort of intervention
may appear at first sight to be quite technical – rather than political – and
more interested in the transparency of country accounting systems and the
achievement of quantified Millennium Development Goals, it is an interven-
tion that is deeply concerned with the promotion of particular institutions.
Amongst the highest-level indicators for success for this project is “% of
households satisfied with union councillor contact” (ibid.: 17), as well as other
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public service provision, and one of the four broad areas (or “pillars”) that
legitimates the intervention is its preoccupation with “devolution” (DFID,
2006c: 2). Devolution is important not only because it “demonstrates a com-
mitment to moving spending decisions closer to recipients” (DFID, 2006d: 5),
which implies some form of democratic accountability, but also because at
provincial level the assemblies were, even at that time, elected and provided
some form of democratic legitimacy despite the military government still in
power in Islamabad (DFID, 2006c: 5). It is therefore not surprising that
around a further £5.5 million was spent on supporting provincial government
in the same financial year.
Other projects also reflect that the thrust of DFID’s governance work was
to bolster specifically liberal democratic institutions, not least the £3.5 million
programme to support “free, fair and credible elections in Pakistan” in 2007
(DFID, 2006b). Support for elections provided by DFID comprises mainly
support for the Pakistani Electoral Commission and for international election
observation, with some support for local civil society partially focused on
building capacity for national election observation (DFID, 2006b). Further-
more, a four-year project worth £18 million was funded to strengthen civil
society groups’ ability to make demands to the devolved governments on the
basis that “[c]itizens’ engagement is key to a responsive and accountable
state” (DFID, 2007c; see Kurki 2011, 2013 for more discussion of why civil
society strengthening is a move that is particularly important for liberal
democratic government). On a smaller scale, a two-year DFID-funded project
run by US democracy promoters, the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI), worth £325,611 aimed at “strengthening the
capacity of political parties to engage in local governance” (DFID, 2004). All
of this expenditure takes place alongside smaller-scale FCO projects, which aim
to support the right to freedom of speech and expression. In the detail of the
projects supported, then, there is a thorough-going, although tacit, commitment
to the institutions that together make up liberal democratic governance.
Despite the policy makers’ injunctions to be sensitive to local contexts and
histories, the academic literature, in fact, very widely acknowledges that what
is to be promoted is liberal democracy: “Aid providers know what they would
like to help countries achieve – the Western-style, rule-oriented systems they
know from their own countries” (Carothers, 2004: 136). Samuel Huntington,
in advocating a Schumpeterian, procedural version of democracy, indeed
hails it as a desirable move that the question of what we mean by democracy
appears to have been settled, because in order to promote democracy effec-
tively it is necessary to know what it is: “fuzzy norms do not yield useful
analysis” (Huntington, 1991: 9; Schumpeter, 2010).
The perceived advantage in using this particular conception of democracy
again comes back to the notion that it can arbitrate neutrally between existing
relations of power (Przeworski, 1999; Barro, 1999). Democracy is viewed as a
set of “procedures” that are neutral and objective, that will distribute power
evenly, and can be separated from the substantive decisions that are their
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outcome: Larry Diamond exemplifies such a procedural conception when he
sets out a lengthy set of rules that would constitute a “free and fair election”
(Diamond, 2002). Concrete practices of democracy promotion are informed
by this view, which is why donors invest in technologies such as election
observation and the strengthening of neutral arbiters of process and proce-
dures such as electoral commissions (Hyde, 2011; Carothers, 2004: 83–90).
However, although the election here stands as a particularly powerful symbol
of neutrality in the distribution of power, it is important to note that it is only
one amongst a complex web of different institutions that make up liberal
democracy. The position of the election as the cornerstone of a much broader
set of democratic institutions is set out intriguingly by DFID thus:
A holistic and large programme to support democratic institutions in
Pakistan prior to the 2007 elections represents high risk without corre-
sponding returns. Issues that merit careful and material consideration
such as parliamentary capacity, transparency of political party funds and
operations, and the media’s role in promoting democracy, therefore, while
crucial, cannot be dealt with in the absence of a clear and demonstrable
commitment of sustained democracy from the Government of Pakistan.
The 2007 election is a litmus test of this commitment.
(DFID, 2006a: 7)
In other words, the election is not only the linchpin of the set of institutions
that DFID intends to promote, but is also prior to them, both in the sense that
it must happen first and in the sense that it takes priority. Paradoxically, then,
the very desire for neutrality, based on the repressive hypothesis of power,
which began by stressing the importance of local ideas, practices and tradi-
tions, also leads to a highly restricted vision of what democracy can be, in
which the election both sets up the conditions for, and guarantees, the other
institutions of liberal democracy.
Democratic theorising and power: is liberal democracy neutral?
The criticism of this approach to Democracy Promotion, as Milja Kurki has
pointed out, is that one of the most contested ideas in political theory and
popular imagination– democracy – is narrowed down to a particular set of
concrete practices. Peter Burnell is one of the few mainstream commentators
who does not merely pass over this point (Burnell, 2000: 4; others include
Whitehead, 2002; and Schmitter and Karl, 1996; see also the more detailed
discussion by Kurki, 2010: 369–370; Kurki, 2013; and Hobson and Kurki,
2012). However, despite his suggestion that “greater mass empowerment than
has been commonplace in the West” (Burnell, 2000: 23) might emerge from
taking democratic theorising seriously, he nevertheless ends up dismissing the
possibility that a more radical or participatory conceptualisation of democracy
could be entertained by Democracy Promotion.
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This reticence in engaging with the possibilities of alternative theories of
democracy is defended on the following grounds: “external actors can con-
tribute very little to the development of truly popular or grass-roots democ-
racy anyway” (Burnell, 2000: 4). The logic of this argument is somewhat
curious because, unlike the many accounts of democratisation that fail suffi-
ciently to acknowledge the importance of external actors (see Abrahamsen,
2000: 2–3), Burnell is very clear that “democracy assistance […] could come
close to being essential” (Burnell, 2000: 5) for democratisation under some cir-
cumstances and that “approaching two thirds of currently existing democracies
owe their origins to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from with-
out” (ibid.: 7). In other words, he implicitly suggests that external actors do
successfully intervene, but only when it is liberal democratic theory that animates
them. It seems at least possible that in their suffocating elision of alternative modes
of theorising democracy, they are likewise actively preventing the emergence
of different, perhaps “truly popular or grass-roots”, alternatives.
Burnell suggests furthermore that promoting “untried models” is too
“risky” and that it lies beyond the ability of Democracy Promotion agencies
(Burnell, 2000: 4). The logic here is to imply that the difference between pro-
moting liberal democracy and other potentially democratic forms of govern-
ance is due to the distinction between practice and theory: it is safe, justifiable
and ultimately possible to promoteWestern forms of democracy because they are
known, tried and tested as practice, but beyond this we are in the untrodden
and dangerous terrain of democratic theory. Burnell’s privileging of practice
over theory is problematic for two reasons. First, in countries where Democ-
racy Promotion is advocated, the practices of liberal democracy are arguably
often themselves “untried models” and the risks associated with their imple-
mentation during democratic transitions – even if judged worth taking – have
been well documented and are often catastrophic (Huntington, 1968; Chua,
2004; Kaplan, 2001; Hawksley, 2009). Second, Burnell’s implied dichotomy
allows us to forget that liberal democracy is also entirely underwritten by
theory. Sue Unsworth notes, just for example, that the “implicit model” is
“the reproduction of Weberian norms and democratic political systems as
found in OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]
countries” (Unsworth, 2007: 21). Similarly, Swain et al. (2011) suggest that
Democracy Promotion does, and should, rely on the notion – borrowed from
Robert Dahl – of “polyarchy” (Dahl, 1977; see also Huber, 2015 and Robin-
son, 1996). Democracy as we know it in the West, then, is not an alternative
to the dangers of democratic theorising, but rather a consequence of them.
Not only this, but practices and theories are never separate from one another,
but always in a process of interaction, acting on and constituting the world
and each other as they do.
To understand this last claim in context, we need to return to the idea that
liberal democracy functions using the “repressive hypothesis” of power. Fou-
cault’s essential contribution was to point out that repressive practices are
localised tactics within a broader “general economy” of power that is also,
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and primarily, productive. A Foucauldian approach is sceptical that proce-
dures, “the rules of the game”, and power can be separated out, rather view-
ing procedures as already implicated in the circulation of power. For our
purposes, the procedures – however broadly defined – of, say, a democratic
practice based on “free and fair elections” can be traced to a particular kind
of individualisation which takes human beings as already constituted in their
preferences and interests and amenable to counting and measurement prior to
any democratic engagement. These procedures may, as in Diamond’s account,
institutionalise processes of contestation, but in so doing they also put in
place a particular regime of political and civil rights that likewise stress indi-
viduality above, say, relations of care or the social or economic rights of the
group (Burnell, 2000: 4). As such, then, discourses and forms of expertise (of
individual rights, of counting, of combating electoral fraud) and the ways in
which they intersect with non-discursive practices (the ballot box, recourse to
individual legal redress), taken together, will constitute procedures that pur-
port to be neutral but in fact produce and reproduce a whole way of looking
at the world.
By broadening our conception of power, we can see that Democracy Pro-
motion, far from being outside power relations in an adjudicative role, aiming
only at the better distribution of power that is located in local hands, are
rather fully implicated in the production and maintenance of power relations.
Promoting democracy “as a contested concept”?
As Kurki (2010, 2013) has shown in detail, both the precision of the con-
ceptualisation of democracy at the heart of Democracy Promotion and the
consensus that seems to surround it, are all the more striking considering that
democracy is one of the most contested concepts in the history of political
theory. If we were to take history and context as seriously as the authors cited
in the previous section suggest we should, we must quickly recognise that
there have been many forms and models of rule throughout history that have
been considered “democratic”, not all of which have featured any or all of the
institutions of liberal democracy.
David Held counts at least eight models of democracy that have actually
existed: the Greek city state, the republican tradition of active citizenship,
social democracy, particularly in Scandinavian countries, and forms of “direct
democracy”, often advocated in socialist regimes, are the most immediately
obvious (Held, 1996; see also Hobson, 2008). Kurki (2013) develops in some
detail the argument that alternative models should inform contemporary
democracy promotion policy and furthermore points to theoretical contribu-
tions to democratic theory as other sites of contestability (Kurki, 2010: 373;
Kurki, 2013: Chapters 2–5). These include “participatory” democracy, which
focuses on participation not only in public decision making but also in sites
such as the workplace and civil society (Pateman, 1975); “deliberative”
democracy, which advocates broader inclusion of citizens in democratic
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deliberation and the formulation of institutions and rules that would enable
this to take place in ways that privilege fairness, equality and justice
(Bohman, 2000; Dryzek, 2000); “agonistic” and other relational ideas about
democracy which stress the importance of subject formation and the never-
ending play of power in democratic encounters (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001;
Mouffe, 1999, 2000, 2004; Norval, 2007; Laclau, 2005); and “cosmopolitan”
democracy that takes engagement at a supranational or global level to be a
precondition of democratic life (Held, 1996).
To this I would add the forms of decision making and dispute resolution
that have their own specific and local histories, such as the “jirga” in northern
Pakistan. The jirga is a:
key mechanism of governance […] representatives of affected parties meet
and sit in a circle to “deliberate” and finally decide […] Jirgas deal with
disputes between people, but they also negotiate conflicts about lands and
forests, and represent “the local” in dealings with state officials. Jirgas are
still powerful.
(Geiser, 2012: 713)
My intention in mentioning this form of local governance is not to idealise
the jirga, as if it were some kind of unproblematic alternative, or to suggest
that it is a form of governance that is somehow authentic or untrammelled by
colonial or liberal histories. On the contrary, although the village jirga pre-dates
the British, its history is complex and bound up with British rule (Beattie,
2011: 574; Tripodi, 2009; Sammon, 2008). However, the problem the British
had with working with the jirga was that it was understood to be “extremely
democratic” (Commissioner Derajat Division, quoted in Beattie, 2011: 579),
and therefore unwieldy. It is more than a little strange, therefore, given that
“democracy” is precisely what has come to be valued by British development
practitioners, that the jirga is now entirely absent from official discussions
about the region. These important institutions did not even merit a mention
in DFID’s 2011 “Pakistan Country Governance Analysis” (Coffey Interna-
tional Development, 2011): once considered profoundly democratic, grass-
roots organisations, jirgas are no longer even discussed as part of Pakistan’s
existing postcolonial institutional landscape.
The point here is simply to note that concrete alternative models to the
liberal tradition exist. Furthermore, the differences between them are far from
trivial. Contrary to the idea that liberal democracy offers a set of neutral
procedures that are in principle separable from outcomes, experiments with
deliberative democracy, for example, have shown that changing the institu-
tions and the “rules of the game” may shift the substantive outcome drama-
tically (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003). Yet any alternative imagining of
democracy or democratic institutions – perhaps rooted in local histories, per-
haps imaginatively building on and exceeding them, perhaps borrowing from
theoretical explorations or now-vanished models, probably always a
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combination of these – is ruled out by the insistence of Democracy Promo-
tion on a narrow range of institutions, values and techniques, despite explicit
claims that this is precisely what they do not want to do. For example, when
Sen suggests that the rich argumentative and deliberative traditions of north-
ern India might pave the way for India’s introduction of electoral democracy
(Sen, 2006: 3–16), he assumes that the proper institutional form for continu-
ing this tradition is liberal democratic, rather than considering other modes of
institutionalising deliberation. Similarly, Gilmore and Mosazai describe
modes of local governance in Afghanistan, they are at pain to mention that
“[v]illages elect their representatives to shuras [local councils]”, although
electoral technologies were in fact introduced by donor organisations into
these more traditional fora (Gilmore and Mosazai, 2007: 147). Even when
other models or forms of democracy are mentioned, they are generally not
considered with any seriousness as alternatives to liberal democracy, but rather
as precursors or additions to it: liberal democracy has effectively colonised the
ordinary modes of thinking about democracy.
Where I would depart from Kurki’s account, however, is in a stronger
emphasis on the relations of power that circulate within Democracy Promo-
tion techniques. It is not merely an oversight that democracy is not promoted
as a contested concept. When she puts forward concrete proposals about what
might be done to promote democracy differently, she suggests that this might
be “a lot to ask”, but does not really say why this is, thus failing to uncover
the sedimented relations of power that are involved in upholding liberal
democracy as democracy (Kurki, 2010: 381). The clue, however, might be in
her analysis that a more plural and contextual approach to Democracy Pro-
motion would – by opening up debate on the criteria by which regimes can be
judged as “democratic” – disrupt the “student-teacher relationship between
the West and the rest” (ibid.: 380). In other words, promoting democracy as a
contested concept would imply that we can no longer think of Western
countries like the UK as perfect and uncontested models of how democracy
should be done.
Democracy Promotion and democracy promotion
The Observer nicely depicts the way that desire – experienced as “massive
popular demand for democracy” (DFID, 2007b: 20) – is incited by the drama
and spectacle of people queuing to vote in the rain, hoping for dramatic
change and televised by journalists who – along with election observers – are
“stuck on this seemingly never-ending democracy-sort-of concert tour”
(Charman, 2009: 39; see also Coleman, 2013: 2). Fiona Russell, the election
observer of the play, puts it like this: “there’s nothing like the excitement of an
election night. A first election” (Charman, 2009: 14). As she explains, this
compares favourably with a country in which these liberal democratic prac-
tices have become routine. Liberal democracy – along with the particular
rights and freedoms that go with it – is revalorised and relegitimated on
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television screens in Leeds (ibid.: 62) as well as in polling stations observed by
Western missions. As such, Democracy Promotion can be seen to reinforce
the notion that liberal democracy is the one best way of organising human
affairs.
The link between Democracy Promotion overseas and the maintenance of
liberal democracy at home (conventionally understood) can be understood
through an analysis of Democracy Promotion as just one aspect of what
David Campbell (1990, 1998) calls Foreign Policy. Campbell’s Writing
Security has been hugely important and is still one of the most influential
texts poststructural International Relations. He argues that conventional
Foreign Policy can only take place as a function of a whole range of practices
he calls “foreign policy”, which constitute and enable us to discern what
counts as “foreign” in the first place. Any kind of identity can only be estab-
lished by reference to what it is not. Therefore, it is only by a process of
sorting out that which is “foreign”, or “other”, that identities, such as
national identities, can be derived and maintained, and loyalty to them
demanded.
Since the book came out two decades ago, there has been a great deal of
interest in how the borders between domestic and foreign are produced and
policed, which has created the agenda for a field of work called Critical
Border Studies (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009). Work in this field has
stressed the non-territorial dimension of borders: in other words, the border
between the UK and Pakistan is not located only in the immigration queues
of Heathrow Airport, but in multiple technologies and forms of surveillance
that track, police and assess the risk associated with the movements of bodies,
establishing what, or who, is legitimate or illegitimate, foreign or domestic
(for example Amoore, 2007; Bigo, 2000; Vaughan-Williams, 2008; Basham
and Vaughan-Williams, 2012). Work in this area has provided a much more
nuanced account of what a border is and the different sites in which it is
performed. However, as R.B.J. Walker (2011: 6) has pointed out, the biopo-
litical focus of much of this work – extremely valuable though it is – has not
yet yielded much critical attention towards how the border between the
domestic and the foreign is produced and reproduced in ordinary techniques
of governing “domestic” populations, in non-state-based locations and in the
practices of everyday life and, also, towards the ways that the border between
foreign and domestic intersects with and makes possible other boundaries,
such as those that precariously delimit gender and “race”.
Although Campbell does not use the language of “bordering”, he offers
pertinent examples of how the domestic and the foreign are produced at
multiple sites and as a consequence of multiple exclusions, as well as giving us
a language to think about how practices of Foreign Policy, such as Democ-
racy Promotion, intersect with foreign policy and democracy promotion. As
we saw in the Introduction, above, there is in the UK’s recent history a clear
“othering” process that takes place through the identification of a danger: in
this case, the alien and the dangerous element is frequently the figure of the
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Muslim (often implicitly Pakistani) terrorist: the barbarian. It is also crucial
to note that this enemy is often mobilised through the often-repeated con-
tention that “democracy” and “democratic values” are what is under attack
andwhat is to be defended in the “war on terror” (Carothers, 2004: 1, 63–64, 73).
Thus the enemy of “Britishness” is identical to the enemy of liberal democ-
racy, which constitutes democracy itself as the intrinsic element of Britishness
that must be defended and to which loyalty is required in order to demon-
strate and qualify for belonging. Finally, the precise mode by which this
othering takes place is a temporal one, which legitimates democracy as an
intrinsic part of Britishness because threats against democracy, internal and
external, have been struggled against through history, constituting the British
people in opposition to them.
More on history in Chapter 3. First, though, let us see how the othering
discourse relates to democracy promotion in practice. Tony Blair, for exam-
ple, regularly spoke of “terrorism” as the opposite of “democracy”, describing
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as “a struggle between democracy and
violence” and talking about “each revolting terrorist barbarity, each reverse
for the forces of democracy”. He furthermore reminded us that Mohammed
Sidique Khan, one of the London bombers, was “free to speak out, free to
vote” and dismissed the latter’s professed anger at UK foreign policy by sug-
gesting: “let Iraqi or Afghan Muslims decide whether to be angry or not by
ballot” (Blair, 2006).
Tony Blair exteriorised the problem of home-grown terrorism and legiti-
mated ongoing intervention in Pakistan by suggesting that the bombings have
made it clear that, “[w]hat happens today in Pakistan matters on the streets of
Britain” (Blair, 2007b). This feeds into the government’s cross-departmental
“Prevent” agenda, which casts one of the causes of “radicalisation” as “poor
governance” (FCO, 2006: 29) overseas, to be tackled in part, as we have seen,
by Democracy Promotion by DFID through its agenda on “good govern-
ance” (DFID, 2006e: particularly 38–40; DFID, 2007b), and the FCO’s
mandate – notably particularly for the “Muslim world” – to “[e]ncourage the
spread of democracy and good political governance” (FCO, 2006: 56).
It should be emphasised, then, that democracy can here be understood to
be promoted according to our two understandings of Foreign Policy/foreign
policy. On the one hand, a construction of “democracy” as the opposite of
“barbarism”, legitimates the Democracy Promotion overseas in the, by now
familiar, terms of liberal democracy. On the other hand, the construction of a
British identity as the opposite of a threat to democracy, enables the articu-
lation of a narrative with a strong positive content about what it means to be
British, characterised as being “free to speak out, free to vote”. The freely
choosing subjects implied by a liberal democratic paradigm have the option
to participate fully in the democratic practices of Britishness. This is an
othering that is temporal, rather than spatial, and associated with the familiar
teleologies of development, in which danger can be averted by developing,
democratising, civilising, modernising, progressing and coming up to date.
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I therefore argue that foreign policy in the contemporary UK is in practice
concerned with upholding liberal democratic values through a process of
othering that equates participation in liberal democracy with the self, or the
acceptable practice of loyalty to a British identity, and lack of democracy
with the external, the uncivilised and the foreign. In consequence, it should
now be clear that it is possible to refer to Democracy Promotion as a sub-
category of Foreign Policy – that is, as the state-based and externally focused
process of reproducing a liberal democratic identity and containing challenges
to it. As this discussion should now also have made clear, however, we also
need to be mindful of the modes of democracy promotion that are not
directly state based, and which may take place within conventional borders:
the everyday practices of shoring up liberal democracy as a way of life and a
mode of identification.
It is interesting to note that, even speaking from within the mainstream
Democracy Promotion literature, Laurence Whitehead was able quite clearly to
acknowledge this constitutive identity-based logic of Foreign Policy before 1989:
The simplest and most fundamental motive for the promotion of
democracy is to extend to foreigners the benefit of a system that is valued
at home. Citizens of established liberal democracies readily believe in the
superiority – both moral and practical – of their own form of govern-
ment, and most would find it hard to doubt that the world would be a
safer and happier place if it were generalised.
(Whitehead, 1986: 10)
Whilst acknowledging that citizens of the Soviet Union or Iran might, at the
time, feel much the same about their own systems, he suggests that Democ-
racy Promotion “should be interpreted first and foremost as affirmation […]
of internal legitimacy” (Whitehead, 1986: 10).
However, what in Whitehead’s 1986 account had been “established liberal
democracies” are now characterised simply as “established democracies”
(Carothers, 2004: 4). Likewise, Swain et al. (2011: 3) suggest that “the defini-
tion of democracy is often contested in transitory countries”, implying that
such questions in Western countries are now settled and closed. Maureen
O’Neil, former Chair of the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development, suggests that there has been an “internationalization of the
concepts underpinning developed countries’ national experiences of redis-
tribution, economic development and law-making” (O’Neil, 2007: viii). This
generalises the particular “national experiences” of developed countries in a
way mirrored by DFID, which suggests that “[t]he democratic institutions we
have in the UK took centuries to evolve” (DFID, 2007b: 20). By positing the
institutions of the West as an endpoint, they are established as the only, nat-
ural and inevitable consequence of a process of democratisation: whilst noting
the temporality implicit in this, the point for now is that this appears to put
them beyond question. As such, when Carothers suggests that “for elections
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to gain international credibility, certain procedures must be followed”, the
logic of this is to legitimate, and make credible, the procedures followed in
Leeds as much as in Islamabad (Carothers, 2004: 86).
As April Biccum has pointed out, DFID has explicitly attempted to pro-
mote a particular sort of British citizen in the UK citizenship programme in
schools, with their Developments magazine and through their engagement
with UK-based international NGOs. She demonstrates the thrust of this work
is to promote quiescence in a liberal order of global governance, which has
tended to co-opt even the most seemingly radical of social movements, as the
organised spectacle surrounding the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005
“amounted to a stage-managed legitimizing of democratic representation,
lobbying and debate” (Biccum, 2007: 1111–1126). If consent for the good
governance agenda in development agreed at Gleneagles was the Democracy
Promotion element of the event (DFID, 2006e: 12), democracy promotion
occurs at the level of the individual British citizen and her commitment to the
rituals of democracy and citizenship through her acts of lobbying, protesting
and so on. Indeed, at the G8 protests in 2005 – just after the London
bombings – the discourse of civilisation and the barbarian could not be more
evident: Tony Blair condemned “[the] savagery [of the terrorists] designed to
cover all conventional politics in darkness, to overwhelm the dignity of
democracy and proper process” (BBC, 2005a). Once again, at home as over-
seas, democracy is promoted through glorification and othering, at the same
time that it is reduced to a “process”, a set of procedures that are held up as
the one right way to do politics.
It is again Peter Burnell who demonstrates some subtlety in discerning the
power relationship here: viewed from the “alternative standpoints” of those
who would theorise about democracy rather than join the liberal democratic
consensus, “fundamental reforms applied not least to the western liberal
democracies themselves would follow as a principal recommendation” (Bur-
nell, 2000: 23) of promoting democracy as a contested concept. Disrupting
Democracy Promotion, then, by introducing alternative conceptualisations of
democracy, would destabilise democracy promotion and the very edifice of
liberal democratic identity that forms a crucial part of domestic, Western
national identities. This is not a price that is likely to be paid easily and
without considerable struggle.
Working at the frontiers
In this chapter I have sought to show that Democracy Promotion is a set of
practices and procedures that is far from being neutral and free from the
effects of power, as is claimed. Rather, it is deeply implicated in the productive
power relations that enable the constitution of particular subjectivities, selves
and others. I have also shown that Democracy Promotion is intimately linked
to the practices of democracy promotion, which at various sites in society
discursively constitute a domestic identity by reference to what is seen to be
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threatening it: Pakistan is an important “other” in this process, by standing in
as a site of identification for those “others”, such as Mohammed Sidique
Khan, who are understood to have rejected and to be violently opposed to
democracy. As such, UK Democracy Promotion is mobilised in the service of
eliminating and containing threats to the liberal democratic British identity
that is promoted at home, not least through the spectacle of Democracy
Promotion itself. In this way, dangers to democracy can be exteriorised: this
process of exteriorisation is both the discursive means of promoting democ-
racy at home, by offering democracy as a redemptive, temporal narrative and
a set of rituals by which Britishness can be affirmed and demonstrated, and
the legitimation for ongoing Democracy Promotion in Pakistan.
Identity, then, is not something we can take for granted: rather we see a
constant, vigilant, detailed practice of building the distinction between who
may belong and who may be excluded from a community, enabling us to
understand what is expected of us in practical terms. The same, it seems, can
be applied to democracy, which cannot be taken as a given, a simple good, a
universal value, but rather as an edifice that is constantly under construction
and never innocent of power. However, as Foucault puts it:
We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond
the inside-outside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism
indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting on limits.
(Foucault, 1991e: 45)
I have suggested here that in the contemporary UK, the frontiers of national
identity and the limits of what counts as democracy are intimately linked and
mutually constituted, and it is at this intersection that we therefore need to
focus our reflections. That being the case, if we believe that democratic sub-
jectivity might be differently constituted, we will need to think not only about
what the limits of democratic identity currently are, but also why, for whom
and for what purposes democracy is useful. These are the questions that will
be taken up in the next chapter.
Note
1 Kurki (2013) rightly discusses the fact that “liberalism” and “liberal democracy”
are not always and everywhere the same thing, but are much debated and contested
ideas. Her patient teasing out of the range and variation in democracy promotion
practice is heroic and much to be welcomed as it shows the possibilities for change
within the status quo. There is no need to repeat that work here: I agree both with
her analysis of the variation within liberal thought and with her contention that
there is much that unites ideas about “liberal democracy” and that taken together
liberal democratic ideas have been overwhelmingly influential for Democracy
Promotion.
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2 Democratic representation
The cartoon in Figure 2.1 appeared in the respected and serious daily news-
paper The Financial Times on the eve of Pakistan’s general elections in Feb-
ruary 2008: elections that were to inaugurate democratic rule for the first time
since the military coup led by General Musharraf in 1999. It sums up rather
elegantly the ways in which Pakistan is quite often represented in the British
media. The unseemly, highly masculine and incipiently violent struggle this
cartoon suggests is a far cry from a benevolent picture of democracy as a
universal value. Democracy in Pakistan is a problem.
Whilst the regularly anti-democratic military, with their haphazardly aimed
nuclear weapons, is clearly pinpointed as significantly to blame, it is their
disunited opposition, the squabbling politicians and disengaged, outward
Figure 2.1 Why politics will not fix Pakistan
Source: The Financial Times, 19 February 2008: 6. Ingram Pinn/Financial Times 2008.
Used under licence from the Financial Times. All Rights Reserved.
(backward?) facing Mullah (the only representative of what liberal democratic
discourse might call “civil society”), that are particularly relevant here. Power
politics are standing in the way of progress and development: the imagined
marginalisation of real developmental needs by politics is signalled by the
small boys in school uniforms, being pushed out of the picture/off the edge of
a splintering country. There are no women anywhere to be seen.
Above all, the basic requirement of liberal democracy – that there is a
division of a particular and important kind between the public and private
spheres – appears to be missing here. Thus the irrational passions of ambition and
anger, the religious spokesman and allegiances to particularistic regional, kinship
or sectarian identities should – for the proper functioning of liberal democracy – be
firmly excluded from the rational public sphere. Meanwhile, the issues that
should be represented in the public, such as the proper role of government in
education or the needs and interests of women (as their identities are already con-
stituted in the private domain of family life) are crowded out and remain unrepre-
sented. Whole swaths of the population, made up of individual voters, are unable
to speak for or represent themselves because they cannot shout loudly enough.
This cartoon is also part of a more generalised discourse that suggests that
Pakistan is “the most dangerous country in the world”. The front page of the
internationalist and left-leaning New Statesman magazine in 2010 depicts the
Pakistani flag in the shape of a bomb with the fuse lit (New Statesman, 2010),
which is emblematic of the 282 articles in national British newspapers
between 2005 and 2008 that refer to Pakistan precisely as “the most danger-
ous” country. (A broader search on “Pakistan” and “danger” yields nearly
2,000 articles during the same period.) In an editorial in the Pakistani Friday
Times, Najam Sethi (2012b) named the top ten bestselling English-language
books on Pakistan, which all had names like Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis
State or Pakistan: Playing with Fire or The Unravelling: Pakistan in the Age
of Jihad, to name but the first three. Every single book title participated in a
whole system of representations which constructs Pakistan as “other”, threa-
tening, perilous, intersecting with the notion that Pakistan is the place where
terrorist ideologies “are born” and which hosts and trains young British men
who are intent on causing death and destruction in the UK.
Intimately intertwined with this discourse of Pakistan as a very dangerous
place is the notion that Pakistan constitutes a profound epistemological pro-
blem. Pakistan is dangerous because it is chaotic: it cannot be properly
known and is therefore intractable to being managed. It is this threatening
unknowability that informs a later New Statesman cover (New Statesman,
2011), this time depicting a shadowy general looking through binoculars, one
lens of which shows a US flag and the other Osama bin Laden. The trouble
with Pakistan, it is implied, is that its inscrutable “double game” makes it
impossible to understand. It is not the struggle between military and civilian
governance, its Islamic and sometimes conservative cultural heritage, nor even
its nuclear weapons that cause the most unease (other countries share such
features); it is the uncertainty it provokes that causes most consternation.
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Indeed, the New York Review of Books even suggests that the key role of
Pakistani novelists writing in English is to “assume the burden of representing
their country to the world” and making it comprehensible to the Western
reader (Mishra, 2011: 37).
In suggesting that politics can’t “fix” Pakistan the cartoon is elaborating
two related points that run through the discourse of Pakistan as a dangerous
and unknowable place. First, democracy in Pakistan is not democracy as we
know it. There is no sense, here, that power is evenly distributed amongst
already constituted individuals. How could anyone be “free to speak out, free
to vote” in this chaotic landscape, where the public and the private spheres
are so woefully undelimited? How can interests be aggregated and voices be
exercised when there is no possibility of free association, when half the
population is nowhere to be seen, when the provision of public services is less
of an election issue than the more properly private matters of allegiance to
tribe, or region, or slogan? This might be politics, but it is not really democ-
racy in the way understood by Amartya Sen when he describes democracy as
a universal value.
Second, and of particular interest for this chapter, because of these defi-
ciencies in the political landscape of Pakistan, democracy is inadequate to the
task of knowing the country and its population. If they cannot be adequately
counted and thereby represented in a separate public sphere, how can
women’s needs and rights be fulfilled and protected by the legislature? If power is
not distributed equally, put directly into the hands of the people, how can devel-
opment priorities be established and public services provided? If the popula-
tion cannot be known through the usual democratic institutions of the free
vote and the free press, unencumbered by the power relations of the private,
domestic sphere, how will the elected government know what to do at all?
I want to suggest that this set of epistemological uncertainties are precisely
what Democracy Promotion in Pakistan is attempting to manage and control.
As the Department for International Development (DFID) put it, also
shortly before the 2008 elections: “A free and fair election will provide Paki-
stan with […] political stability and international credibility” (DFID, 2006a).
I suggest that the attempt to stabilise Pakistan is envisaged to function through
an attempt to make it knowable and thereby domesticate it, rendering it less
dangerous and irredeemably foreign: in other words, Pakistan needs to be
better represented. This is where Democracy Promotion becomes most useful:
democratic institutions – both electoral and deliberative – function as a useful
set of practices that offer to render the unknown quantifiable and legible.
To show how Democracy Promotion functions in this way, I focus on the
institutions that liberal democracy provides and ask how they intersect with
Foucault’s account of the form of rule known as “liberal governmentality”. I
show how democracy functions as a useful set of practices that enable gov-
ernmental rule. This will entail demonstrating how it enables populations to
be known and individual subjects to be constituted and managed within its
ambit. I will begin by discussing Foucault’s ideas about governmentality as
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they relate to democratic institutions in the abstract, and then relate this
understanding to the micro-practices of Democracy Promotion.
How does liberal democracy produce knowledge?
I want to suggest that democracy produces freely choosing subjects who can
vote and otherwise represent their interests so that those interests can be
known. This is an argument that is heavily influenced by Michel Foucault’s
work on governmentality, although it makes a number of leaps about the role
that the institutions of liberal democracy specifically play in contemporary
governmental regimes. Although Foucault is explicit in Discipline and Punish
about the role that parliamentary representative regimes play in the constitu-
tion and reproduction of power in industrial societies (Foucault, 1991f: 222),
he wrote relatively little about the specific institutions of liberal democracy
and he pays more attention in his later works to ancient democracy (Sawyer,
2016). Nevertheless, I suggest here that it is possible to use his work on power
and governmentality to develop important insights about the epistemological
role of liberal democratic institutions.
It is useful at the outset to make a distinction between the related concepts
of “government”, “governance” and “governmentality”. For the sake of
clarity, I shall follow the distinction made implicitly by DFID between “gov-
ernment” and “governance”, although Foucault refers throughout to “gov-
ernment” to cover both meanings and denote the intimate interconnections
between them.1 However, as my concern is with the conditions of possibility
of contemporary British democracy promotion, I will use and analyse the
terminology employed by British state agencies, including the government,
wherein the former is understood as the government of a country: the indivi-
duals and/or the political parties that people the ubiquitous executive and
ministerial institutions of the modern state, including the offices of government
ministers, Prime Minister and/or President.
Governance, by contrast, is much more broadly defined: “Governance is
about power and authority and how a country manages its affairs” (DFID,
2007b). This takes in a much broader range of actors: “governance works at
all levels in society: from the state down to household level […] governance is
about people and their relationship with the state […] the formal and infor-
mal rules that determine the way things are done”. As such, governance
might be understood as the “conduct of conduct” within a given society
(Foucault, 2007: 193). Importantly it is good governance that is the focus of
DFID’s interventions, and democratic politics is viewed as the “best framework”
for achieving it (DFID, 2007b: 3).
Foucault describes the operation of “sovereignty” as a highly constrained
form of power which is mainly “deductive” in its operations: that is to say,
the sovereign had the right to collect taxes, demand time and services, and the
ultimate “right to decide life and death” (Foucault, 1981: 135). By contrast,
with the emergence of the Industrial Revolution, Foucault points to the growing
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importance of alternative forms of power, which work alongside sovereignty.
These are no longer purely repressive or deductive, but rather they work to:
“incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise and organise the forces under it: a
power bent on generating forces, making them grow and ordering them” (ibid.:
136). The “disciplinary” modes of such power are explored in Discipline and
Punish, which looks in detail at the ways in which the micro-techniques of
measuring, examining and surveillance all allow for the production of “docile
bodies” (Foucault, 1991f: 135–170). One crucial technique at the disposal of
disciplinary power is the establishment, through individual measurement and
examination and broader statistical techniques, of the “norm”. This has a
double purpose, not only rendering the differences between individuals useful,
“by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties”
(ibid.: 184), but also by exhorting conformity to the norm (ibid.: 181–182).
“Governmentality” is a concept that appears particularly in Foucault’s
1977–78 and 1978–79 lecture series (Foucault 2007, 2008). It refers to the
systematic ways of thinking, or what Foucault calls “rationalities”, that make the
“conduct of conduct” possible in the contemporary world, as well as the tech-
nologies and techniques through which governance operates (Dean, 2010: 40–41).
Governmentality shares with disciplinary power a concern for “fostering life”
and putting it to use, as differentiated from the sovereign power to take life
(Foucault, 1981: 138). However, governmentality can be understood as dis-
tinct from discipline in important respects. If disciplinary power works at the
level of the individual, the “governmentality” lectures and the first volume of
The History of Sexuality stress the ways in which discipline has been joined to
a “bio-politics of the population” (ibid.: 139). The micro-practices that con-
stituted and regulated the individual in the classroom, the drill ground or the
prison, do not cease to proliferate, but for the purposes of governance, “the
multiplicity of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is” (Foucault,
2007: 42). Furthermore, and notably, along with the level of the population,
what will be important is:
a different level, that of the series, the multiplicity of individuals, who will
not be pertinent, or rather who will only be pertinent to the extent that,
properly managed, maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible
what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent.
(Foucault, 2007: 42)
For our purposes, two key consequences follow from this important insight.
First, population is constituted as a level of intervention and concern.
Whereas nothing escapes the panoptical attention of disciplinary power, gov-
ernmentality is concerned rather with the broad consequences of individual
practices: “the big picture.”
To give an example, the election observers in Charman’s play, The Observer,
discussed in Chapter 1, are not required to take note of coercion at the
micro-level:
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If thirty-two were coerced […] Does it have an effect on the outcome?
Palpably I mean […] If we report things that don’t affect the outcome of
this election then we’re not helping anyone get a clear picture.
(Charman, 2009: 33)
Second, whereas discipline concerned the management, control and optimi-
sation of the body’s capacities as a “machine” (Foucault, 1981: 139), govern-
mentality operates rather as a function of individual freedom (Foucault, 2007:
48–49). The aggregate actions and choices of freely acting and choosing
individuals are what must be “managed, maintained, and encouraged” for the
optimum outcome for the population as a whole. Thus, provided that coer-
cion is negligible, the voting subject acts freely and makes a choice. The
question then is how the voter can be maintained in her identity as a voter
and how she can be managed and encouraged to act responsibly in the exer-
cise of her choice, through the incitement and mobilisation of her aspirations
and desires.
Techniques regarding the “norm” remain important but they are also to be
understood differently under regimes of discipline and governmentality,
respectively. Discipline is constructivist in that it takes a desirable outcome as
the “norm”, asking what particular people, techniques or specialisms would be
best for performing a particular task and then directed training and exam-
ination at a minute level of individuals in order finally to establish and separate
those who are incapable from those who are normal (Foucault, 2007: 57). A
disciplinary regime, therefore, might concern itself with the most efficient
means of registering a democratic choice, with the best technologies of
designing a voting system, a ballot paper, the processing of individuals
through a polling station. It would also divide those entitled to vote from the
abnormal categories who are deemed incapable or are otherwise disallowed.
On the other hand, a governmentality regime is more concerned with ren-
dering calculable a reality that is understood to be external to itself and quasi-
natural. It does not concern itself with establishing a norm, but rather with
discovering it, rendering it visible and amenable to manipulation. This is
achieved through “an interplay of differential normalities”, in which certain
distributions, once measured, can be considered more favourable than the
others, which are then, in turn, to be brought into alignment with it (Fou-
cault, 2007: 63). A governmentality regime, therefore, might assess voter
registration figures in different areas and attempt to bring the norm in more
disenfranchised areas into line with the general norm, whilst always assuming
that the choices and interests of voters are already fully formed and with the
right techniques can be made representable through the electoral process. In
short, whilst sovereignty might be said to prohibit and discipline to prescribe,
governmentality is rather a form of power that regulates, that is, maintains
the proper arrangement and analysis of what is understood as a concrete,
external, fully formed reality that is not tractable to decree, but rather can be
known, managed, channelled and put to work.
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As the above examples might suggest, none of this is to suggest that the
rationalities characterised by either sovereignty or discipline have been abol-
ished by governmentality (Foucault, 2007: 107). Rather, they exist alongside it
and are transformed and re-inscribed by it. The specific configurations of
these forms of power in different times and places, the ways in which they
operate and interact, the modes of ongoing transformation and re-inscription
that they undergo, are all a matter of empirical investigation. I will therefore
turn next to the specific configuration of liberal democracy to discuss how
contemporary democratic practice is informed by governmentality.
Governmentality and liberal democracy
The history of governmentality is intimately linked with the history of both
liberalism and liberal democracy, with its emphasis on electoralism. As Fou-
cault (2008: 321) points out, there is nothing inevitable about the historical
conjunction of liberalism, electoralism and democracy. It is also worth noting
that there are myriad different forms that the connections between liberalism
and democracy can take (Kurki, 2013: Chapter 2). We therefore need to
explore the way in which a specific articulation of liberalism and democracy
is enabled in contemporary governmental regimes and the important con-
sequences this has had for the way democratic institutions can be imagined by
democracy promoters.
According to Foucault, the emergence of liberalism as a rationality
accompanies the discovery of a way of thinking about the economy, which is
for the first time understood as a quasi-natural realm that aggregates indivi-
dual decisions within the realm of the market and which it is the primary job
of the state to manage and control. This discovery emerges alongside the
invention of statistics as a technology of the state that can measure and make
visible the population, providing information about how decisions at the indi-
vidual level are aggregated that can then be put to further use to optimise
outcomes (Foucault, 2007: 87–110).
With the development of the population as a level of analysis and the
means to make it knowable (legible, calculable and analysable), the correlative
objective of governance is: “to improve the condition of the population, to
increase its wealth, its longevity and its health” (ibid.: 105). Liberal democ-
racy is a rational means of organising government within liberalism, analysed
as a way of thinking, with its emphasis on the individual: “the rationality of
the governed must serve as the regulating principle for the rationality of gov-
ernment” (Foucault, 2008: 312). Although Foucault does not focus on the
technologies of democratic rule, it is nevertheless against this backdrop that
the calculative technologies of electoral democracy are developed. The indi-
vidual – conceptualised as independent and autonomous, with interests and
needs that are fully transparent, knowable and representable by a simple cross
on the ballot paper – is enshrined as the basic principle, and unit, of
legitimate government (Dean, 2010: 143; Coleman, 2013: 28–33).
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Above all, the election – this simple, quantitative means of obtaining
information about the interests and preferences of individuals in a way that
can be aggregated at the level of the population – is useful. Foucault suggests
that, “participation of the governed in the drawing up of the law in a parlia-
mentary system is the most effective system of government economy” (Fou-
cault, 2008: 321). It provides the means, along with other statistical
techniques, particularly opinion polling, and the burgeoning concomitant
expertise that goes with it, of determining the various distributions of norms,
the various needs, desires and interests of the electorate, the better to manage
them. It also constitutes identities: constructing the electorate as a population
amenable to measurement and enjoining the individuals within it to consider
themselves as voters and citizens, to reflect upon their vote and exercise it
freely and responsibly. If it is the role of governance to manage the affairs of a
country in order to ensure citizens’ flourishing and prosperity, the election
provides both the information and legitimacy to pursue this end.
It may be tempting to join Fiona Russell in The Observer and remark the
never-ending failure of the election – “[n]othing changes” (Charman, 2009: 61) –
rather as Foucault points out the “perpetual failure” of the prison (Foucault,
1991f: 264). Those hoping for really radical change are indeed, it seems, des-
tined to be disappointed by the technology of the election, because of the
limitation and regulation of participation that is written into its very design.
Nevertheless, the democratisation of state sovereignty has had concrete con-
sequences, many of which are part of the explicit programme of those who
recommend liberal (or social) democracy (Sen, 1999, just for example), in
terms of the opening up of space to make and meet “social” demands to
foster life, for health care and education, poverty reduction and generation of
economic growth, environmental projects and the protection of natural and
cultural heritages, to name but a few.
It is important to understand, for my purposes, however, that this space is
opened up as the result of a specific history and in the service of particular
rationalities and power relations. This concerns not least the creation and
always vigilant maintenance of – and constant struggle over – the separation
between what counts as “public” and contestable, and what is considered
“private” and (in theory) beyond the sphere of governmental intervention. If
the basic problem of liberalism is to draw the balance between “governing too
much and governing too little” (Dean, 2010: 144), then the participation of
individuals in the exercise of sovereignty provides an elegant solution to this
problem by displacing the problem back onto the individuals from whose
autonomy and rights it originates. A particular institutional design is implied
by liberalism, for if government is understood as something to be limited,
then participation must also be regulated and limited. This is achieved
through institutions, which include representative, rather than more broadly
participatory, mechanisms, a separation of powers, the independence of the
police and judiciary, freedom of speech, and the broader principle of the “rule
of law”, understood to apply to all equally and in theory neutrally. This is
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why liberal democracy is understood as more than merely electoral democ-
racy, despite the undeniable importance of elections: a whole range of tech-
nologies is inextricably united in producing and reproducing the citizen, the
electorate, the law and the government.
Democracy promotion, governmentality, power
In Chapter 1, I discussed how the conception of power frequently used in
Democracy Promotion has much in common with what Foucault influentially
named the “repressive hypothesis”, which is to say, the hypothesis that power
mainly functions through exclusions, denials and prohibitions (Foucault,
1981: 10–12). Democracy Promotion relies on being considered neutral: the
premise is that democracy will distribute power evenly, but democracy pro-
moters are not understood to exercise power over anyone. The assumption of
neutrality means that the productive flows of power that are intrinsic to Democ-
racy Promotion are not seen and not questioned. However, governmentality is
a web of productive power.
Let us begin with the election. The importance and centrality of elections
as a democratic practice is not, as we have seen, much questioned in the lit-
erature. Its function as a governmental technology is signalled by Carothers,
who suggests that the main reason for putting significant emphasis on the
election, rather than other democratic practices, is not only its symbolic value,
but also because it is “the best way of concentrating the energies and atten-
tion of a society in transition […] toward a broad, participatory act of poli-
tical self-determination” (Carothers, 2004: 15). In other words, an election is
what enables, and requires, individuals to reflect upon their vote and make a
free choice: they are moulded as subjects through this technology.
DFID justify their financial support to the elections in Pakistan in exactly
the following terms:
Research and monitoring on electoral behaviour will promote an
improved understanding of social and poverty issues that influence voting
behaviour thus enriching the policy dialogue.
(DFID, 2006a: 9)
Thus the voting population is understood to be calculable and knowable
through its electoral behaviour, in ways that are useful for government in its
crucial role of fostering life. Furthermore, “special initiatives [will] address
knowledge/information gaps that lead to lack of electoral participation
among marginalised groups” (DFID, 2006a: 9). In other words, those voters
who are unable to reflect freely and responsibly on their vote – probably
because they are illiterate, or isolated because of social status (ibid.: 9) – need
to be enabled to do so. This is viewed as a straightforward matter of provid-
ing “knowledge/information”, which in principle is objective and can freely be
reflected on by voters themselves.
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Furthermore, the election (along with rights to free expression and asso-
ciation, which I will discuss below) constitutes a public sphere in which these
choices can all be made visible and representable. The aggregate counting of
ballots then enables the overall sum total of individuals reflecting on their
vote to be understood more broadly, so that a government can not only be
inaugurated but also that it might, because of the participation of the electors,
know what it legitimately ought to do.
This process of rendering a population visible and knowable occurs not
only at the level of the country holding the election, but is also implicated in
larger, international flows of power. Susan Hyde notes that the ubiquity of the
international election observer has developed into a mode of “signalling”
(Hyde, 2011). Whether or not a given election is “free and fair”, there is a
general expectation that the election will be held and that it will be inter-
nationally observed. In a world in which there are significant rewards for
holding democratic elections in terms of aid, investment, trade and member-
ship of international organisations, there is a strong incentive to “signal” this
in credible ways, particularly through the practice of election observation
(ibid.: 9). Without this form of international visibility, there is an assumption
that the election was not valid, which means that even elections which are less
than “free and fair” are more likely to be observed, so as to maximise the
potential benefits from holding them in the first place. Hyde argues that
although the “signals may not be perfectly informative”, refusing to send the
signal itself becomes a source of relevant information, whereas the practice of
observation itself generates reports which bring yet more information
(ibid.: 12). The important thing to note here is that the election becomes part
of a broader system of inscription and power, in which the competitive logic
of international governance requires states to compete against one another for
aid and other benefits by making their own performance – against externally
defined targets – visible and calculable (Gould, 2005: 10).
This signalling functions alongside a whole industry of “country govern-
ance analyses” which aim to know in minute detail a whole range of infor-
mation about how political and economic affairs are managed in countries,
well beyond merely analysis of electoral practices (Unsworth, 2007: 32;
DFID, 2007a; for Pakistan’s own country governance analysis, see Coffey
International Development, 2011). In all these ways, whole swaths of popu-
lations become representable, knowable and visible both as individuals with
particular preferences and interests, and as citizens of states that have (or not)
particular valued characteristics.
Equally tellingly, such anxiety as exists surrounding elections is generally
related to concerns that elections do not always provide the most accurate
way of representing populations, as the cartoon discussed at the start of this
chapter implied. Thus Carothers warns that although the “mechanical process
of voting” may be perfectly accurate and fair, it is always necessary to guard
against the possibilities of “a biased election commission, a lack of any civic-
education efforts, grossly unfair campaign coverage on television, or blatantly
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unequal resources” (Carothers, 2004: 88–89). Any such irregularities in the
broader “neutrality” of democratic practices, it is implied, will skew the
information derived from the election such as to make it impossible to read.
This anxiety likewise informs concerns over the possibility that donors might,
unwittingly, interfere with democratic mechanisms of demand and bargaining
that occur between the public and politicians (Unsworth, 2007: 28). Similarly
the ever-present worry about “patronage” in Pakistan also centres on the
way that practices of patronage will interfere with the accurate representation
of the population (Coffey International Development, 2011: 11). The concern
over the possible inadequacies of the election then entails an interest in other
democratic practices that can supplement it: these include the institutions of a
free press, freedom of association and public debate.
Freedom of speech and association
Liberal democracy relies upon the right to freedom of speech and freedom of
association alongside elections, so that freely choosing individuals can test out
their opinions in the public sphere, and worse options, ideas and beliefs can be
discarded in favour of better ones. This is the precondition of being able to make
a rational decision at the ballot box in possession of all relevant information
and provides the opportunity for individuals to discover what their interests are
in debate and conversation with others. Through processes of debate and
contestation, a population will be able to represent its needs and interests,
such that politicians will be able and obliged to understand and respond to them.
If one of the crucial logics of liberal governmentality is to produce and
maintain separate public and private spheres, the state is understood to play a
crucial role in constructing a broader public sphere in which representation
can take place. This includes not only state institutions, but also a public
sphere that is free from censorship and the construction of a “civil society” in
which “citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes”, which
is understood to exist only insofar as a strong and capable state is able to
guarantee and facilitate it (Diamond, 2008: 13; see also Kurki, 2011). Thus
the state is fully implicated in modes of everyday democracy promotion, even
when they are formally divorced from state institutions.
Free speech and association is the lifeblood of liberal democratic life in that
it enables a range of policy options to be represented and developed in the
public sphere and provides ongoing government action with legitimacy
through the process of public debate. If the election renders the interests of
the population visible and quantifiable, it is freedom of speech and association
in civil society that makes populations truly legible. This focus on legibility
explains the emphasis on visible “demand” that is found in the Democracy
Promotion academic and policy literature (Unsworth, 2007: 28; DFID,
2007b: 16, 23, 32, 34). This is often articulated around practices of “bar-
gaining”, not least the ways in which citizens mobilise around how money
raised through taxation should be spent, which particularly informs the logic
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behind putting budget support into government coffers as a mechanism for
delivering aid (ibid.: 62; Smillie, 2007: 60; Moore and Unsworth, 2006: 710).
What is crucially important here is that citizens are more often than not
conceptualised as engaging in speech in the public sphere with their interests,
values and identities already fixed and decided: as in the classic liberalism
described by Graham Burchell, “[i]nterest, then, functions as the principle of
a personal choice which is unconditionally subjective or private” and therefore
“irreducible” (Burchell, 1991: 130). As should by now be very clear, this lib-
eral formulation of the rights of free speech relies on the repressive hypothesis of
power, masking the ways in which power also enables what it is possible to say,
the ways in which it is possible to say them and even the subjectivities of the
individualswho get to speak. Just as electoral democracy is understood as a neutral
forum which puts power directly into the hands of the people in the form of the
ballot paper, likewise individuals are understood to hold and exercise power by dint
of the right to hold and share their own opinions in a free, democratic country.
Thus Quadir, for example, suggests that the importance of “participatory
governance” is in “representing the concerns of gender, age, caste, ethnicity,
wealth and class […] based on the voices of ordinary citizens in decision-
making” (Quadir, 2007: 116). The logic of participation here is not to trans-
form subjectivities, which are taken as given, but rather to ensure that they
are fully representable, and therefore governable. Unsworth (2007: 33) finds
this kind of representation more troubling, however, suggesting that “political
mobilisation is often along ethnic lines rather than around economic or other
interests that would facilitate compromise over time.” This makes a particular
set of assumptions about what ought to be represented in the public sphere –
with loyalties related to ethnicity perhaps understood as unfit for the public
sphere because they are understood to be mainly appropriate to the private,
domestic relations of family and kinship – but still assumes that identities and
interests precede democratic engagement.
The freedom of the press is clearly a crucially important element of the right
to free expression. As Benedict Anderson (2006) has so famously shown, it is the
daily practice of reading the same newspapers that enables a large population
of individuals who will never meet to imagine themselves as a homogeneous com-
munity, governed by the same laws and norms, preoccupied by the same concerns,
united by certain recurring narratives. The freedom to publish entails the ability
to be represented at this crucial national level, where much governing still takes
place, and to ensure that the opinions and beliefs that are formed in the private
sphere can be represented to the institutions of government.
The role of the press is characterised in the Democracy Promotion litera-
ture as representing sets of identities and interests that exist prior to and can
therefore be reflected transparently by the media. For example, in Larry
Diamond’s book on Democracy Promotion there are 36 references to “media
and press” in the index, each of which either praises a press that is “free” or
expresses concern about media that have been “censored” or “co-opted” by
the government or incumbent in power (Diamond, 2008). One entry seems
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more nuanced than this, showing a politician (Alejandro Toledo in Peru)
effectively hounded out of office by an elite-dominated and hostile press. Even
here, however, Diamond’s conclusion is that “a president must battle for
public opinion” (ibid.: 175), thus failing to dissociate press and public or give
a meaningful account of how they are co-constituted.
Freedom of speech and association is understood to exist in the absence of
censorship or coercion. The power that produces gendered, racialised, ethnic
or class identities, that enables subjects to understand themselves as belonging
to a particular religious or tribal group rather than to a particular class, for
the purposes of voting, is ignored here as attention is focused on the power that
says “no”, that censors, that forces a constituent to vote in favour of a more
powerful landlord instead of in her own, already constituted interest. The
press is not understood to have a role in actively constructing what might
count as the truth. This is an important omission.
Democratic talk
Unsurprisingly, in light of the previous discussion, when the DFID “Pakistan
Country Governance Analysis” assesses the role of the media, it predictably
focuses on “transparency”, the problem of “intimidation”, and the role of
media in enabling audiences to understand government policy and “hold
government to account” (Coffey International Development, 2011: 10). What
is therefore more interesting is the statement that the media must be sup-
ported to “contest militant viewpoints” (ibid.: 10). This is very different from
an assumption that all that needs to be done is to ensure there is no censor-
ship. Thus at the limits of Democracy Promotion, where the attempt to know,
manage and civilise the unruly other comes up against the irredeemably
unmanageable barbarian – the terrorist, the militant – the power of repre-
sentation to create, not just reflect, identities is unusually acknowledged.
Whilst there is no scope here to review the vast literature on democratic talk,
including deliberation and reason giving in democracies,2 it is worth drawing
out some of the important productive dimensions of power that play a role in
democratic contestation and speech.
At this point it is useful to consider the two interlocking meanings of
“representation” identified by Spivak (1987: 275):
Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as
“speaking for”, as in politics, and representation as “re-presentation”, as
in art or philosophy. These two senses of representation – within state
formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject predication, on
the other – are related but irreducibly discontinuous.
The literature on democratic representation is particularly concerned with
representation as a process of proxies “speaking for” others. Hanna Pitkin’s
(1967) classic and still influential study of traditional electoral representation
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identifies four different ways of thinking about representation, all of which in
some way rely on the broad notion of a representative as a person who stands
in for some (group of) other(s): this conception is still very prevalent in ways
of thinking about electoral representative politics (Dovi, 2011).
Meanwhile, work on non-electoral forms of democracy, whether that be in
citizens’ juries, mini-publics or broader forms of public deliberation and
debate (Bohman, 2000), likewise regularly involves some kind of speaking for.
This may be through a variety of mechanisms, including the scientifically
representative sampling of smaller groups that deliberate on behalf of some
larger population and may then be able to make recommendations to an
elected body (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006).
Alternatively, public debate may be conceived as a key institution in its own
right which enables not only better-informed preferences but also itself func-
tions as a mechanism for their transmission to proxies within decision-making
bodies (Dryzek, 2000; Bohman, 2000).
If we consider representative politics to be constitutively concerned with
speaking for, then Spivak’s second sense of representation modes of speaking
that are possible – which statements can be uttered and which are ruled out
by contemporary ways of knowing and thinking – are of the utmost impor-
tance. In her classic essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Spivak, 1987), she is
concerned with the ways in which Indian women were rendered absent and
invisible not only by the systematic exclusion of their voices, but also by the way
that feminine practices and identities were struggled over by men, in the attempt
to define what ways of speaking by and about women would be possible.
The importance of discursive representation is obviously not restricted to the
practice of speaking for, or representing, someone else. The practice of
speaking for oneself, including in organised deliberative settings, also requires
participation in available discourses: indeed without this participation, there
is no subject. Even Spivak’s silenced subaltern woman has a subjectivity that
is defined, although not determined, by prevailing discursive practices.
An example from her essay can help us understand this point: she describes
a suicide of an unmarried Indian woman who waits until menstruation before
killing herself, in order to provide evidence that she was not pregnant, or in
“imprisonment within legitimate passion with a single male” (Spivak, 1987: 308).
She reads this act as “an unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social text
of sati-suicide”, not least because sati is forbidden during menstruation.
Spivak is interested in the (always indeterminate) meaning of the suicide, as if
it were – in Foucault’s words – a “document”, which can be enquired into her-
meneutically. However, I want to suggest, rather against the grain of Spivak’s
own emphasis, that we can more fruitfully treat it as something more material
and concrete – a “monument” – and enquire into its conditions of possibility
and its function (Foucault, 2002: 148, 156).
The subaltern’s subversive agency, and Spivak’s reading of it, are only made
possible by the existence of the prevailing discourses and practices of sati, and
its intersection with women’s sexuality, in the first place. We can discern from
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an understanding of the history of struggles over sati how such an act of sui-
cide and its timing becomes possible, what forms of subjectivity it implies and
how they interact with the subjection to power relations of the subaltern-subject:
what ways of being a woman, what practices of femininity, are possible in this
given society? We can demonstrate that sati reproduces and re-inscribes
existing power relations, but also that these power relations enable creative (if
ultimately destructive) resistances. For all the inequalities and oppressiveness
associated with such historically constituted practices, they are also the very
ways in which subjectivity, and concrete action, is rendered possible. As such,
the subaltern, though she may not speak, (re)presents a “body totally imprinted
by history” (Foucault, 1991a: 83), which cannot just be read and understood
only according to the relations of power circulating in Indian society at the time
and the concrete practices that they produce, but furthermore can only act by
means of them and the slender room for manoeuvre that they offer. What I
want to say here is that Spivak is in danger of assuming that the subaltern
woman possesses an essence or agency that precedes her insertion into discourse.
This is precisely what I want to deny, drawing rather on Judith Butler in
affirming that “gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who
might be said to preexist the deed” (Butler, 2006: 34), and that the subaltern
woman’s subjectivity and agency is only possible as a function of discourse.
This has important consequences for understanding democratic practice.
Discourses are clearly not reducible to signifiers that represent an objective
reality, but rather they are “practices that systematically form the objects of
which they speak” (Foucault, 2002: 49), including the possibility of particular
speaking positions. Or, to put it another way, a “system of relations estab-
lishes a discursive practice that sets the rules of the game: who can speak,
from what points of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria
of expertise” (Escobar, 1994: 41). Thus when, as freely choosing subjects,
voters are asked to reflect on their choices and represent themselves at the
ballot box or in deliberative institutions, the processes of thought in which
they are engaged are already closely interwoven with power relations.
Representation, then, is always an active process of producing, and also
struggling intersubjectively over, the world from within an inegalitarian web
of power relations. Within democratic deliberation, the ways we have of
knowing and of judging what sorts of statements may count as true, and what
sorts of reasons are acceptable, are always conditioned by the workings of
power (Foucault, 1981: 92–93). Discursive struggles take place precisely over
the field of what may be recognised, or taken seriously, as truth, or as good
reasons. For example, is it appropriate to take seriously a Pakistani villager
who said that he had a thing or two to teach me about democracy, given the
highly consensual and inclusive decision-making forum that existed in his
village? Or is this proposition absurd, given the hierarchical structure of the
forum and its exclusion of women and non-Muslims? Do we want to take
seriously his discursive attempt to take control of the word “democracy” and
claim it for a different discourse from the conventional (“Western”) one of
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liberal democracy? When I put this question to a British political activist,
who had just expressed his distaste for the habit of British Pakistani popula-
tions in his local area voting as a block, he suggested that, “it all depends on
whether that is ‘true’ democracy, but I suspect that it isn’t”. This example is
given as a way of illustrating how truth is struggled over: the ability to be
taken seriously as a speaker of truth is a form of power, and conversely power
is exercised over us as we attempt to, and are socially obliged to, voice what
will be taken to be good reasons in our kind of society.
The intersection of power with truth, and therefore knowledge, is crucial to
a Foucauldian understanding of the world. In the original French, this is always
expressed as “pouvoir-savoir”, which – like savoir-faire, perhaps – has an
everyday, concrete feel and connotes the local and specific practices through
which we come to have the ability to know (Spivak, 1995): the ability to
recognise democracy when we see it, for example, as well as the ability freely
to represent ourselves by means of it, whether that be through practices of
contestation, reason giving, voting, or all three.
Conclusion: the politics of representation
In this chapter I have shown the contingent ways in which democracy and repre-
sentation are bound up in one another and in relations of power/knowledge. Lib-
eral democratic governmentality enables the emergence of a particular kind of
democratic subjectivity, which in turn enables and requires us to be repre-
sented, and to represent ourselves, in particular ways. Above all, the democratic
practices of representation – whether through counting votes or through more
deliberative means of giving reasons and persuading – are epistemologically
useful in that they enable populations to be understood, known, governed and
managed in particular ways.
Representation produces and reproduces truths, knowledges, discourses,
identities and populations: representative practices need, therefore, not to be
interpreted, but rather to be understood and traced in their logic and effects
as they intersect with democracy promotion. I therefore do not treat practices
of representation as forms of meaning, whose deeper intentions can be dis-
cerned hermeneutically. Rather, representation functions as a set of concrete
practices: I am interested in what representation – in both senses – does, what
functions it performs, what possibilities it may rule in or out, what subjects it
produces and what action it makes thinkable.
In the next chapter I will return to the temporal narrative of democracy
promotion, and the story of the barbarian and the savage, to show exactly
why, how and in what specific ways such knowledge comes to matter.
Notes
1 Bevir and Rhodes (2004) suggest that “governance” is a relatively recent construct
in Western democracies, denoting a move away from centralised institutions to
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diffuse networks and multiple organisations. However, as Foucault’s work suggests,
this tendency towards the diffusion – rather than centralisation – of power is a key
feature of any kind of governmental rule.
2 James Bohman (1998) provides a good, although now somewhat out-of-date,
review. For an excellent and full discussion of deliberative democracy from a
poststructural perspective, see Norval, 2007.
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3 Disordering histories
[O]f-course developments and in-the-end inevitabilities suggest the grip of tele-
ology: the turn of mind that tells us things had to come out the way they did
because they were always leading to us, and how can we imagine “progress”
toward something different from ourselves?
(From The New York Review of Books. © 2011 by David Bromwich)
There is a character – Jim – in Mohsin Hamid’s bestselling novel The Reluc-
tant Fundamentalist whose fundamentalism is not so reluctant. The joke of
the novel’s title is that its depiction of “fundamentalism” concerns not edu-
cated and disillusioned Pakistani narrator Changez – despite the increasing
radicalism of his opinions – but the American asset-stripping firm for which
Jim works. Here the motto is: “Focus on the fundamentals […] It mandated a
single-minded attention to financial detail” (Hamid, 2007: 112). It is Jim, this
fundamentalist, who suggests (all the while playing with a technologically
advanced and highly engineered watch) that, “[t]ime only moves in one
direction. Remember that” (ibid.: 109). He goes on to add to Changez:
The economy’s an animal […] It evolves. First it needed muscle. Now all
the blood it could spare was rushing to its brain. That’s where I wanted
to be. In finance […] And that’s where you are. You’re blood brought
from some part of the body that the species doesn’t need any more. The
tailbone. Like me. We came from places that were wasting away.
(Hamid, 2007: 110)
Jim’s account implies a certain version of history which – as we will see – is
rather common. It suggests that history is an evolutionary,1 or teleological,
process in which time moves ever forwards and in doing so leads to
improvement and progress. Progress is generally understood in technological
terms as well as privileging rationality, or “the brain”. This might remind us
of the familiar and seamless teleologies of development and modernisation, as
well as the narrative of civilisation as an ongoing movement through time
towards higher and better modes of life. We might equally bring to mind
Francis Fukuyama’s (1993) famous contention that the march of history
came to an end in 1989 as the battle of ideas was allegedly settled. Fukuyama
here seems to join with Jim in suggesting that the history of ideas works
according to an evolutionary logic, in which worse ideas are tested out and
discarded in favour of better alternatives until humankind alights upon an
endpoint on which all might agree.
Changez, however, emerges from a different, postcolonial history and can
therefore provide an obvious foil to this type of thinking. Within a few pages
he reminds the reader that:
we were not always burdened by debt, dependent on foreign aid and
handouts; in the stories we tell of ourselves we were not the crazed and
destitute radicals you see on your television channels but rather saints,
poets and – yes – conquering kings. We built the Royal Mosque and the
Shalimar Gardens in this city, and we built the Lahore Fort with its
mighty walls and wide ramp for its battle-elephants. And we did these
things when [the United States] was still a collection of thirteen small
colonies, gnawing away on the edge of a continent.
(Hamid, 2007: 115–116, my emphasis)
This chapter is about the stories we tell of ourselves and why they matter.
I suggest that versions of history underpin in crucial ways our experiences
of our own subjectivity, our sense of belonging to a community, our demo-
cratic identities and our understanding of what our relation to the future
ought to be, what options are open for further action. A question then opens
up about whether or not history might be thought about differently. What
difference might it make for our experience of the present and hopes for the
future, if we were able to think about history in different ways?
This is not a question of inventing fictions, but rather – like Changez
speaking of Pakistan – questioning whether there might not be other, more
defensible, ways of narrating our identity as subjects of history. At stake, as a
matter of political strategy, would be different orientations towards the future
and different forms of relation with oneself and with others.
In the first main section of this chapter, I investigate the narratives about
history that currently circulate in discourses of democracy promotion, focus-
ing on three interlocking ways of thinking about history: civilisation, devel-
opment and the slow but inexorable spread of democracy. I look in detail at
how these three narratives function, in all their diversity. The second section
builds on this to show precisely how the narratives constitute othering prac-
tices in temporal teleological terms: the other is the savage or the barbarian,
outside of civilisation but also before it. The next section explains why this
matters. It explores in detail the political programmes that emerge from
attempts to contain or domesticate the barbarian and the savage, respectively,
looking at the ways in which they open up and foreclose different ways of
acting. To conclude, I return to Foucault in order to ask how history might be
re-fictioned to provide an alternative politics. This final section will elaborate
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on the precise opportunity offered by the histories that animate our con-
temporary practices of thought for exploring a somewhat novel form of gen-
ealogy. This discussion provides the framework for the alternative history that
constitutes the final four chapters of this book.
The stories we tell of ourselves
I suggest that we need to be concerned with three distinct, but deeply inter-
related, stories that we tell about ourselves. They are all teleological. The first
is a story about civilisation, the second is about development and the third is
about democracy promotion. Let us take each in turn.
Civilising histories
As we saw in the opening pages of this book, the language of “civilisation” is
a commonplace way of securing identity and identifying and condemning
threatening others in temporal terms. After the London bombings, as we have
seen, Tony Blair (2005a) stated that: “they will never succeed in destroying
what we hold dear in this country and in other civilised nations throughout
the world.” This was echoed by a joint statement of the G8 leaders (ibid.),
who declared that “this terrorism” is an “attack […] on all nations and on
civilised people everywhere”. Lest there be any doubt about what a “civilised”
identity might comprise, Tony Blair (2006) spells out that it is “religious tolerance,
openness to others, to democracy, liberty and human rights administered by
secular courts”. These are institutions all clearly recognisable as emblematic
of liberal democratic governance and explicitly inimical to the kind of
democratic innovation proposed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2008.
It is this widespread political discourse that posits “civilisation” as the
opposite of barbaric terrorism that animates at least some of the resistance to
the Archbishop of Canterbury’s proposal for an accommodation with shari’ah
law in the UK. Take, for instance, remarks in the Daily Mail by Mark
Dooley (2008), who suggests that “when the future of Western civilisation is
under threat, such posturing [by the Archbishop] is suicidal”, or Melanie
Phillips, who argues that sacking the Archbishop would be a “powerful
statement” that “Britain really wants to defend itself and Western civilisation”
(Phillips, 2008). Without reference to a civilisational discourse that refers to
shari’ah law (understood to be an aim of terrorism) as a barbaric and exis-
tential threat, these statements would be simply unintelligible. They resonate
with the scores of other references to barbarity, primitivism and the appar-
ently medieval values of shari’ah law that appeared in the newspapers that
week, and press into service an established and readily available narrative that
functions to condemn threats to an established identity.
The immediate conditions through which this civilisational discourse is so
readily intelligible are, of course, the historical context of the “war on terror”
and a similar, at this point established and hegemonic, response to attacks on
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New York and Washington, DC, four years earlier on 11 September 2001
(Bowden, 2009: 177–178; Croft, 2006: 70). It was in terms of this discursive
splitting of the world into “civilised” and “uncivilised” – the familiar dis-
course of “you are either with us or against us” espoused by US President
George W. Bush – that Pakistan was exhorted to join the side of “civilisation”
in the war, and subsequent attempts to establish liberal democratic govern-
ment, in Afghanistan (ibid.: 156). Thus this narrative is already deeply
involved in the domestication of a foreign enemy.
It would be wrong, however, to focus too closely on this immediate context
if that were to occlude a much longer history of uses of the notion of civili-
sation. The history of this word, and the practices associated with it, has been
painstakingly traced by Brett Bowden. He shows in detail the way that civi-
lisational discourses have been used since colonial times to demand con-
formity to the practices characterising those countries that think of
themselves as the “West” and to rule out competing practices as “barbaric”
(Bowden, 2009). Bowden has shown that “civilisation” has, since the word’s
emergence, been defined as particular (changing) ways of governing familiar
in the West (ibid.). It is against this historical involvement in practices of
governing that any analysis of the civilisational narrative must be understood,
as it alerts us to the deep entrenchment of thinking about “civilisation” as
liberal democracy (see Hobson, 2008).
To talk of civilisation is to engage in a set of assumptions, a practice of
thought, about the history of the world. To examine this idea, we must first of
all distinguish between two ways in which “civilisation” is mobilised. On the
one hand, Samuel Huntington’s (2002) influential language of a “clash of
civilisations” draws on ideas about multiple civilisations co-existing in time
but separated by space and distinguished by different cultural values: “civili-
sation in the plural” (Jackson, 2006: 82–87; O’Hagan, 2007; Hobson, 2008).
Competing with this, importantly, is a notion of “civilisation in the singular”,
which sees civilisation as “both a process and a goal […] a term for expressing
the distinguishing characteristics of a good society and also the process by
which people are made fit for this society” (Jackson, 2006: 83). This latter
conception of civilisation operates using a different conception of time: it is a
teleological narrative in which some people or parts of the world are situated
further back in time, along the trajectory towards civilisation, in a past that
the “civilised” peoples have already gone beyond (ibid.).
It is no coincidence that the particular point in history when the term
“civilisation” first comes into widespread English usage (between 1772 and
1836; Bowden, 2009: 31), also happens to be the time of the beginnings of the
British Empire, when a vexed political debate was taking place regarding
the best way to govern, amongst others, that part of the world which later
became Pakistan. Here, then, we have the premise of the colonial “civilising
mission”, an endeavour which consistently represented non-Western countries
as temporally backward, but not without the possibility of catching up, often
understood through the metaphor of im/maturity. Thus, indigenous people are
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understood to be “wards” of the civilised nations (ibid.: 148–149) who – with
time and proper tutelage – may grow into the “mature adults” of the
Enlightenment (Foucault, 1991e: 49). Thus the history of the civilisational
discourse is inextricably intertwined with a sense that places like Pakistan –
understood to be the point of origin for the “foreign” and “barbaric” ideology
of the terrorists – are behind places like Britain in time.
The two conceptions of civilisation – plural and singular – are never used
completely in isolation from one another, but always interact, and usually in
ways that reproduce the notion that “civilised nations” are also those
belonging to a specifically Western “civilisation” which is both distinct from
other “civilisations” or cultures and also better, less barbarous, more devel-
oped and modern (Gregory, 2004: 57–58). However, as we have seen, the
notion of “civilisation” that is mobilised in response to the London bombings
and the Archbishop is dominated by the latter conception – “civilisation in
the singular” – as evidenced not least by the constant references to the
“medieval” or “primitive” aims of the bombers, or practices of shari’ah law.
The temporal narrative of civilisation is underlined by the title of the
speech, given by Tony Blair in March 2006 (the year of the good governance
White Papers), in which he reflects both on terrorism and on UK foreign
policy: “Not a clash between civilisations, but a clash about civilisation”, a
title which brings into play both these notions of civilisation before settling on
the singular (Blair, 2006). This speech depends on a whole set of binary for-
mulations which develop and extend the initial response to the bombings as
the actions of “barbarians” against “civilised people” and they are reliant on
the teleological temporalities of the “civilisation in the singular” narrative,
suggesting, for example, that the “battle” being waged is “between progress
and reaction, between those who embrace the modern world and those who
reject its existence”. This kind of language explicitly rejects the idea that
multiple civilisations could co-exist in the world and therefore implies that
those who are not (yet) civilised must be taken on, become civilised or be
destroyed, in the “battle of values and progress” (Blair, 2006).
We will return to examine the political consequences of the story of civili-
sation, but first there is another temporal word often used in tandem with
“progress” in Pakistan, and this brings us to our second story: development.
Development
The attacks in London appeared to have been deliberately timed to coincide
with the G8 summit in Gleneagles. This was a summit about development. “It
is particularly barbaric”, said Tony Blair (2005b), “that this has happened on
a day when people are meeting to try to help the problems of poverty in
Africa.” This quite obviously enacts a linking of the two temporal narratives
of civilisation and development: the supposed “civilised” values of the G8,
the UK government and the Make Poverty History campaign, as opposed not
just to the “barbarism” of the terrorist display of violence, but also to the
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barbarities of poverty, lack of development, bad governance and corruption
(Douzinas, 2008: 195).
The idea of “development” pre-dates, but is intimately linked to, the emer-
gence of modernisation theory, which was inaugurated in Rostow’s famous
article, “The Stages of Economic Growth” (1959). This is the theory that
assumes that economic development as it occurred in Western Europe and
North America was not dependent on an historically specific set of circum-
stances, but is rather a progressive and benign process that every region in the
world would, or should, go through as part of the inevitable process of history
leading to a modern and prosperous future. This assumption that “developing
countries” are not essentially different from those that are “developed” but
rather situated, or even stuck, further back in time at earlier “stages” of
development is evident in the very vocabulary of “developed”, “developing”
and even “under-developed”. It is a mode of thinking that underpins the
enormous industry of “development”, in which “experts” from developed
countries attempt to guide the developing world through these stages and
towards the goal of “development”, by which is generally meant a similarity
to the West (Escobar, 1994).
This temporal logic remains prevalent despite the range and subtlety of
development practitioners and scholars, many of whom are highly thoughtful
and critical (see Kothari, 2005, for example, for a range of critical ways of
thinking about development). The specifically temporal and teleological
notion of what development is, and its relation to the idea that history has a
directional and progressive force, is rather neatly summed up by Phil Vernon
(2012), a development worker and director of programmes at International
Alert: “One clue how to frame our aspirations is to imagine how historians in
a hundred years might frame the history of human progress […] Put simply,
development planning is history looking forwards.” The very title of the
“Make Poverty History” campaign – so prominent at the time of the London
bombings – is reliant on this understanding of time as a civilising force
moving forwards in the service of progress and development.
It was this same G8 summit on development that provided the context for
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) White Papers of 2006, the documents that so
clearly spell out the UK government’s commitment to the agendas and tech-
nologies of Democracy Promotion and good governance as an intrinsic ele-
ment of development. It had not always been the case that democracy and
development were considered to be so deeply intertwined. Indeed, the pro-
tracted debate about whether democratisation inhibits or promotes economic
development (Lipset, 1960; Hadenius, 1997; Przeworski et al., 1996; Prze-
worski and Limongi, 1993; Helliwell, 1994; Gillies, 1993) has only died away
in the last 15 years. Yet, as the White Papers attest, there is now a powerful
articulation of liberal democracy and development in policy thinking, such
that development is by definition characterised by the presence of democratic
institutions (see Chapter 1 above and also Quadir, 2007: 99; Smillie, 2007: 57;
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Burnell, 2000: 4, 5, 15, 20, 28). To understand this, we need to look more
closely at the third story we tell of ourselves: the story about the spread of
democracy.
The official history of Democracy Promotion
The democratisation/development debate was less about whether practitioners
should promote development or democracy, than about which should come
first. This is because, just like the story of development, the story of the
spread of democracy is animated by constant analogies between European
history and the history of other parts of the world. By viewing contemporary
Europe as a developed and democratic ideal endpoint, this narrative both
idealises the institutions we now have and assumes that history elsewhere will
follow a similar path.
We have seen that a common and idealised historical narrative told about
Britain is one that stresses a slow but continual process of struggle and
development that has brought us democracy (see Colley, 2009). As part of
this narrative, certain key events – the Magna Carta, the Glorious Revolution,
the Great Reform Act, votes for women, the Second World War – are totemic
moments that can be appealed to in order to remind democratic citizens of
the hard-won nature of their rights and secure commitment to a liberal
democratic identity. Compare this with DFID’s assertion that, “[b]uilding
democratic values and institutions takes time. The democratic institutions we
have in the UK took centuries to evolve” (DFID, 2007b: 20). These stories we
tell of ourselves are deeply influential for the manner in which Britain engages
with its undemocratic others.
Thus, despite the concern with local histories and contexts that we saw in
Chapter 1, other countries – like Pakistan – can appear as ciphers of an
idealised Western history. Democracy is very often assumed to be an inevi-
table outcome of the history the West has been through. Furthermore, events
from a specific Western history populate accounts of Democracy Promotion,
as though other parts of the world were just empty vessels waiting to be filled
via the same trajectory. For example, Sue Unsworth suggests that: “An
example from the history of Western Europe is the long process of (often
violent) bargaining between rulers and citizens that resulted in the creation of
civil, political and economic rights in return for recognition of obligation to
pay tax” (Unsworth, 2007: 33). Similarly, Sheri Berman defends a social
democratic approach to Democracy Promotion in these terms: “During the
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, Europe was the most
turbulent region on earth […] Yet during the second half of the twentieth
century it was one of the most stable, a study in democracy, social harmony
and prosperity” (Berman, 2012: 68); going on to conclude that “democracy
promoters have lessons to learn from Europe’s experience” (Berman, 2012:
83). Western history is understood and narrated as a difficult yet inexorable
progress towards a set of institutions that have offered democratic rights to
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the poor and the powerless. Thus, it seems perfectly logical to prescribe a
similar path for the poor and powerless elsewhere. Jeremy Gould (2005: 11) –
who otherwise provides a nuanced account of postcolonial flows of power –
also offers an idealised version of Western history by suggesting that in Western
countries “demands for public consultation and participation” were decisive
in the development of liberal, democratic institutions in ways that are denied
to contemporary developing countries.
In light of the pervasiveness of references to Western history as a model, it
is unsurprising that an underlying teleology, underwritten by references both
to civilisation and to development, is easy to trace in the mainstream
democracy promotion literature: DFID, for example, makes reference to
poverty and poor governance as a state of “lagging behind” (DFID, 2006e: 44),
as well as suggesting that “[b]uilding democratic values and institutions takes
time” (DFID, 2007b: 20). Thomas Carothers proposes that “[b]y sending out
more and more delegations to monitor elections […] the established Western
democracies have reinforced the basic idea that holding elections is something
that civilized countries do” (Carothers, 2004: 87). Meanwhile, Larry Dia-
mond speaks about “progress” towards the notion of democracy as a “uni-
versal value” (Diamond, 2008: 13). Sue Unsworth, on the other hand,
narrates a cautionary history of Democracy Promotion itself as a series of
failures, a long series of “fixes”, unsuccessful practices that have moved into,
then quickly out of, fashion (Unsworth, 2007: 23–27), but nevertheless sug-
gests that certain more recent practices are an “advance” (ibid.: 31). All these
examples imply that history itself has an evolutionary logic.
This is the case even for some writers who are critical of the liberal demo-
cratic order. Consider, for example, William Robinson’s suggestion, within his
Gramscian analysis of contemporary democracy promotion, that “[w]hat was
‘discovered’ [in 1492] was not the Americas, but universal human history and the
world as one totality” (Robinson, 1996: 4). This sentence draws upon the
discovery of the “savage” and the Enlightenment understanding of him as a
figure who represents the past – a representation of what Europe once was
like – which concomitantly offers our own society as his future and his destiny.
More on the savage below, but first it is important to say that not all
accounts of Democracy Promotion are complacent about offering the benefits
of history to the undeveloped. This is often because of the confrontation
between the broad teleologies offered by this version of history with the actual
historicity of events. Sue Unsworth, for example, offers a rather different take
on what might be learned from history: “This process of institution building
is inherently messy, conflict ridden, incremental, uncertain, and long term”
(Unsworth, 2007: 33). Despite the open-endedness she claims to find in his-
tory, she nevertheless takes it as a basis for her claim that “[h]istorically poor
people have almost always made progress in alliance with more powerful
groups” (ibid.: 38). She has an endpoint (“progress”) – and a set of universal
processes (“institution-building”, “alliances”) as ways of getting there – in
mind, even if chaotic events might get in the way.
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This identification of historicity as an obstacle is reminiscent of Larry
Diamond’s view that “we have to identify the historical and structural obsta-
cles to democracy around the world” (Diamond, 2008: 6). History is what
appears to be getting in the way of progress: “History has seen no shortage of
[human failings], which have played a large role in the breakdown of democ-
racy. But human progress follows from the capacity to learn from and trans-
cend our failings” (ibid.: 13). An acknowledgement of the contingency and
open-endedness of history, then, does little to disrupt the underlying teleology.
Various ways of describing the disappointments of Democracy Promotion
underline this point: there has been “backsliding” (Carothers, 2004: 2),
“democratic recession”, “setbacks”, “deterioration” (Diamond, 2008: 12) and
“reversals” (Swain et al., 2011: 1). All these words connote an endpoint
towards which there is the possibility of linear progress or regress: but no real
notion of the multiple possibilities that a truly open-ended version of history
might proliferate.
Now that the profoundly teleological logic of the story Democracy Pro-
motion tells of itself has been unearthed, it is easy to understand the deep
intertwining of developmental and Democracy Promotion narratives. On the
face of it, the democratisation/development debate had appeared to take issue
with the assumption (much coloured by modernisation theory) that all good
things go together. However, it is important to note that at root the debate
never really contested the idea of democracy as an endpoint. Rather it took as
its target the concrete ways in which democratisation and economic develop-
ment should be sequenced within an overall narrative that took the Western
developed countries as their model. As such, it offers no genuine critique of
liberal democratic capitalism as the ultimate endpoint – merely doubts about
how to get there.
The stories that practitioners of Democracy Promotion tell about the Cold
War, and its end, appear to quell those doubts.
Key moments in the history of Democracy Promotion
Democracy Promotion is readily understood as having emerged as a Cold
War project. It is widely considered to have its origins after the Second World
War with the beginnings of struggles for national self-determination and the
end of the colonial rule that had blocked the normal teleological progress of
history, coinciding with the emergence of a country called Pakistan. Whilst
Kurki (2013: 122) and Huber (2015: 11–12) note that American Democracy
Promotion began after the First World War, they also note that it is during
the Cold War that it really takes off. Both Sue Unsworth and Ian Smillie offer
potted histories of democracy promotion that begin in the late 1940s and
acknowledge the role of democracy promotion as a Cold War strategy (Uns-
worth, 2007: 23–27; Smillie, 2007; see also the discussion of Laurence
Whitehead’s work above in Chapter 1). This reading of history suggests that
the initial articulation of democracy and development was a specific response
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both to a shameful past of imperialism and, importantly, to alternative
models of development offered by the Soviet Union. Take, for example,
President Truman’s inaugural address in 1949, at which he said:
The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts
of democratic fair dealing.
(quoted in Esteva, 1992: 6)
It seems that from its very beginnings, Democracy Promotion is understood
as a ruptural break in the 1940s from an oppressive history of civilising
missions.
Somewhat similarly, Brigg points out that a metaphor of “colonisation” is
regularly employed by writers in the “post-development” school who critique
the teleologies of development. He compares the colonial period to Foucault’s
conceptualisation of “sovereign power”, which relates above all to violence,
the ability of the sovereign to take away the life of subjects (Foucault, 1981:
135–136), and argues therefore that metaphors of colonisation are wrongly
applied to the modern “development” era since 1945, because “development
operates through the mobilisation of interests and aspirations of Third World
subjects” (Brigg, 2002: 424). The meaning of 1945 is readily understood, then,
as a ruptural moment when power was redistributed from imperial rulers to a
multiplicity of local individuals, ideally via a ballot paper.
However, the story runs, the experience of the Cold War means that this
process was initially deeply imperfect, with the principles of democracy fre-
quently being “betrayed” (Diamond, 2008: 1–2) by cynical Western leaders,
keen on short-term gain in the struggle with the Soviet Union, even at the
price of the very principles of democracy they were ultimately attempting to
defend. This is, of course, a common element in the story we tell of our rela-
tionship with Pakistan. Particularly widespread is the story of anti-democratic
military dictator General Zia ul-Haq, whose rule was propped up by funding
and support from America in return for his support for the Mujaheddin’s
struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Mohan, 2007; Rashid,
2008: 184; Cohen, 2004: 302–303). This is a narrative about Pakistan that is
still regularly told: for instance, a box office hit, the film Charlie Wilson’s War
(Nichols, 2010), narrated in detail – in cinema multiplexes and living rooms –
the story of the compromises with anti-democratic power that took place in
the name of the fight for democracy itself in Pakistan in the 1980s. The film
ends with the worrying spectre of a resurgence of anti-democratic power as
the Taliban take over Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, J.T. Rogers’s play, Blood and Gifts, which takes as one of its
concerns British acquiescence in these events, was staged at the National
Theatre in London in 2010. This play demonstrates the ongoing perception
that the story of the Cold War struggle in Pakistan is relevant to the growth
of “barbaric” and anti-democratic forces. Western funding is portrayed as
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causing the desire of the Afghan Taliban to “cross oceans” in order to
“spread” Islam (Rogers, 2010: 124). Whilst it might be objected that the
Afghan Taliban are not known for crossing oceans to proselytise or commit
terrorist crime (Gardner, 2010), the point to note is that the ultimately self-
defeating nature of supporting undemocratic dictators in the name of
democracy is now quite widely taken as read. These sorts of stories continue
to function as a cautionary tale about the dangers of blocking the progressive
path of history with short-term political machinations.
Despite this critique of Cold War practices, however, the period is still
viewed as the last stage in a teleological history that was leading inexorably to
the triumph of democracy as a universally acknowledged set of values. Larry
Diamond thus provides an account of the Cold War as a narrative of two
possible alternatives – democracy or Soviet-style communism – rather than
any sense of multiple or open-ended trajectories (Diamond, 2008: 4).
If the Cold War can be understood as an era of contestation between two
possible ways of governing, then its conclusion lays down the conditions of
possibility for seeing liberal democracy as the only contender after the fall
of Soviet communism. This seems like an obvious point. The importance of
1989 as a decisive and ruptural moment is almost undisputed: 1989 is under-
stood as the “twelve months that shook the world” (Smillie, 2007: 48; see also
Unsworth, 2007: 24; Carothers, 2004: 19). This was the era that was dubbed
“the end of history”: the (dialectical) battle of ideas was understood – and not
only by Francis Fukuyama – to have been decisively won by one side, such
that the one best way to govern was no longer an open question (Fukuyama,
1989, 1993; McFaul, 2004).
The ruptural end of the Cold War leaves us in no doubt as to where the
logic of history has brought us. The important and influential four-volume
study of democracy in developing countries published in 1988 states in its
introduction that “democracy is the only model of government with any
broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world today” (Diamond et al.,
1988: x). Viewed after an intervening period of 20 years, for one of the
authors, the “third wave” of democratisation that 1989 inaugurates is cele-
brated as “the greatest transformation of the way states are governed in the
history of the world” (Diamond, 2008: 6). The FCO introduces its 2006
White Paper with the words: “With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
order that had set the framework for international relations for nearly 50
years came to an end. Markets and democracy spread across much of the
world” (FCO, 2006: 6). In the words of Slavoj Žižek, “[i]t is easy to make fun
of Fukuyama’s notion of the End of History, but the dominant ethos today is
‘Fukuyamaian’: liberal democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found
formula of the best possible society” (Žižek, 2008: 421).
Even in more critical accounts, there is nevertheless a sense of a pivotal
moment: William Robinson denies that we have reached “the end of history”
but writes that “we are living in a time of transition from one great epoch to
another; we stand at a great historic crossroad, the fourth in modern world
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history” (Robinson, 1996: 4). Meanwhile, Christopher Hobson detects a “new
standard of civilization” emerging after 1989 which asserts that “truth and
‘rightness’” of liberal democratic governance in ways that exclude alternatives
(Hobson, 2008: 83–85).
These various readings of history all function on the basis that the world of
democracy promotion now is understood to be, in important respects, differ-
ent from the era of the Cold War. Particularly in the more mainstream
accounts: if at that time, democracy was promoted strategically and spor-
adically, with an ideological enemy in view, now it is promoted ethically, as the one
proper path through history. The final obstacle to the correct passage through
history – alternative models offered by the Soviet Union – has now been
lifted. As such, it is no surprise that democracy promoters distance themselves
not only from modernisation theory but from the tactics (Carothers, 2004: 19)
and institutions of the Cold War (DFID, 2006e: 8).
A moral tone and sense of dramatic promise pervades the discourse of
Democracy Promotion at the time and in subsequent years, which – as both
Rita Abrahamsen (2000: 36) and April Biccum (2005) have separately pointed
out – in fact suggests a profound continuity with earlier colonial, civilising
practices. Thus, Douglas Hurd in 1990 is able to talk about a “moral duty”
(both towards the citizens of other countries and British taxpayers) to pro-
mote democracy (Hurd, 1990: 4), whilst the subsequent Labour government,
at least in its early years, made much of its “ethical foreign policy” (Cook,
1997a, b) and the moral dimension of its aid programme (Marriage, 2006).
Given the continuity of a teleological Democracy Promotion narrative with
older practices of civilisation and development, it is all the more remarkable
that 1989 has come to be understood as a moment of rupture and change. This
mode of talking about history, however, serves an important purpose,
enabling democracy promoters to dissociate themselves from a shameful past,
whether that be colonial oppression or Cold War manipulation. The End of
History, and the way that it appears both to demonstrate the progressive
nature of history and unblock the last impediment to its realisation, provides
a justification for present and future-oriented Democracy Promotion.
Civilisation, development and the spread of democracy are pervasive stories
that we tell of ourselves: stories that orient us towards the rest of the world and
secure a developed identity by showing us an other who is poor, backward,
badly governed and in need. It is worth pausing here to note that the success
of a discourse or set of practices need have little to do with whether or not it
achieves its stated aims. On the contrary, Foucault (1991f) shows us that the
prison’s self-perpetuation and apparent inevitability are extraordinary precisely
because of its utter failure to reform criminals or deter crime. Its success resides
in the way that it now seems indispensable. Its techniques and technologies
have extended beyond itself, crafting ways of living and being (discipline,
panopticism, individualisation) that reach beyond its heavy walls.
The success of the project of development since the end of the Second
World War, with the incorporation of Democracy Promotion as an integral
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element of it particularly after 1989, can be described in similar terms.
Despite the failure of development and good governance projects and pro-
grammes to reduce the prevalence of poverty and inequality in the global
South, our understanding of the world is powerfully influenced by this division
into “developed” and “developing” countries (Roy and Shaw Crane, 2015),
and it is hard to imagine contemporary international relations without the
ongoing technologies, practices and identities that are linked to develop-
mental thinking. Before looking in more detail at these technologies and
practices, let us consider the identities that these teleological stories produce.
Who are the others?
The three teleological stories we have examined inform and map onto each
other in complex ways, but what they share is a mode of thinking that con-
stitutes the self by reference to an other who is backward, trapped in the past
and in need of moving forwards through the trajectory of a history that is
given in advance. Let us now examine exactly how the distinction operates.
Uncivilised others: the savage and the barbarian
What is logically implied by the narrative of civilisation-in-the-singular is that
not all the others of civilisation need be contained or destroyed: some of them can
be domesticated and made safe by being brought up to date. Despite the
apparent binarism of the division of the world into “civilised” and “uncivilised”
nations, there are two figures who stand outside the reading of the history
offered by “civilisation in-the-singular”: as Foucault points out, we can
understand the “other” of civilisation as either the “barbarian” or the
“savage” (Foucault, 2005b: 194–197).
On the one hand, the barbarian “is someone who can be understood,
defined and characterized only in relation to a civilization […] There can be no
barbarian unless an island of civilization exists somewhere, unless he lives outside it
and unless he fights it” (Foucault, 2005b: 195). Although not disrupting the sin-
gular nature of civilisation – the barbarian is by definition, and in his belligerence,
not the occupant of an alternative civilisation in a multi-civilisational world –
he is both a warlike and a wicked figure and there seems little to be done with
him: he can only be contained. The discourse of the “barbarity” of the
attacks on London relates precisely to this irredeemable and warlike concep-
tion of the uncivilised other who co-exists with civilisation in time and space.
The barbarian has been a figure in political thought since Herodotus, but in
contrast, the savage is of relatively recent origins, probably contemporaneous
with the “discovery” of the Americas. The word comes from the Latin for a
wood (silvaticus), and originally described people living in forests without the
benefits of organised society (Salter, 2002: 20). The savage therefore exists
prior to civilisation and can be understood as the ancestor of Western
civilised man:
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The savage – noble or otherwise – is the natural man whom the jurists or
theorists of right dreamed up, the natural man who existed before society
existed, who existed in order to constitute society [… and] that other
natural man or ideal element dreamed up by economists – a man without
a past or a history, who is motivated only by self-interest and who
exchanges the product of his labor for another product.
(Foucault, 2005b: 194)
As such, once the savage enters into the social and economic contracts of
sovereignty and exchange that characterise Western civilisation, he is no
longer a savage (Foucault, 2005b: 195), and consequently there is always the
possibility that the savage may be domesticated, as Western man must once
likewise have been.
Civilised and uncivilised gendering
This discussion of the civilised, barbarian and savage man is relentlessly, and
deliberately, framed in masculine terms, and it is important to note that the
figures of the savage and the barbarian are gendered in particular ways. The
barbarian is on first reading exaggeratedly hyper-masculine (Ling, 1999): he is
the soldier, defined only in terms of his military and fighting prowess. It is
unthinkable that he might show mercy, love or understanding for others (vir-
tues associated with the de facto caring roles of women): on the contrary, his
only concern is to increase his strength (Foucault, 2005b: 196). The barbarian
displays a wild and violent masculinity, however: his relations with women are
those of the “rapist” (ibid.). He does not enter into the civilised, Enlight-
enment virtues of reason: his violence is total and as such it seems to be
tinged with an emotionality that is uncontrolled and dangerous. If women
need protecting from him, it is because he has refused the practices of mas-
culinity associated with cool rationality, which assigns emotion to the safety
of the feminine and domestic sphere. In contrast, the natural savage is fem-
inised not only because of his contiguous relationship with nature and his
apparently peaceable, noble existence in the forests, but also by virtue of
being still immature and in need of tutelage: he is rather like a child, and
therefore belongs to the feminine sphere.
It follows from this that the domestication of violent masculinity and the
redemption offered by civilisation-in-the-singular is not so much about the
emancipation of women from oppressive local practices (see Spivak, 1987:
297), as it is the proper re-alignment of gender relations in the civilised
mould. The savage who enters the juridical social contract and the various
contracting economic relations of the liberal governmental order, by that very
fact, ceases to be a savage and is transformed into the traditional bearer of
rights and the role of “Homo economicus” (Foucault, 2005b: 194).
It is precisely the gendering of this account of the sovereign and economic
order as peopled by freely contracting, independent, autonomous men that
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has been much criticised by feminists. As feminists in the “ethic of care” tra-
dition have pointed out, all human beings at some stage in their lives will
require care and all have at least the potential to be enriched by participating
in caring work (Gilligan, 1990; Gasper and Van Staveren, 2003; Robinson,
2006). We are, in this sense, not autonomous individuals, but rather inter-
dependent. Thus, stories of homo economicus elide the complex relations of
care and the reproductive work (usually provided by women) that enable
interdependent human beings to grow into adults, and that feed, clothe, tidy
up after them, and look after their sick or elderly relatives whilst they get on
with the important business of politics and commerce (Fineman, 2004).
The entrance of the savage into history, then, inaugurates the division of
the social world into the public and private spheres, and privileges the former.
The ambiguous gendering of both the barbarian and the savage then serve as
a foil to conventional gendered relations that implicitly upholds and legit-
imates them by equating them with civilisation. The savage is domesticated
and ceases to be a savage when he enters the public sphere and founds a form
of government that is recognisably liberal, thus constituting a private sphere
in which women implicitly also participate in the work of civilisation by
enabling men to appear autonomous and independent in public through their
invisible caring work.
Why do these stories matter?
The reality or otherwise of real barbarians and savages in history is less at
issue than how understandings of the past shape our practices of thought. I
argue that they unreflexively enable us to identify current problems and envi-
sage possible resolutions to them: this will “define where the center of the
battle lies” (Foucault, 2005b: 197) in struggles over how to govern now and in
the future.
How does the narrative of the barbarian and the savage relate to the civi-
lisational discourse we find in the UK in the present? It sets up a problem,
which is first of all a problem of knowledge. How will we know what to do
when we encounter the barbarian or the savage? How will we know one from
the other? What is the correct way of dealing with each? The civilisational
discourse itself provides a certain answer to the problem. We know from this
story that we must learn to distinguish between the two; we know that the
barbarian must be destroyed or contained in order to secure civilisation; we
understand that the savage might be domesticated by an entrance into history.
As I argued in Chapter 2, however, the institutions of liberal democratic
governmentality not only offer themselves as an endpoint of history, but also
as an intricate and useful solution to the problems of knowledge that dealing
with the savage and barbarian will entail. The importance of democracy for
civilisation is reinforced – in a world where history never unfolds quite as it is
expected to do – by the usefulness of democratic institutions in knowing and
controlling an unruly world.
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Contemporary civilising missions
Tony Blair stated after the London bombings that, “the vast and overwhelming
majority of Muslims […] are decent and law-abiding people who abhor this act of
terrorism every bit as much as we do” (Blair, 2005b; see Closs Stephens, 2008: 64).
The “we” (British people? Civilisation?) invoked here clearly excludes Muslims,
identifying them as in some sense foreign, but Blair does not put “the vast and
overwhelming majority” beyond the promise of inclusion and domestication.
Whilst the barbarian – in the shape of the terrorist – must be fought, it is this
“vast and overwhelming majority” who rather resemble the savage.
The existence of parts of the world that are not (yet) redeemed by history,
then, provokes the spectre of more barbarians. The FCO, for example, suggests
that “terrorism” might be the consequence when “[s]ome parts of the world
[…] are in danger of being left behind” (FCO, 2006: 4). This formulation
explicitly evokes history and progress as the opposite of barbarism. However,
democracy – as the endpoint of history – is also viewed as a crucial defence:
Larry Diamond suggests that “[t]he enemies of democracy – such as the
global jihadist movement of radical Islam – can win only if democrats defeat
themselves” (Diamond, 2008: 13). This is echoed by Carothers who suggests –
without denying the claim – that policy makers are convinced that “lack of
democracy helps breed Islamic extremism”, adding that “Pakistan is the most
glaring case” (Carothers, 2004: 63–64). Indeed, it is Pakistan that is perceived
as a particularly important “hard case” for democracy promoters (Swain et
al., 2011: 2): the beginning of a backslide of the “third wave” of democracies
is pinpointed by Larry Diamond as the 1999 coup by General Musharraf,
which is itself understood as a failure of democracy to deliver on the promise
of all the good things – development, good governance, human rights – that
were meant to go with it (Diamond, 2008: 12).
The stakes, then, for ensuring that history takes its proper course in unde-
veloped or undemocratic places like Pakistan are understood to be very high:
the consequences of failure are understood to be the encroachment of bar-
barism, the terrorist. However, and crucially, teleological time is something
that is understood to be tractable to a push in the right direction and the
institutions of liberal democracy are crucial tools to do so.
Civilisation and knowledge
For Democracy Promotion to function as a quest for knowledge, the partici-
pation of the “other” in the governmental order is required and it is here that
we re-encounter once again the important issue of the formation of sub-
jectivity. In order fully to participate in liberal democracy, the savage must
become the freely choosing subject of modern governmentality. He must know
himself and his interests and be able to make his choices and concerns legible
in the democratic order. It is in entering into these modes of participation that
the specific form of subjectivity of the modern citizen is formed.
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A refusal to participate in liberal democratic governmentality will, by defi-
nition, constitute a subject as a barbarian: someone who cannot be integrated
into the civilised structures of managing power and politics emblematic of a
modern, developed society. On the contrary, the participation of the savage is
what domesticates him and brings him to know himself in the ways that are
required by liberal democratic governmentality. By knowing himself and then
making his needs, desires and criticisms known through liberal democratic
structures, he will become fully integrated into civilisation and any specific
support required for bringing him up to date can be identified and rationally
targeted.
Civilising missions have long been involved in projects to know the recalci-
trant other. Edward Said draws on Foucault’s work to demonstrate, in
Orientalism, the ways in which very diverse narratives about cultures in the
global “East” form together an orientalist corpus united by ways of knowing:
“Orientals were […] problems to be solved or confined” (Said, 1995: 207). He
is thus able to show how “Orientals” have long been understood as “peoples
variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilised and retarded”, and
as such are “linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the
insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as
lamentably alien” (ibid.). Note the way that domestic, or Occidental, iden-
tities are secured through this very same process. These alien elements wher-
ever they are, it is implied, might also be contained if only they could be
civilised, brought forwards in time. It was also, at least in part, the result of
this narrative that people called “Orientals” came to exist at all, insofar as
they came to understand themselves as such and became both subjects and
objects of an orientalising form of knowledge.
Similarly, after the end of colonisation, as Escobar (1994) has shown, sub-
jects come to know themselves as poor or lacking in development and in a
political economy of representation in which development is the key currency,
the key mode of understanding and making sense of the world, this becomes
a decisive element in their identity – and often a useful means of making a
living in the context of donor funding. Individuals’ material, social and geo-
graphical positioning provides them with a means of knowing themselves and
others as developed or developing.
Again, I have described these forms of subjectivity in masculine terms
because the self-knowledge that is required assumes the autonomous, freely
contracting, independent homo economicus. What impact does this have on
the practices of gendering that constitute civilised subjectivities?
Civilised practices and gender
As I have suggested, to be civilised or developed implies an acceptance of the
division of the public and private spheres, with a specific set of gendered
relations that emerge as a corollary. Blair (2006) suggests that the terrorists’
“positions on women [are] reactionary and regressive”. The crucial point here
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is that in promoting particular institutions as progressive (rather than reac-
tionary), the civilising practices recommended by Blair do not necessarily
emancipate women, but rather aim at producing a particular re-alignment of
gender roles and need to be understood within the context of the production
of the public and private spheres so emblematic of liberal democratic
governance.
The effects of the gendered constitution of civilisational narratives can be
traced in the detailed projects undertaken in the name of the promotion of
democracy and good governance overseas. As discussed in Chapter 2, for
liberal democratic governmentality to function without distortion, so that the
population can be adequately known, it is important that women are free and
equal citizens with interests that are fully representable and legible, and which
can therefore be managed and promoted:
states require the capability and the political will to analyse gender
equality issues objectively, for example by clearly identifying gender
differences in survey data. States can then use this knowledge when
developing and implementing policies that promote gender equality.
(DFID, 2007b: 33)
There is, however, a curious tension in the construction of the category of
women.
On the one hand, women are constructed as the autonomous, rights-bearing
individuals of liberal governmentality, with one vote and the right to make
free choices on an equal basis with other citizens in the public sphere. Gov-
ernmental technologies that work through mobilising the free choices of
individuals can even be designed with women’s needs specifically in mind: for
example, DFID “encourage countries to address issues of […] how taxation
impacts gender equality, such as enabling and constraining economic oppor-
tunities for women” (DFID, 2007b: 33), whilst the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) advocates participatory mechanisms such as
“gender responsive budget initiatives” (UNDP, 2002: 80), which require
women to express their distinctive needs and interests to government the
better to foster their economic and social flourishing and activity.
On the other hand, implicit in these specific mechanisms is the acknowl-
edgement that not all individual citizens are equal or the same: that women
tend to have different responsibilities from men and that they have a distinct
social identity which may tend to constrain the exercise of their freedoms.
This is because, as discussed above, women tend to take specific responsibility
for caring work and this is an integral part of their identity. The governmental
construction of all people as free and equal citizens has been much glorified
for its promotion of gender equality and women’s rights (DFID, 2007b: 33;
UNDP, 2002: 23–26). However, it is precisely this construction with its in-
built assumption of autonomy, that renders largely invisible the inter-
subjective, interconnected domain of care – constructed as private and part of
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the set of processes in the “social” that can be managed but not directly
controlled by the state – currently peopled largely by women.
A valorisation of a democratic practice that privileges individuality and
autonomy not only tends to leave unquestioned the overwhelming responsi-
bility on women for caring work, but also fails to value care, not least by
placing emphasis on measurable indicators, such as economic productivity:
this then contributes to women’s low status. Conversely, a valorisation of care
and interdependence would require a move away from thinking in terms of
individual rights and freedoms, to a more intersubjective and relational
approach. The latter approach would force a questioning of the constitution
of masculine and feminine identities and thereby the notional universal bearer
of individual rights, as premised on a subject (usually a man) who functions
in a public space and whose private caring responsibilities and needs always
already are, have been and will be met by others (usually women). As should
now be obvious, such a questioning would explode the complex of practices
of thought that posit the savage as the starting point for development. We
would have to tell a whole new story about ourselves in order to achieve an
alternative, intersubjective mode of thinking about women’s rights.
Nowhere is the elision of power underwritten by contemporary narratives
about history more evident than when women’s rights are explicitly promoted.
As I discussed in Chapter 2 – using the example of Spivak’s subaltern –
practices of femininity are the product of power, which both produces and
constrains social roles and identities. This includes, for instance, cultural con-
ventions that women defer to men, that it is their responsibility to perform
caring tasks such as ensuring that their household is provided with water, or
that they be more afraid of unsafe public spaces, not to mention the physical
dangers of violence that are intimately linked to their low status. DFID comes
close to acknowledging as much, when it suggests that the promotion of good
governance must include intervention even at the level of the “relations
between men and women in the household” (DFID, 2007b: 6).
However, its concrete strategies to intervene in the web of power that con-
stitutes gender inequalities and identities do not resolve the tension between
an assumption that all individuals are free and equal in the public sphere and
the inegalitarian relations that constitute individual identity in private. Thus,
it remarks that “women may not participate in a village meeting if it is held at
a time of day when they need to collect water, if it is unsafe to get to, or if
men dominate the discussion” (DFID, 2007b: 16). The implied solution
assumes that the problem is a matter of when and where the meeting is held
and how well it is chaired – but this does nothing to question the relations of
power that produce what it means to be a man or a woman or how they
might be reformed or transformed. A meeting held at a different time of day
or in a safer place does not merely accept that there is little that can be done
to intervene in the productive relations of power that create subordinate
feminine identities, but also reinforces the very fear that might limit women’s
mobility and sense of security, not to mention the impression that it is their
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job to collect water. Thus, power relations do not merely limit the effectiveness
of DFID’s intervention; on the contrary, their intervention is itself productive
of the power relations.
An insistence on a particular form of liberal democracy that privileges
autonomy, then, actively constrains notions of what gender identities might be.
Consider Gilmore and Mosazai’s response to the complaints of village councils
(shuras) that “‘women’s rights’ are given too high a priority by donors as against
issues like corruption and sustainable livelihoods”: their suggestion is that
“cultural sensitivities like this need to be factored in when development choices
are explained to ‘partners’ in a recipient country” (Gilmore and Mosazai, 2007:
148). Leaving aside the breathtaking patronising arrogance of this remark and
yet another attempt to save brownwomen from brownmen, let us instead note that
what is assumed is that “women’s rights” are fixed, given and non-negotiable.
Note, too, that this non-negotiability is the case not even in democracies
but especially in democracies, where the logic of human rights, as articulated
with democracy and good governance, requires a particular gendered config-
uration of citizenship. This is again underwritten by the assumption that the
historical process by which women have won particular rights (and not
others) in Western countries is the universal process that all people must pass
through and which can thereby be short-circuited through a proper “expla-
nation” that forecloses the possibility of struggle. The danger is that if women
are bequeathed a set of already-established rights from a Western history, they
are not democratic law makers, but rather – at best – merely litigants, and
then only once their rights have already been violated (Mouffe, 2000: 42).
Again, this form of liberal democracy is taken to be universal because of
an unspoken but insidious narrative about history, which assumes that the
women’s rights that we have in countries like Britain are the best we can do
and therefore unquestionable. The vehement defence of “women’s rights” in
opposition to the Archbishop’s lecture is instructive here. The widespread
condemnation of the lecture is more often than not based on anxiety about
the disastrous consequences for women’s rights that would ensue if shari’ah
law were accommodated inclusively in the British liberal democratic system.
Widely expressed worries include “separate and impenetrable courts and
schools”, “extreme female segregation”, “fully shrouded Muslim women”
(Alibhai-Brown, 2008) and “a parallel system of religious courts” (Smith,
2008), although more outlandish concerns are voiced, such as a possible pro-
hibition for women on coffee breaks (MacKenzie, 2008) or driving, as well as
dark warnings about violent and barbaric punishments for sexual impropriety
(Alibhai-Brown, 2008).
These worries proliferate despite the fact that the majority of cases heard
by shari’ah courts are divorce proceedings, without which it would be impos-
sible for some Muslim women ever to obtain a divorce (Khan, 2008a), thus
arguably enhancing and not curtailing the possibility of women’s rights.
However, this point about shari’ah courts cannot be heard. The ferocity of the
condemnation of the Archbishop shows how the very discussion of the role of
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religious institutions, or the practices constituting acceptable femininities, are
in practice ruled out of the public sphere and therefore beyond the realm of
democratic contestation. Indeed, he is attacked for having the temerity to
bring up the subject at all. Thus, the Independent argues that:
news has little room for the subtleties of academic gavottes […] The pro-
blem comes when you ask what is meant by sharia. Most of us are clear.
It is to do with the stoning to death of adulterous women […] in a world
where perception becomes its own reality, it is important for the leader of
the Church of England not to create such fecund possibilities for
misunderstanding.
(Vallely, 2008)
As the precise content of shari’ah law apparently cannot and must not be
publicly discussed, the resulting privatisation of such concerns appears to
reinforce the possibility of exactly what these commentators fear: parallel and
segregated lives whose self-evidence is put beyond debate. Indeed, the casting
of these institutions as “foreign”, other, stuck in an uncivilised past, is a very
effective way of forcing a segregation by imposing the blackmailing logic of
“your culture or your rights” (Williams, 2008b).
However, blackmail and segregation is the cost of maintaining the existing
gendered status quo. Thus, when the Sun newspaper sends two “page three
girls” (the young women who pose half-naked every day on page three of that
newspaper for the purposes of male gratification) to the Archbishop’s resi-
dence to play Rule Britannia at top volume (Wooding and Clench, 2008), this
may be crass, but it cannot be condemned with a corresponding violence. The
force of the Sun’s intervention is that it reinforces fears that shari’ah law
would compel women to wear the veil. The particular young women who
besiege the Archbishop are perceived to have made the free choice to dress (or
not) in a particular way. This is a right that could be contested only by
bringing the subject of the constitution of gender identities into the public
sphere. However, the civilisational narrative that suggests that the con-
temporary settlement of women’s rights is the very endpoint of human evo-
lution allows nothing further to be said. Contestation of the dress code begins
and ends with the right of young, attractive women to get undressed in public,
whether religious believers like it or not.
Thus the constitution of the private sphere as the proper location for the
practices of both religious belief and relations of care emerges from the
intersecting stories of civilisation, development and the spread of democracy.
These stories are gendered and racialised in particular ways. They therefore
matter because they inform the practices of thought that determine how an
unruly and unknowable present is to be governed, down to the detail of
what rights we have, what issues can be debated in the public sphere, what
cannot be said and even what women might reasonably be expected to wear,
particularly if they are to appear in the newspaper.
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It should be clear that I believe that some of these practices are ones we
might want to change. How could we do so?
Telling different stories?
Development and its concrete practices have long been highly contested, and
yet the overall project of development remains. Development interventions –
particularly, in recent years, the ubiquitous structural adjustment pro-
grammes – have been controversial and widely criticised on their own terms
for failing to achieve their stated aims of promoting growth, reducing poverty
and inequality, and promoting good governance (Corbo et al., 1992; Mosley
et al., 1991; Caufield, 1996; Chossudovsky, 2003; Cornia et al., 1987; Stewart,
1991; Moore and Unsworth, 2006; Unsworth, 2007). Various recent critiques
that have captured the public imagination have taken issue with the ways in
which development aid interferes with the proper functioning of markets, thus
implicitly accepting the (neo)liberal status quo (Easterly 2006; Collier 2008;
Moyo 2010). Meanwhile, proponents of more participatory forms of devel-
opment, such as Robert Chambers, have documented the ways in which
development interventions have wreaked havoc by ignoring the situated knowl-
edge of local people and the complex systems upon which their livelihoods
depend (Chambers 1997).
An especially perspicuous critique, Arturo Escobar’s (1994) achievement in
unmasking development as a teleological narrative has been significant: he
de-naturalises a way of looking at the world which takes “development” as a
universal process for granted by asking us to look again at the political con-
sequences of development studies and practice and the way they constitute
the undeveloped as subjects and objects of knowledge. Whilst the “post-
development” school, of which Escobar is perhaps the most important thin-
ker, has been subject to many justified (and some unfair) criticisms (see Ziai
2007 for a good summary of postdevelopment and its critics), this politiciza-
tion of development as a discourse has been extremely important. It has been
accompanied by others who have usefully demystified development as a tele-
ological, depoliticising (Ferguson, 1990) project, caught up in historically
specific and Western accounts of progress and science (Rist, 1997) and in the
notion of “trusteeship”, which is to say the idea that development profes-
sionals always already know which way the process of development is heading
and what its goal is (Nustad, 2001; Cowen and Shenton, 1996).
Somewhat similarly, as we saw in Chapter 1, critical writers like Milja
Kurki (2010, 2011, 2013), Alison Ayers (2006) and Rita Abrahamsen (2000)
offer persuasive critiques of Democracy Promotion by pointing out that the
narrow understanding of democracy that is promoted and demonstrating that
it is based on a particular, Western, version of liberal democracy.
What all these critiques share, however, is an assumption described most
pithily by postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak. Development, she suggests,
can be “recognized as coded within the legacy of imperialism […] whose
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supposedly authoritative narrative production was written elsewhere, in the
social formations of Western Europe” (Spivak, 1995: 164). She sees the
development discourse, which draws so heavily on the assumed universality of
the particular experience of the “West”, as an example of what she calls
“epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1987: 287). The pain and poignancy of inha-
biting “widely different epistemes, violently at odds with each other” (Spivak,
1995: 163) might be illustrated by Hamid’s evocation of the stark difference
between narratives of a modern Pakistan of destitution and dependency and
the proud and exalted history of the Mughal court, not to mention the
elided but unmissable allusion to the various “civilising missions”, colonial
and developmental, that lie in between the two.
The problem with this account is not that it is wrong, but that it is partial.
The corollary seems to be to assume that in the West we are not living with
epistemic violence, but rather that the narrative production of our civilisation,
our development, our democracy, is genuinely authoritative because it is, in
some way, an authentic story about our real experience of history. Thus,
accounts that focus on the Foreign Policy implications of these stories,
including Democracy Promotion, fail to take the risk of challenging the stor-
ies that we tell of ourselves: the stories that legitimate civilising missions in
the first place. This means that they do not challenge the basis of the power/
knowledge configurations that make Democracy Promotion an essential part
of shoring up domestic/ated identities.
In contrast, I want to suggest that the stories we tell of ourselves are worth
risking. In doing so, I take my inspiration from Michel Foucault’s 1976
account of the importance of genealogy in his lectures, published in English
as Society Must be Defended (Foucault, 2005b). I suggest that these lectures
prompt us to disrupt the “narrative production” of development and democracy
promotion.
Blood dried in the codes: Foucault on history
Foucault’s sights in these particular lectures are firmly set on the systems and
practices of thought and analysis that enable particular forms of historical
knowledge to take shape. In doing so, he describes how ways of organising
and thinking about the world have been enabled precisely because of modes
of historical narrative.
Most accessible to an English-speaking audience is perhaps his discussion
of how the narration of the history of the Norman Conquest structured poli-
tical thought and dissent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
(Foucault, 2005b: 99). Foucault claims that a particular struggle over an
understanding of the Conquest structures political discourse at this time,
creating an understanding of the nation as split between an indigenous
“Saxon” population and a conquering “Norman” monarch and aristocracy.
This is found in competing myths, stories and legends: a cult of King Harold
or the return of popular stories such as Robin Hood on the Saxon side, or the
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reactivation of non-Saxon, Celtic stories such as the Arthurian legends for the
(Norman) aristocracy and monarchy (ibid.: 100). The struggle provides a
framework for remembering and interpreting other, subsequent historical
events, by means of a type of “coding” given by the Conquest: “conflicts –
political, economic, juridical – could […] easily be articulated, coded and
transformed into a discourse, into discourses, about different races” (ibid.:
101). Thus, a story about history offered a binary schema of a society split
into two races, which provided a whole way of understanding history and the
world since.
This was a narrative that was explicitly concerned to discern “the blood
that has dried in the codes” (Foucault, 2005b: 56, 65), the forms of struggle
that had given rise to the ongoing divisions within society. Furthermore, the
struggle was understood to continue on the very terrain of how history was
understood and narrated. A systematic way of understanding society as a
function of a history given by the Norman Conquest did not provide a “par-
ticular thesis”, but rather was useful to a number of different groups in pro-
viding them with a means of formulating and making sense of their positions.
That is to say, it enabled the development of a politicised understanding of
historical narratives, one that challenged earlier “Roman” modes of historical
writing which had sought to legitimate existing power structures by demon-
strating their continuity with the laws, kings and power structures of the past
(ibid.: 66). The different stories told by royalists, parliamentarians and more
radical groups such as the Levellers or Diggers about the history of the Norman
Conquest enabled them to use knowledge about history to advance their own
struggles (ibid.: 102–109).
The English discourse of race war, then, “functions in both a political and
a historical mode, both as a program for political action and as a search for
historical knowledge” (Foucault, 2005b: 109). In their struggle over the
interpretation of history, these groups are engaged on the terrain of power/
knowledge, acutely aware that the historical narrative one accepts is crucial in
determining political practice.
As Chris Philo points out, then, the purpose of treating history as having
the structure of a battle between races is not:
to prove in some once-and-for-all fashion that the “truth” of history is
that politics is simply war by another name. Rather, it is to trace a pro-
cess whereby scholars writing about history […] began themselves to
conceive of history in this fashion, and in the process composed a history
that took war-like relations, the antagonisms endemic to struggle, conflict,
combat and the like, as the model for what needed to be analysed.
(Philo, 2007: 351)
In some sense, then, the factual accuracy of historical narratives is beside the
point. What is of more interest is the function of these narratives: what are
they doing? Foucault suggests that:
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I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean
to say, however, that the truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the
possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to
induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders
or “manufactures” something that does not yet exist, that is, “fictions” it.
(Foucault and Gordon, 1980: 193)
The history that we take to be true – as we have seen – has material con-
sequences, a concrete reality and existence of its own, and enables a political
programme by which we can act.
This does not mean, however, that we should be indifferent to whether
these narratives tell us anything important or accurate about the history of
the world: “One ‘fictions’ history on the basis of a political reality that makes
it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical
truth” (Foucault and Gordon, 1980: 193). Thus the task of writing history is
twofold. First, we need to discern the blood in the codes, and then second, we
need to make visible and mobilise new narratives.
This first task is what we have achieved in this chapter. We have discerned
in detail what version of history it is that enables the particular political pro-
gramme of democracy promotion. This is the version of history that functions
as true precisely because current politics depend on it. A passionate interest in the
present, however, demands the mobilisation of new narratives: narratives that can
be compelling not only because of their use of empirical and archival evi-
dence, but also because they help to imagine an alternative political practice.
The point of such histories is to disrupt the very codes through which we now
know the world. Genealogy, then, is a method for disturbing complacency
about the codes, the discourses, the stories we tell about ourselves.
Disorderly and tattered genealogies of democracy promotion
In this chapter, we have seen a variety of interlocking stories. Taken together
they give us to understand that there is a universal logic to history, for all that
the chaos of actual events may get in the way of its eventual, ineluctable pro-
gress. They constitute a particular regime of truth in which teleological time
operates to produce particular subjects of history: the civilised, the barbarian,
the savage. This then enables awhole political programme of detailed intervention,
which is gendered and racialised in specific ways. Is it possible, however, to
“fiction” an alternative political programme by re-coding these stories, or
discovering new ones? One thing is now clear: if we are to embark on this
work, then another seamless history will not do.
Genealogy, though, is opposed to the writing of seamless histories and
universal teleologies:
genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges,
to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle
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against the coercion of a unitary, formal and scientific theoretical dis-
course. The project of these disorderly and tattered genealogies is to
reactivate local knowledges.
(Foucault, 2005b: 10)
What follows in the next four chapters may indeed seem disorderly for any
reader expecting a continuous historical narrative. However, its disorderliness
is not random, but rather a deliberate attempt to disorder the neatness of the
stories we tell of ourselves, taking the pivotal moments of those stories as
starting points. Thus, we will ask, did democracy promotion really begin as a
ruptural break with colonial practices? Did history end in 1989 with the
beginning of a newly moral practice of democracy promotion? How do the
continuities and the ruptures in these stories we tell of ourselves support a
particular politics? What if they are not really continuities, or ruptures, at all?
Are those stories merely useful fictions that provide a political programme,
which we could, by telling other stories, change?
Although many readers of Foucault have characterised him as an historian
of discontinuity (Philo, 2007; Thacker, 1996), this was not precisely his inten-
tion. In an interview he states that, “[t]his business about discontinuity has
always rather bewildered me […] My problem was not at all to say, ‘Voilà,
long live discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good thing too’”
(Foucault, 1991d: 53–54). He suggests instead that he is interested in changes
in the regimes of truth and statements that appear to belie the “calm, con-
tinuist image that is normally accredited” (Foucault, 1991d: 54). The point is,
as ever, to show that there are alternatives to the stories we tell of our-
selves and potential to unearth alternative ways of knowing the past. It is
therefore equally disorderly to discern the continuities where we took for
granted rupture, as it is to show the rupture, where we thought to see only
continuity.
In Chapters 4 to 6, we will see that almost everything about the seamless
continuist stories we have seen above about civilisation, development and the
spread of democracy is profoundly misleading. I will show that the British
have been promoting democracy for much longer than the official history of
democracy promotion suggests, and that decolonisation did not represent a
ruptural break in which the iniquities of imperialism were replaced by a ben-
evolent, but incomplete, Democracy Promotion. On the contrary, I will
demonstrate that the civilising colonial mission has from the start been
engaged in promoting versions of good government that have included var-
ious forms of representative institutions, which both precede and produce the
movements for national self-determination in British India.
Moreover, whereas cautionary tales about the Cold War, or the discourse
surrounding the London bombings, suggest that democracy is a remedy for, or
alternative to, violence, I will show that the violence of the Partition of India
and Pakistan was made possible, and provoked, by the promotion of “good
government”. Electoral democracy, representative institutions, the division
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into public and private spheres all enabled and enforced the particular
solidification of religious identities that clashed catastrophically.
Finally, I show in Chapter 6 that far from vindicating the institutions of
liberal democracy, another look at the events of 1989 – particularly the
Salman Rushdie affair – can show us how democratic institutions enacted
profound epistemic and physical cruelty and violence at that time. Chapter 7
shows how they continued to do so despite changing understandings of
democracy promotion in the years of the “war on terror”.
Most importantly, though, the next three chapters will demonstrate that the
progressive, teleological understandings of time that provide the conditions of
possibility for the precise stories outlined above have emerged in response to
uncertainty about the present. They have therefore been successful discourses
primarily not because they were accurate accounts of the past, but rather
because they provided a useful means for orienting practical responses
towards the future. This is why we should care about the stories we tell about
ourselves, and this is why the stakes of showing why such stories are mis-
leading are so high. We care about the past because it offers us a way of
understanding how to proceed in the future.
Note
1 However, as Stuart Croft (2006) has pointed out, an account of history or society
that was more closely based on the actual work of evolutionary scientists would
look very different from this and would emphasise contingency, accident and chaos.
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4 Authoring the codes elsewhere
Colonial governmentality and
teleological time
This is a common pattern in the history of thought: an idea becomes sharply
formulated and even named […] at exactly the moment that it is being put
under pressure.
(Ian Hacking, “How Should we do the History of Statistics”)
This chapter goes back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in
order to unearth the emergence of some of the practices discussed in the
preceding three chapters. I make two related points. First, I show that the
teleological story we tell of ourselves that I presented in detail in Chapter 3 is
misleading in a number of ways. Second, and more importantly, I demon-
strate how this way of thinking about time and progress emerged in the early
nineteenth century as a function of the problematisation of how to govern in
a confused and unknowable India. Thus, I will show that whilst teleological
versions of history are not a very good guide to what happened in the past,
they did in the 1830s become a useful way of deciding what to do in the
present. This is because they provided a way of thinking about the future. In
other words, I show that history has not been produced by the logic of tele-
ology; teleological narratives, however, have been produced by the specific
unfolding of history.
The British have been worrying about the promotion of good government
in what is now Pakistan, and devising representative institutions to help them, for
much longer than is commonly thought. The very government of Britain at
home was also profoundly changed by this experience. As Michel Foucault puts
it in a rare reference to imperialism, this entailed a kind of “boomerang effect”:
It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques
and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European
models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect
on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, insti-
tutions and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was
brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice
something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself.
(Foucault, 2005b: 103)
In the following pages, I will describe precisely how one instance of this
boomerang effect took place. I show how it was that the quantitative tech-
nologies of liberal democratic governmentality that are now so familiar to us
were implemented in the subcontinent, in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, for the first time in the British Empire. This was because they
provided a means of knowing and controlling a population seen as unruly
and a present that seemed uncertain.
Even more crucially, the teleological form of othering that constitutes
British identity is also an invention that dates back to this precise period and
its history is deeply intertwined with the emergence of liberal democratic
governmentality. The word “civilisation” became established in the English
language around the period 1772–1836 (Bowden, 2009: 31), at exactly the
moment when ideas about time, temporality and progress were coming under
new pressure in the way Ian Hacking describes in the quotation at the start of
this chapter. In my discussion of these conflicting ideas about time, tempor-
ality and governing in this chapter, I am particularly indebted to Jon Wilson’s
excellent study, The Domination of Strangers (2008), although I take his ideas
in a slightly different direction according to my purposes.
This pressure is most easily understood by considering how the different
ways of thinking about governing respectively attempt to resolve the con-
stitutive tension at the heart of liberal governmentality. This is a tension that
emerges because governmentality brings together two rather different tradi-
tions. On the one hand is the notion of the self-governing polity of Ancient
Greece, from which we draw our ideas about democratic participation on the
basis of political equality as citizens: the city-citizen matrix. On the other,
emerging out of a Christian tradition, is the idea of the shepherd and flock. It
is this latter matrix, in which the community’s leader is responsible for
knowing and caring for each member of the “flock”, and which – in an his-
torical process that need not concern us here – has been displaced from the
Church to the state, that underlies the understanding that it is the state’s
responsibility to know, understand, care for and enable the development of its
population (Foucault, 2007; Dean, 2010: 90–101). The chapter proceeds in
three main sections that each deal with a particular resolution of these ideas.
The first section explores ideas about governing that operated using a con-
ception of time that was continuous and accretive, animated by the stadial
notion of progress that was emblematic of eighteenth-century thought
(Burchell, 1991: 137). Using Edmund Burke’s work in particular, I show that
eighteenth-century ideas about time had stressed an organic growth of
wisdom, which was deeply involved with the place and people that were its
subjects. Thus, the laws, procedures and processes of governing were unique
to the time and place in which they had emerged and were emphatically
non-transferable. Modes of governing that had evolved in India must, by this
token, be respected in India. Meanwhile, British modes of governing that
stressed participation and relationality were valorised as the precious inheritance
of the past that must be preserved against the depredations of time.
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Here, the pastoral role of governance is privileged. Pastoral responsibilities
are understood to be conferred by ownership of property, which brings with it
the duty to care for and about the people connected to it, andwho are tied to local
landowners through historically constituted and inherited links of affection and
obligation. This hierarchical and highly gendered polity is nevertheless highly
participatory, not least because of electoral practices, in ways that enabled the
British to see themselves as a peculiarly “free”, self-governing people.
The second section shows that these ideas came into conflict with an India
that was difficult to understand. It was for a long time accepted that the laws
and customs that had evolved there should be respected, but in the everyday
reality of trying to govern, this led to profound perplexity, which appeared to
derive from the lack of a shared history. Concrete attempts to resolve the
epistemological problems posed by India were justified (after the fact) by a
Utilitarian perspective, associated with James Mill, which worked with a
temporality that aspired to be ruptural. Given the “barbarous” and incom-
prehensible nature of India, the best thing to do was to break with past his-
tory, draw a line under previous customs and start again, using a rational and
minute control of the population to instil a better governance founded on
logic, objective knowledge and reason. The shepherd-flock paradigm was
re-invoked, but in new terms: the flock would henceforth be known through
objective categories and governed according to general laws.
The third section, however, suggests that – given the importance of freedom
and the tradition of the city-citizen matrix for British ideas about governing –
the new, abstracted forms of governmental rule created significant unease
about the legitimacy of this new shepherd-flock configuration in India which
did not appear to allow for the participation of the governed. This unease led
to discussions, in the “Age of Reform” (the early 1830s), of how institutions
could be used to represent India. The uneasy compromise that emerged of
assuming that the East India Company could function as a kind of a repre-
sentative institution was hardly democratic. Nevertheless, the debates at this
time laid down the conditions of possibility for the liberal democratic
institutions that are now so familiar.
In this period, two incommensurable sets of practices of thought about
governing and time, characterised by Burke and Mill, were precariously
resolved by the emergence of a set of governing practices based on teleology
and a faith in progress. This resolution would have consequences long into the
future. Thus Thomas Babington Macaulay and other thinkers who were con-
cretely engaged in the difficult business of governing India took the emergence
of scientific rationality and representative institutions in Britain as the end-
point of a process of organic development and upended this idea to imagine
that India might, with help from its British governors, go through a similar
process in the future and alight upon a similar endpoint. This, I suggest,
marks the emergence of ideas about “progress” that is expected to be the
same everywhere, as distinct from earlier ideas that progress would look dif-
ferent for different peoples and places: progress in the singular, rather than
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progress in the plural. By the 1850s, this new way of thinking about civilisa-
tion had become widespread, such that Henry Buckle’s immensely popular
History of Civilization in England was able to claim that human actions
everywhere are likewise determined by general laws that are as fixed as those
understood to govern the world of physics (Hacking, 1991: 188).
The British polity before the age of reform: affective ties and continuity
Governing relations
In late eighteenth-century Britain, the resolution of shepherd-flock and city-
citizen matrices was achieved in a way rather unfamiliar to liberal democratic
techniques of rule. The local landowner, who inherited administrative office
along with, and inextricable from, his (and it was almost always his) other property
(Wilson, 2008: 72), was deeply involved in highly decentralised practices of
governing and this involved detailed narrative knowledge of the people. This
knowledge could only be obtained through an ethical investment in the
maintenance over time of the affective relationships that constituted political
life. Within this framework, the existence of electoral practices, public hustings
and some semblance of representative institutions provided a limited element
of choice in whom to defer to, alongside an ongoing emphasis on participation
and mutual accountability and responsibility.
This system of governance was taken as evidence of the widespread belief
that the British political system was particularly conducive to freedom (Colley,
2009: 361–363). It was a belief that played a key role in constituting a sense of
British identity and was buttressed by the popular practice, around election
time, of crowds singing patriotic songs and waving Union Flags in order to
demonstrate their support for the system of governing as “freeborn English-
men”, understood to form part of an historical narrative stretching back to
Saxon England, the Magna Carta, the restitution of an ancient constitution in
the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and so on (ibid.: 343, 352, 52).
Suffrage was, before the 1832 Reform Act, highly restricted, but it would be
wrong to assume that the mass of British people were entirely excluded from
political life. In comparison with other European countries, the British polity
was, although hierarchical and highly gendered, also extremely decentralised,
flexible and participatory in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
It is perhaps Edmund Burke who gives the clearest account of the parti-
cular ways of thinking about governing at that time. His work has a particular
relevance to any study of British India in this period, given his stinging
attacks on the East India Company (Burke, 1991c, 1991d), and it is worth
looking in some detail at his work, which gives important clues to the ways
governing in India could be thought about just before the Age of Reform (see
also Wilson, 2008: 28–33).
Burke was much more concerned with practical political skill and the
management of relationships – described in affective terms – than abstract rules:
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We Englishmen, stop very short of the principles upon which we support
any given part of our constitution; or even the whole of it together […] All
government, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every
prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance incon-
veniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy
others; and we chuse rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants.
(Burke, 1991b: 142)
Citizenship, here, is a whole tissue of complex relationships whose emotional
resonances are more important than the cold rationality of the “subtle dis-
putant”. Instead, happiness, enjoyment and benefit are the outcome of being
embedded in relationships in all their complexity and the never-ending
negotiations they entail.
This is the antithesis of living by generalised rules. General rules lead to
dispute, and rupture the very ties that hold the polity together. The happiness
of a “happy citizen” has little to do with the Utilitarian “greatest happiness to
the greatest number”, because Burke’s conception of happiness is not indivi-
dualised but relational: it is therefore not tractable to quantification or mea-
surement, but rather is something that must be maintained through ongoing
ethical work. This implies that personal character, rather than codified law, is
likewise of the utmost importance. Skill and tact in managing relationships,
disagreements and ongoing events were the crucial political attributes:
“Whilst manners remain entire, they will correct the vices of the law and
soften it at length to their own temper” (Burke, 1991a: 152). Crucially, the
relationships that cemented the political community are taken to be con-
stituted by the ownership of property (Langford, 1991: 50–51; Wilson, 2008:
32), and it is thus the character of the local landowner as the practical and
skilled arbiter of the compromises and judgements of everyday life, that is
centrally important for the management of the affective life of the community.
Hierarchy and deference are also valued in electoral practices: on the face
of it, the outcomes of elections might seem like a foregone conclusion, given
the many-faceted influence of local landed families with long histories of
ruling particular constituencies. Indeed, many seats went uncontested. How-
ever, it is important not to over-estimate this tendency, because that would be
to disregard the complex networks of responsibility and accountability that
accompanied relations of deference: “the voters demanded, indeed antici-
pated, paternalist services of many kinds in return for their loyalty” (O’Gor-
man, 1989: 225–226). The process of making these demands was highly
participatory. Elections would go on for days (somewhat curtailed by the
Reform Act) and formed a kind of rowdy, public carnival in which a powerful
emphasis was placed on the practices of the hustings, at which people of all
social classes, including women, held the much-valued and -vaunted right to
“have their say” (Lawrence, 2009: 30, 5). In the event that demands and
expectations of paternalist services were not met, it was by no means unheard
of for seats to change hands.
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MPs were accountable not just to the electorate, but to the crowd more
generally. Furthermore voters were also understood to be accountable to
one another and to non-voters. Voting took place in public and even when
the secret ballot was introduced – not until 1872 – it was tellingly widely
denounced by Parliamentarians as “un-English” (Lawrence, 2009: 46). Voters
were expected to be able to explain and stand by their decisions. Thus elec-
tions were fully implicated in complex networks of affection, patronage and
mutual responsibility. The development of British institutions, then, was per-
ceived quite differently from the way the same history of the same set of
events is used today.
Government and chivalry
As this discussion suggests, political relations were gendered in ways that,
despite some obvious continuities, nevertheless differ importantly from the
configurations of liberal democratic society. I argued in Chapter 3 that a
valorisation of care, relationality and the emotions would explode the com-
plex of gendered practices of thought that emerge from the narrative of the
savage and the barbarian. In this section, my reading of Burke suggests, by
way of illustration, that a radically different way of thinking about time and
history necessarily entails an alternative ethics of gender relations.
None of what follows should be taken as an invitation to idealise Burke’s
thought. Eighteenth-century Britain was a world in which paternal bene-
volence was valued alongside “manly” courage in leaders, and the public
sphere of the hustings was often violent and hyper-masculine (Lawrence,
2009: 14–20). Nevertheless, the highly partisan presence of women at these
events – for all that they were valued in part for their “decorous role in the pro-
ceedings” (ibid.: 21) – signals that they were never quite excluded from
participation. The gendering of political relations requires some teasing out.
Burke, then, takes the familiar Enlightenment view that a society can be
judged by observing the way its women are treated and he makes regular
appeal to the ancient virtues of “chivalry”. On these grounds, he is outraged
by the brutal treatment of Marie Antoinette at the hands of French revolu-
tionaries and likewise the perceived violation of Begums of Oudh, when
Company servants raid their palaces to take possession of disputed revenue
(Colley, 2009: 258; Fidler and Welsh, 1991: 30, 48, 55).
There are various elements to Burke’s horror at the Oudh incident that are
worth examining in detail. The first is the lack of “reverence paid to the
female sex in general” (Burke, 1990: 4.5.99), a breach of traditional gender
norms of chivalry that extends to “a rapacious and licentious soldiery in the
personal search of women” (ibid.: 4.5.101). This violating failure of the
important virtue of good manners is compounded, second, by the fact that
these are women of “high rank and condition” (ibid.: 4.5.99). The importance
of this is signalled by the origin of the fortune allegedly plundered by the
Company under Warren Hastings:
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This prince (suspicious, and not unjustly suspicious, of his son and suc-
cessor) at his death committed his treasures and his family to the British
faith. That family and household, consisted of two thousand women; to
which were added two other seraglios of near kindred, and […] of about
fourscore of the Nabob’s children, with all the eunuchs, the ancient ser-
vants, and a multitude of the dependants of his splendid court. These
were all to be provided, for present maintenance and future establish-
ment, from the lands assigned as dower, and from the treasures which he
left to these matrons, in trust for the whole family.
(Burke, 1990: 4.5.83, emphasis in the original)
Burke has no problem with the idea of a woman owning property, then.
However, it is not thought about as a personal fortune that is hers to dispose of.
Rather, property brings with it a whole web of inherited and future responsi-
bility and dependence, including particularly the well-being of the family’s women
and others in need of protection. In the Company’s act of forcible confisca-
tion, they are not merely dispossessing the princess, but also disrupting, not
only for now but for future generations, a series of hierarchical relations of
trust and dependence on which the well-being of a whole community depends.
Perhaps the worst element of the Company’s actions, for Burke, is that the
instrument of the prince’s dispossession is “her own son […] It was the pious
hand of the son that was selected to tear from his mother and grandmother
the provision of their age, the maintenance of his brethren, and of all the
ancient household of his father” (Burke, 1990: 4.5.83, emphasis in the origi-
nal). The most immediate of familial ties that are founded upon and vested in
the bodies of women are severed through a violent and highly intimate viola-
tion of the bodies of a mother and a grandmother, and in the process an entire
family, household and broader society are imperilled in the work of a moment.
The familial model of a Burkean polity, then, with its basis in affection, trust,
paternal authority and provision, is dependent on particular gender relations,
in which the figures of fathers, sons and brothers engage in the political work
of ensuring that mothers and grandmothers, the elderly, the eunuchs and the
dependants are provided for. A disregard for gendered codes of behaviour is,
then, potentially catastrophic – and not only for women.
Feminist scholars of international relations have long remarked the litany
of differential binary oppositions that litter the discipline (Thapar-Björkert
and Shepherd, 2010: 275; Campbell, 1998: 195–205). Just as the masculine is
privileged over the feminine, the public is given primacy over the private;
universality and abstraction over the cultural, the local and the specific; spa-
tial relations over temporal; morals over ethics (Gilligan, 1990); rationality
over sentiment. The former terms in each case are linked through their asso-
ciation with the public world of men, whereas the latter are feminised and
confined to the private, domestic sphere.
Whilst Burke’s thought is populated by the “figure of the lady in distress”
(Zerilli, 1994: 60) in ways that are highly problematic for any present-day
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feminist, we can nevertheless now see that it is possible to read his work as
putting these binaries radically in doubt. Indeed, he suggests that culture,
affection, care, ethics, and domestic and familial relations are constitutively
important for the very possibility both of the nation and therefore the inter-
national. Burke alerts us that there is nothing inevitable about our gendered
discursive economy. On the contrary, I suggest that it was recently forged
along with other techniques of governing that sought to abstract politics from
the day-to-day management of relationships and affective ties.
History, time and preserving continuity
Inseparable from this idea of the political community as a set of pragmatic,
familial relations is Burke’s sense of temporality, as underlined by the importance
of the “ancientness” of the Oudh estate: he views the nation as “an idea of con-
tinuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers, and in space”, and the
relationships amongst the political community as a “partnership not only between
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and
those who are to be born” (quoted in Fidler and Welsh, 1991: 40–41; see also
Wilson, 2008: 33). Thus the guiding conception of time was one of continuity –
literally borne through the bodies of women – in which accumulated wisdom,
sensitivity to context and practical skill and experience, were of the highest impor-
tance (Fidler and Welsh, 1991: 11). This bears important similarities with
Adam Smith, who, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 2010), laid out
a view of the political community as a complex, interconnected organism
which functioned according to sentiment and affective ties (Rothschild, 2001).
Dramatic change, then, was dangerous because these relational processes
by definition could not be thought up or contained within a single mind or
moment, but rather were the emergent property of a set of temporal and
spatial relations that exceeded any attempt to capture, codify or abstract
them. This was, of course, the basis for Burke’s fierce opposition to the
French Revolution (Fidler and Welsh, 1991: 29–36): “Rage and phrenzy will
pull downmore in half an hour, than prudence, deliberation and foresight can build
up in an hundred years” (quoted in ibid.: 30). As there could be no map,
blueprint or set of rules that could encompass the complex practical wisdom
built up over continuous time, once lost, they would be gone perhaps forever.
For this reason, Burke is horrified by the idea that the British in India
might be destroying ancient ways of doing things, customs and traditions that
had evolved locally and were highly adapted to the environment and people
who had produced, and been produced by, them (Burke, 1991d: 209). He was
committed to the idea that political practice was a matter of local culture
and had to be approached in all its specificity: “I could never conceive that
the natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in the same
manner” (Burke, 1991a: 161). The problem of the cultural distance of the
Company from those they are ruling is furthermore compounded by the fact
that:
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they are separated from the Country that sent them out and from the
Country in which they are; […] there is no control by persons who
understand their language, who understand their manners, or can apply
their conduct to the Laws of the Country.
(Burke, 1991d: 211)
Thus lacking in the appropriate relational ties, it is impossible for them to
rule appropriately. Culture – understood as both language and ethical “man-
ners”, as well as specific, not universal, “laws”, all of which are temporally
constituted – is what founds good government and enables the accountability
of rulers.
Modes of governing were changing in the first third of the nineteenth cen-
tury in very important ways. This was the “Age of Reform” – often vaunted
in the stories we tell of ourselves about the history of British institutions –
which had already by 1833 seen Catholic emancipation, the abolition of the
slave trade and the extension of the parliamentary franchise to every adult
male who owned a house worth £10 or more (Colley, 2009: chapter 8), whilst
in India, the burning of widows had been formally abolished in 1829 (Wilson,
2008: 167).
However, such reforms were an attempt to reconfigure complex relation-
ships within the context of a present thought to be linked intimately with the
past. The supporters of the 1832 Reform Act were not intending what might
be perceived as a damaging break or rupture of the affective and temporal
links that constituted the polity. On the contrary, attempts by Utilitarians, like
Bentham, to codify the complex web of unwritten laws had long been mar-
ginalised and resisted (Wilson, 2008: 29–35). Despite the fact that indus-
trialisation, urbanisation, scientific discovery and Enlightenment philosophy
were changing patterns of governing across Europe, Britain continued to
function in ways that made it look almost ungovernable according to the
rational principles becoming fashionable in continental Europe at the time
(Hilton, 2006). However, it was the experience of governing India that would,
in important ways, change much of that.
Uncertainty, abstraction and the machinery of government
The assumptions of how to rule in Britain were in some respects translated to
the business of governing in India, at least at first. There was never any
question, in the eighteenth century, as the Company gained ever more poli-
tical power through battles and treaties: the local population should be ruled
according to “ancient customs and usages of the country” including the
“ancient Mughal constitution” (Wilson, 2008: 51–52).
What these laws concretely were was not a matter of particular interest for
Company servants, so long as they could be established and enforced. The
important thing – for the Company as much as for Edmund Burke – was to
rule legitimately through the institutions that constituted a link to the past
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and not to allow invasion and conquest to rupture the delicate web of con-
tinuity that held the polity together. Thus, in the late eighteenth century,
Company servants were writing long explanations in prose to substantiate
and explain their decisions and actions, making reference to historical precedent
and the advice of local judges and scholars (Wilson, 2008).
By the 1830s, however, there had been a very significant change. By now,
Company servants were filling in forms. This process required them to classify
local inhabitants according to a restricted number of general categories
(Wilson, 2008: 129). India experienced bureaucratic governmentality for the
first time. This was not because it had been imported wholesale and fully
formed by a foreign force: as we have seen, governing at home was a question
of narrative, precedent and judgement based on specific pastoral knowledge
built up over time. Rather, it became necessary because of the discursive
encounter of the British with the particular challenges and puzzles thrown up
by the novelty of colonial rule (ibid.).
The difficulty involved in governing India was a very practical one. Com-
pany servants working in courts and revenue offices simply did not know
what the laws and customs of the land were that they were required to
uphold. Wilson’s archival work – using documents from the courts of late
eighteenth-century Bengal – describes trials that dragged on for years in the
attempt to establish who owned what and just what local custom ought to
dictate. Local leaders and lawyers – not unaware of the opportunities opened
up by British uncertainty – gave conflicting opinions on the correct course of
action (Wilson, 2008: 83–91). This was taken by Company servants to be
evidence of “despotism” in India, a term connoting arbitrary and uncertain
governance. This was taken to reflect particularly badly on the character of
the Indians who interacted with Company servants, who were understood to
be lacking in the “public virtue” and “honour” that would enable the proper
management of the community (ibid.: 65).
This characterisation is only comprehensible in terms of the particular
resolution of governance that was current in late eighteenth-century Britain,
with its emphasis on relationship management as politics. The perceived
incomprehensibility of local manners and behaviour led to the conclusion that
local governance was devastatingly poor: “For most Britons [as for Company
servants in 1780s Bengal], the word ‘despotism’ simply conjured up an image
of a society so disorganised it was almost impossible to think about how it
was able to exist at all” (Wilson, 2008: 65).
Attempts to manage this uncertainty began with tentative attempts to write
down and enforce a set of strict principles, such as the “permanent settle-
ment” to introduce stable, heritable property rights and fix rent revenues
implemented by the Marquis of Cornwallis in 1793. This system was under-
stood to be abstract and generalisable enough that it could be transferred to
Madras and Benares without making any allowances for local circumstances.
This bespeaks a genuinely novel way of thinking about property, which would
have been quite alien to the Burkean conception of ownership as constitutive
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of political relations, inseparable from the specificities of local context and
affective relations. The new “Bengal system”, then, constitutes away of thinking
about a fully formed, private economic sphere that is distinct from the public
practices of governing, creating the autonomous, contracting homo econom-
icus of liberal governmentality perhaps for the first time in the British Empire.
Note, too, that the development of this abstract system of rules and a separate
public sphere in which they apply emerges not as a deduction from rational
first principles, but rather as an entirely pragmatic response to the challenge of
working out who owned what in an unfamiliar terrain (Wilson, 2008: 69–74).
Around the same time, the usefulness of abstract rules and categories
extended into a movement to write down and translate local codes of law into
English, so that there would be some steady point of reference for decision
making. However, these Indian texts did not offer a codified set of rules, but
rather elaborated the practices and principles “created by the active partici-
pation in a sphere of customary activity outside the court” (Wilson, 2008: 83),
which might and did vary greatly from place to place. As such, these sorts of
texts were of little practical use in dispute resolution since, “if an official was able
to trust the logic of Bengali jurisprudence [which involved a particular style of
reasoning, rather than an abstract set of rules] well enough to make sense of
the text, he would have no need for the work in the first place” (ibid.: 83).
The frustration and uncertainty of being unable to make enough sense of
India to be able to govern leads by the 1820s to sets of pithy rules being
written down by William Hay Macnaghten in his Principles and Precedents of
Mahometan Law and Principles and Precedents of Hindoo Law, published in
1825 and 1827, respectively (Wilson, 2008: 96). As the author of these works
was well aware, he was not merely writing down pre-existing rules, but rather
creating for the first time anywhere in the British Empire (including Britain
itself) a body of positive, abstract, textual laws that were expected to govern
the conduct of an entire population (ibid.: 97).
The new ways of ruling that came to prominence in India, then, included
the use of abstract rules, the delineation of categories of people, the separa-
tion of the public and private spheres, and the introduction of a disinterested,
rational system of decision making in which personal ties were less important
than general principles. A form of rule was instantiated in which the state
took on the pastoral role of the disinterested shepherd who knows the flock
not according to a sentimental or narrative relationship with each, but rather
according to the categorisations and statistics that are the indispensable
science of modern governmentality.
Governing began to be perceived less as the skilled exercise of wisdom in
the management of relationships and more like the running of a machine, in
keeping with changing times and the innovative new inventions that emerged
from the Industrial Revolution. However, such perceptions did not emerge
fully formed out of progressive, rational reflection in domestic institutions, but
were rather the product of perplexity and attempts to deal with what was
perceived as chaos in colonial India. In a strange environment where the
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assumptions, mutual obligations and taken-for-granted understandings no
longer necessarily held, governing turned out to pose profound epistemologi-
cal problems, as expressed by Thomas Babington Macaulay when he
describes the experience of governing India as one of “walking in darkness”
(Macaulay, 1833). It was the encounter of Company servants with a polity
who did not resemble them, with whom they felt no long historical associa-
tions or ties and with whom they shared little mutual understanding, that
changed ideas about ruling and about time.
As Wilson argues, although the changes in Indian government around this
period have been read as influenced by Utilitarian thought propounded by
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (see Stokes, 1959; Said, 1995: 214–215), the
growing abstraction, rationalisation and codification in India precedes the
influence of Utilitarianism (Wilson, 2008: 136). This is not to deny the impor-
tance of Mill’s work on India, but rather to suggest that theory and practice
inform one another in complex ways. Mill’s prescriptions for India and for
Britain were at least in part based on his reading about the difficulties
faced and the practical muddling-through that had been exemplified by
Company servants in India, whilst also laying down an intellectual rationale
for them.
Utilitarian codes
James Mill’s History of British India – first published in 1818 and still in
print – is perhaps the most important source on colonial Utilitarian thinking.
It would lead to the author’s appointment as examiner of correspondence at
the Company, would function as a textbook at Haileybury – the college for
future East India Company servants (Gilmour, 2007: 13) – and was described
by Macaulay (1833), no great admirer of Mill’s thought in general, as “the
greatest historical work that has appeared in our language since that of
Gibbon”. It is important because, in synthesising the problems of governing
India and the abstract solutions that had been proposed for them in this
influential text, he elaborates a theoretical account of the concrete governing
practices we saw above. Thus, the ad hoc muddling through of administrators
becomes a generalised prescription about how to govern that is understood
(by Mill) to be universally applicable.
What is particularly important for my purpose here is to note how gov-
ernance in India has been re-problematised on the basis of an entirely differ-
ent reading of history. Rather than attempting to discern the customs and
traditions from the past in order to manage the present, Mill wants to make a
ruptural break with the past. He did not elaborate a theory of civilisation that
understood history as evolution towards civilisation. Rather, he viewed socie-
ties on a more or less binary schema as either “civilised” or “barbarous”, with
Britain – by virtue of its uncodified laws – occupying a rather ambiguous
position between the two (Pitts, 2005: 129). In order to contain the barbarity,
a single, heroic effort of law making was required by which a rational mind
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could draw a line under the past and provide a full, precise and rational
codification of the Indian legal system (Wilson, 2008: 140; Pitts, 2005: 128).
This is not to say, however, that even Mill hoped to impose European
practices wholesale into India; rather the codification of Indian law would
provide a rupture with the corrupt practices of the present, but would take as
its basis local rules and principles that could be tidied up and made into a
logical and consistent body of positive law. Paradoxically, every attempt to
produce a rupture by producing a code of Indian law would refer back to
Indian practice.
Thus an impulse towards rational abstraction was not itself the con-
sequence of logical deduction, but rather the result of entirely inductive,
rooted and contingent negotiations with the difficulties of the present. Mill’s
solution and the locally specific variations on it that emerged derived from, as
well as feeding back into, the anxious and tentative response by Lord Teign-
mouth and others in Bengal who first attempted to manage uncertainty by
establishing and writing down some principles according to which it would be
possible to proceed (Wilson, 2008: 57–63, 136).
The 1833 Charter Act
In the context of this wide-ranging attention to the proper practices of good
government, public attention was drawn to the East India Company’s anom-
alous position as both commercial trading company and the de facto ruler
and sovereign of British India, which began to appear increasingly trouble-
some beyond those with a direct interest in free trade. When its Charter came
up for renewal in 1833, it was ripe as the next target for reform.
The 1833 Government of India Act, known as the Charter Act (House of
Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1833), not only finally ended the Company’s
right to trade by abolishing its monopoly on Chinese imports of tea, but also
created what Henry Tucker – member of the Court of Directors and future
Chair – called a “new constitution for India” (quoted in Wilson, 2008: 149).
From now on, the sovereign power of India would formally reside in the
British Parliament, ending the nominal authority of the Mughal Emperor,
and would be delegated to a unitary Legislative Council, which would have
powers over all India. This appears, on the face of it, to be a triumph for Mill
and his advocacy of a single set of laws devised by an efficient legislature that
would break dramatically with the confusion and uncertainty of the present.
The 1833 Charter Act did indeed establish a unitary legislative authority in
India that, it was hoped, would provide a single legitimate source of general-
ised, abstract law. The hopes of both Mill and Thomas Babington Macaulay,
who led the first commission to codify the law in India, were that India could
now be governed according to rational principles, rather than the capricious,
arbitrary will of the Oriental despot (Kolsky, 2005: 652).
This radically new resolution of the city-citizen/shepherd-flock problematic –
in which the role of the shepherd is emphatically enshrined and the
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participatory practices of the city-citizen tradition marginalised – was for
many in Britain deeply alien to the prevailing understandings of how a society
should be governed. The ways in which it was reconciled with governing
practices at home rebounded in important ways on British modes of thinking
about how to govern.
Teleology and reform
James Mill’s advocacy of a fully codified legal system for India has rightly
been read as much as a critique of British governance as it was of India’s
(Majeed, 1992). Drawing attention to attempts to contain the “barbarism” of
governing practices elsewhere, he deliberately and inevitably drew attention to
the perceived deficiencies of government at home, where there was an equal
dearth of codified law.
However, the critique of British institutions was not necessarily shared by
the majority of reformers, who were proud of British institutions and modes
of governance. Unlike Mill, they discerned a troubling tension between the
“free government” enjoyed in Britain – with its representative institutions and
traditions of widespread participation – and the “good government” to be
instituted in India – with abstract rules and a centralised, unified government.
This final section shows how they resolved this tension by tacking between the
two conceptions of time – Burke’s organic and Mill’s mechanical time – that
came with these different modes of government. A precarious combination
of the delicately continuous, accumulative time of the Burkean polity, and the
once-and-for-all rupture of Mill’s end to barbarism, gave rise to a specific
teleology that prefigures present-day practices of temporal othering.
The negotiations and debate that preceded the new Charter were bound up
in Britain’s sense of its own identity and place in the world, articulated through
its supposed superior and benevolent governing practices. The Company’s
General Court, for example, were at pains regularly to stress:
their anxious wish to concur with His Majesty’s Government and with
Parliament, in every way in their power, to promote the welfare, pros-
perity and happiness of the Natives in India, alike important to the cause
of humanity as to the power and to the commerce of Britain.
(India Office, 1833a: 8)
Similarly, Charles Grant of the Government’s Board of India stated that:
the establishment of a just and benignant system of administration over
the territories of British India, an object of the last moment to the
nations who inhabit them, is, at the same time, not only most important
to our national honour, but must, in several views, reflect back on us the
benefits which we bestow.
(India Office, 1833c: 11)
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It is notable that these statements appear in confidential documents that were
not for public consumption. These arguments, then, are not merely rhetorical
devices to appease a critical public, but rather integral to the discourses
employed by powerful men at the time: what counted as a good argument for
these men debating over the future of millions of people thousands of miles
away, was expressed in terms of national values and purpose. The moral
superiority of British governing, then, is already seen as a crucial element of
British identity.
This discourse of good government and national pride is echoed in
Macaulay’s speech in favour of the Bill in Parliament: “I compare [the govern-
ment of India] with the government of the Roman provinces, with the gov-
ernment of the Spanish colonies; and I am proud of my country and my age”
(Macaulay, 1833). Here we see the legitimation of a particular British practice
of governing as integral to national identity and standing. Note also that here
we have another example of temporal othering: British modes of governing
now, as they have (organically?) emerged over time, are superior to the civili-
sations of the past. In linking “my country and my age”, Macaulay is expli-
citly noting that he believes that, with the passage of time and the accretion of
wisdom, contemporary civilisations have gone beyond what was to be expec-
ted in the past: even Ancient Rome. Given the pride taken in British forms of
rule, it remains surprising that more serious consideration was not given to
the establishment of some form of genuinely representative institution in
India on the British model. A closer explanation of why not will enable
understanding the specific mode of temporal othering that was emerging.
Mill famously believed that representative government was “the grand dis-
covery of our times [in which] the solution of all difficulties, both speculative
and practical would be found” (quoted in Held, 1996: 119). Alongside his
close friend, Jeremy Bentham, he viewed it as a machine-like technology that
would solve the problems of governance, as the panopticon would solve the
problem of crime and punishment. Yet he does not even want the English
people represented on the legislative body of India, in the guise of a councillor
appointed by Parliament rather than the Company. At a House of Commons
select committee in 1832 he is asked whether he considers “representation as
entirely out of the question”, and he simply replies “I conceive wholly so”,
without any further explanation (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers,
1831d).
Yet the fact that the question is asked at all suggests that his answer is not
self-evident and it is not that the idea never seriously presented itself. On the
contrary, it was very much one of the alternatives on the table at the time,
although this “counter-knowledge” has now been largely forgotten. Robert
Rickards – a liberal reformer who published a series of popular pamphlets on
India following his long residence in the subcontinent – gave lengthy evidence
to the select committees in which he condemned the lackof engagement between
government and Indian people, laying out proposals for the establishment of
“native councils” at the various presidencies:
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What I consider of paramount importance, the appointment of a perma-
nent native council or committee, either with or without a European
president, to revise and amend, alter or repeal, existing laws and to assist
in the formation of new ones, and to watch with unceasing vigilance such
as may be consequently confirmed so as to be able to report to govern-
ment, as the superior legislative authority, such amendments, modifica-
tions, or repeals, as circumstances shall appear to render expedient or
necessary. The power of originating laws should also be extended to this
committee or council, who would submit the same to the government for
confirmation; and no new law should be put in force that had not
received the approbation of the said committee.
(House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830a: 277)
This, for Rickards, is the optimal solution for solving the vexing epistemolo-
gical problems faced by India: mirroring Macaulay’s remarks on the problem
of knowing India, he suggests that, “without it we shall still be wandering in
the dark in India” (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830a: 278).
Whilst there is obviously no suggestion here of elections or genuinely popular
participation, and the (British) government would still hold ultimate sover-
eignty, this proposal is quite clearly informed by a sense that local people and
their knowledge can be represented by means of a law-making institution.
Less “visionary” (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830a) is Sir
Henry Tucker, who had also lived in India for many years and as a Tory and
conservative took a rather different view of most matters than Rickards would
(Prior, 2004). His way of thinking is more obviously in the Burkean mould, and he
is wary of “untried theory” and the hazards of novel ideas that may not export
easily (Tucker, 1833b: 138, 141). Whilst he does not advocate representative
institutions, he is at great pains to advocate that small deliberative bodies, or
councils, are maintained at the sub-presidencies and that the wisdom of ser-
vants who know the customs, traditions and languages of a local area is fully
brought to bear in decision making (Tucker, 1833a). This highly paternalist,
but nevertheless rather participatory argument no longer holds sway.
Rickards’s and Tucker’s very different proposals for how to incorporate the
city-citizen matrix better into the governance of India are both argued in
detail, yet they are not acted upon. Instead, Mill’s view that representative
institutions for India would simply not be possible is upheld, without further
elaboration. The question remains: why?
To understand the answer, I first need to show that Mill did not win the
argument as convincingly as this account might suggest. He did obtain the
unitary legislative council that he wanted for India – but not because his ideas
about mechanical governance and ruptural time had been universally accep-
ted. Mill’s ideal of government as a machine that would make a rational and
ruptural break with the past to clear away the corrupt despotism of India was
not necessarily shared by men whose faith in reason and science was more
cautious.
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Governance as a machine?
The metaphor of the government as a machine was something new, an idea
that had emerged with the Industrial Revolution’s faith in science. It would
have been anathema to a late eighteenth-century sensibility that viewed gov-
ernment rather as an organic process. A generation of men who had been
brought up in a more Burkean age frequently employed metaphors of
machines breaking down or running out of control.
Macaulay, for example, worries that absent the governing structures of the
Company then “the whole machine of state would stand still” (Macaulay,
1833). For Henry Tucker, the idea that governing the whole vast Empire
could be done by one centralised body is “visionary and impractical”: “The
machine will be overloaded and will not move” (Tucker, 1833a: 344). Mean-
while, the prospect of government from a distance in London, abstracted
from the everyday concerns of life in India, would, he states, “make us
something like a steam engine, which the hand of the engineer is wont to stop
or put in motion at pleasure […] unlimited power without responsibility”
(India Office, 1833c: 129). This is echoed by the Court of Directors, which
worries about the Company being reduced to a “mere machine” (India Office,
1833a: 63). This is not to say that they reject the metaphor of government as
a “whole […] complex machine” (India Office, 1833c: 41), but they are wary
of the dangers machines bring with them.
For Macaulay – contra Mill – representative institutions are desirable not
because they function mechanically and make a rational break with a con-
fused present. This is because reason for Macaulay is not a disembodied,
ahistorical force, but rather an organic process, rooted in a particular history,
that reminds us of the Burkean polity in which he had spent his whole life.
British institutions, he says, are the product of “all our habits, all the reason-
ings of European philosophers, which all the history of our own part of the
world would lead us to consider as the one great security for good govern-
ment”. If “[r]eason is confounded” in India, then it is not because there is no
adequate machinery, but rather because history gives no guidance as to how
to proceed: “We interrogate the past in vain” (Macaulay, 1833). Representative
institutions are, by this account, the endpoint of a long history: a history that
has evolved organically, accumulating wisdom through time.
Intriguingly, Holt Mackenzie, who played a key role in drafting the Charter
Act, uses a tellingly different sort of metaphor to talk about governance: “to
disjoin the several parts of government, in a country which is not self-governed,
is like placing the different members of the body in the charge of different
physicians” (Wilson, 2008: 134). Whilst Wilson claims that this is analogous
to a mechanical trope, it is actually different in important ways. A body is a
self-regulating system that grows, develops, heals and revitalises itself without
conscious direction. This metaphor of the body bespeaks a sort of uneasy
reconciliation between the two temporalities of Burke and Mill. On the one
hand the body is a kind of machine: it is a self-regulating system that does
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not require conscious direction to function. On the other, it is fully organic: it
grows, heals, revitalises itself and develops.
Macaulay and Mackenzie, then, are not uncritically accepting the need for
a ruptural break, but are beginning to enunciate a new temporality. Rather
than assuming, like Burke, that the wisdom that accumulates over time is
specific to context and linked to the relationships that are understood to exist
between the living, the dead and the not-yet-born, Macaulay is speculating
about whether “our habits [and] history” might not be more widely applic-
able. The suggestion is there in Mackenzie’s metaphor that the best mode of
governing might be just as universal as the human body and its operations.
However, this metaphor emerges at just the time when the political problem
emerges that not all bodies are equal: some are constituted as free subjects
who participate in their own self-government, whereas others – children,
women, the poor, colonial subjects – require tutelage, discipline and training
(Foucault, 1991f). For colonial subjects (alongside children) in particular, they
need to grow up and be educated before they can be entrusted to make the
free choices that will enable them to govern themselves. This will entail leav-
ing behind the private sphere of the nursery and entering into the public
sphere of rational men.
India and the public sphere
Just as two very different conceptions of time that we saw above were being
articulated onto each other in this period, so were the different ways of
thinking about the public and the private.
Macaulay’s answer to the question of why India cannot have its own
representative institutions can be discerned in his qualified defence of the
highly participatory, negotiated judgements that form the uncodified common
law in England. These are still just about tolerable in a country like Britain:
where there are popular institutions; where every decision is watched by a
shrewd and learned audience; where there is an intelligent and observant
public; where every remarkable case is fully reported in a hundred newspapers;
where, in short, there is everything to mitigate the evils of such a system.
(Macaulay, 1833)
This is a vision of representation and the familiar institutions of liberal
democracy as “protective” against tyranny (see Held, 1996: 78–99). Demo-
cratic engagement depends upon the existence of a clearly defined “public”.
Representative institutions can be understood as the linking technology, or
means of making legible and aggregating, the interests and opinions of the
population. Something important has changed here: this is a different view of
the public from the localised negotiations characteristic of Burke.
The faith in the importance of the existence of “a public” pervades the
political discourse surrounding the negotiation of the Charter Act. For
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example, there are only two very serious sticking points on which the Com-
pany and the government cannot agree by the summer of 1833. One of these is a
quibble about money, but the other is the Company’s insistence that they
should be able to seek “publicity” in Parliament in case the government asks them
to implement a decision with which they disagree (India Office, 1833c: 57;
India Office, 1833a: 24–26). Charles Grant, whilst he disputes the necessity
for any special arrangements, does not disagree in principle, he merely
reminds them that they already have the right to petition Parliament and
thereby seek “the judgement of the Legislature and the arbitration of public
opinion” (India Office, 1833b: 28).
However, the problem of “absolute government” means that a participatory
system of law, justice and dispute resolution in India “is a scandal and a
curse”. This is because despotic rulers cannot set their private interests aside
from their objective public duty. Their lack of ability to act in the proper
ethical manner means that they will make capricious judgments. Worse, the
failure of a public ethics and accountability more generally implies that a
rational, objective public will not subject them to scrutiny. In India, the
trouble is that there is “no public” (Macaulay, 1833): only a messy and
indissociable chaos of contending private interests compounded by a lack of
publicly accountable good manners. It is through the practice of comparing a
freely governed Britain with a despotic India that the importance not only of
correct manners in public but also of a completely separate private sphere
emerges. Thus, the superiority of the separation of public and private spheres
characteristic of liberal democratic governance becomes an important feature
of British identity through an othering practice that invokes India.
To see how widespread this way of thinking was becoming, it is informative
to look at John Wade’s Extraordinary Black Book. This was a pro-reform text
that articulated the cause of reform and the construction of a more repre-
sentative and inclusive public sphere with patriotism and national pride. The
popular appeal of the text, which comprised a collection of essays on all the
major institutions of the day and presented the case for reforming them, is
evidenced by the fact that it was used as a script from which activists made
public speeches as the debates about the various pieces of reforming legislation
took place (Tony Taylor, personal communication).
Not a radical text – it endorsed the property qualification on suffrage – it
nevertheless advocated representative institutions and claimed that at home
the Reform Act would produce for the first time “a national government
responsible to 500,000 electors, every one of whom has an interest in domestic
peace, order, and prosperity” (Wade, 1832: 607). The book is critical of the
East India Company and current governing practices, particularly perceived
abuses of property rights in India, but the solution it offers is a tellingly
domestic one:
Such improvements in the national representation, as would insure an
honest and enlightened government, would render unnecessary any great
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changes in the scheme of our Indian administration […] [P]rovided that
the people of England had an adequate control over [government minis-
ters in charge of India], there would be little risk of misgovernment, either
in Great Britain or her great dependency […] Hence, the happiness of the
vast population of Hindustan, no less than that of the United Kingdom,
is identified in the great question of parliamentary reform.
(Wade, 1832: 418–419)
This is a wonderful example of the boomerang effect of colonisation. The
author implies that India has no public and therefore must be represented by
Britons. This makes the case for the expansion and consolidation of the
public at home even more acute, so that India can be well governed. The
dangers embodied by the other thus contribute to the urgency of securing a
representative public at home.
Furthermore, though, the danger of a private sphere that emerges ungov-
erned into the public is here viewed as particularly emblematic of Indian
governance: “disposition to pervert justice […] is the great political vice of the
East.” Again, however, this forms the basis for understanding the virtues of
British society:
Corruption will never triumph over true patriotism – a mock representa-
tion over one that is real – private interests over the public weal – a mere
faction over the king, his ministers, the public press, and the nation!
(Wade, 1832: 608)
British identity itself, through an othering of India, is articulated and defen-
ded in a narrative that advocates not good manners and the constant nego-
tiation of relationships, but rather the side-lining of such concerns into a
private sphere. “Private interests” and the relational ties of the “faction” are
no longer understood to be the legitimate stuff of politics.
It is important not to over-simplify. This is a complex change in ways of
thinking that came from many directions and had many causes. What it is
possible to state, though, is that one of the means by which the superiority of
the public–private divide could be established in contemporary discourse was
by comparison with an inferior India: this might remind us of just the way
British liberal democratic practices are legitimated now. Yet only 50 years
before, Company officials had assumed that Indian modes of governance were
entirely appropriate for India precisely because no strict division between the
public and private existed.
Technologies of representation
Macaulay and Grant are less sanguine than John Wade about the ability of
the British public to represent India. Whilst an all-male Parliament could
represent women, whose interests were understood to be bound up with theirs
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at the private, domestic level of the household (Wade, 1832: 602; Held, 1996:
97–99), the British Parliament was too far from Indians to be a “faithful
representative”: parliamentarians had not the time, the inclination, the
knowledge nor the correct incentives to solve Indians’ problems rationally
and well (Macaulay, 1833).
Thus, they devise the ingenious solution of using the Company, that
anomalous accident of history, which does have the necessary closeness to
Indian affairs, and “binding up [their financial] interests with the country they
are to assist in governing” (India Office, 1833c: 57). Nor, it should be noted, is this
an entirely unsuccessful endeavour at the level of the workings of the tech-
nology, so to speak. As early as July 1833, when directed to appoint an
additional bishop, the Court of Directors responds that, “convert[ing] the
Natives to the Christian faith […] is undoubtedly an object most interesting
to the civilized world, but it is one for which it cannot be right to tax the
Natives” (India Office, 1833a: 66). The bruising lesson of “no taxation without
representation” in the colonies may have already been learned, though not in a
guise recognisable to twenty-first-century democracy promoters. Highly exclu-
sionary, and unaccountable to Indians, the Company nevertheless provides
India with a representative institution of sorts.
The beauty, though, of pinpointing the reason why India cannot have its
own representative institutions so specifically and concretely is that there is
now plenty to do. If a public sphere does not exist, it can be created through
time, development and maturity:
I see the public mind of India, the public mind which we found debased
and contracted by the worst forms of political and religious tyranny,
expanding itself to the just and noble views of the ends of government,
and of the social duties of man […] Consider too, Sir, how rapidly the
public mind of India is advancing […] It may be that the public mind in
India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system.
(Macaulay, 1833)
This future-oriented project implies certain quite specific interventions: nota-
bly for Macaulay the spread of education and a free press. It is thus of great
use in deciding what to do and orienting attitudes towards the future.
What India needs, then, is entry into a teleological history of civilisation:
note the language of “advance”, “expansion” and “growth”. Bringing together
the ideas of a European present that is constructed historically from the ties and
accumulated wisdom of the past, and the urgent need to contain what is
understood as a despotic barbarism, Macaulay employs the novel language of
“civilisation” to suggest that British history might be an example of a general
history. Macaulay’s preference for English-language education, too, is based
on a teleology for India that is expected very closely to mirror actual British
history. He poses the following question when defending a preference for
teaching Indians using English texts to ancient Indian philosophy:
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[H]ad [our ancestors] confined their attention to the dialects of our old
island, had they printed nothing at the universities but chronicles in
Anglo-Saxon and romances in Norman French – would England ever
have been what she is now?
(Macaulay, 1835)
Thus, India is expected to travel the same historical path to develop its own
public sphere and separate autonomous, private sphere that would contain
and power the economy.
The legacy of 1833
Democracy promotion in what is now Pakistan, then, did not begin in 1945
with the concrete negotiations around decolonisation. This is not to say that
there was any intention to promote democratic institutions in India in 1833:
at least not in the immediate future. As we will see in more detail in the next
chapter, the reforms that were put in place on the contrary functioned to limit
political participation by creating a separate private sphere in which the
workings of economic, social and family life would be confined, away from
intrusion by government.
However, the conditions for the possibility of liberal democratic govern-
mentality were put in place by these reforms; for the first time in the Empire,
a form of rule was instantiated that, it was hoped, would enable the management
of whole populations. It would function according to general rules, abstract
principles, the creation of distinct social categories, and the delineation of
separate public and private spheres. These features would have been unim-
aginable as “good government” to the vast majority of British or Indian
people just a generation before.
The law in India was never fully codified, despite the best efforts of an
enquiry led by none other than Thomas Macaulay. However, the impulse to
produce written codes and categorisations has proliferated ever since, and
many of the legislative codes that emerged in the nineteenth century remain
on the books of South Asia today (Kolsky, 2005: 638). As James Mill hoped,
codification in India also provided something of a model for London. Indeed,
in 1877, James Fitzpatrick Stephen was invited by Parliament to bring to bear
his experiences in India on the ongoing problem of codification in Britain, as
London was felt to be developmentally lagging behind Calcutta in this
important endeavour (ibid.).
Meanwhile, in the same period as the Charter Act, we also see the begin-
nings of Utilitarian ways of knowing at home, marking a break with the old
affective modes of governing based on continuity and personal ties, after this
break had occurred in thinking about governing in India. In 1833 the Royal
Society of Statistics was founded in London in order better to understand
“others” like the poor, women, the insane and colonial subjects using these
sorts of abstract, governmental techniques, so that the population could be
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managed, fostered and made healthy (Royal Statistical Society, n.d.). The
Society’s founding members included Thomas Malthus and Charles Babbage,
who brought to bear their experiences as tutors at Haileybury. Only a year
earlier, a Royal Commission was established to investigate the workings of the
Poor Law that had been in place since 1601. The Commission, much influ-
enced by the Utilitarian ideas of Bentham, Mill and Malthus, sought to
understand the problems of domestic poverty by creating abstract categories
of people (the aged, the infirm, children, able-bodied men, able-bodied
women, the deserving and undeserving poor). They furthermore located
responsibility for poverty firmly in a private sphere of work, economic activity
and family life (Carabine, 2000).
The precise links between these new ways of knowing in Britain and modes
of governing in the Empire are worthy of much more detailed research, but
what is clear is that the modes of governmentality that emerged in British
India quickly made the reverse journey to effect an “internal colonisation” of
othering processes.
What I do not want to do here is to posit 1833 as an alternative ruptural
moment. As we have seen, the teleological resolution that emerged in
response to the clashing temporalities of British and colonial forms of gov-
ernment contained many continuities with the past, just as it transformed our
orientation to it. Nor – despite my obvious preference for a more relational,
negotiated, narrative and historicised approach to democracy – would I wish
to idealise the period leading up to the 1830s, which – as we have seen – was
patriarchal, hierarchical and in many respects extremely exclusionary.
I do, however, want to use it to suggest that there was nothing natural or
inevitable about the changes that did take place. Rather, the very narrative of
“progress” as a natural and inevitable process itself emerged as a form of
temporal othering which served an important purpose in the historical
moment in which it arose. It served to legitimate ruling practices at home by
drawing on, but also transforming, notions about temporality and history in
ways that were rather contradictory. Political community had been under-
stood in the eighteenth century as the outcome of the accumulated relation-
ships and wisdom of the past, but this had never, until now, been viewed as a
teleological process. The encounter with India, however, transformed ideas
about British institutions, which were now seen as an idealised endpoint and a
projected future for the Indian other, even as an encounter with that very
other was transforming British governance in entirely novel ways. The present
in India would now be found wanting in comparison with an imagined future
with idealised European institutions.
It became possible to understand civilisation – a new concept at the time –
as a process inaugurated by the division of the public and private spheres
emblematic of the story of the savage’s entrance into history. This marked a
new way of thinking about India, which – unlike the New World – had
hitherto been considered a separate polity in its own right and not a land of
savages. This change in modes of thinking was furthermore understood to
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entail the need for detailed intervention. The future trajectory that India was
now to be guided through might be understood to look a lot like Britain’s
history, but only by virtue of changing dominant narratives about what Brit-
ish history had been, what it meant and how it related to the present and the
future. Thus, in a sense – in Britain and in Pakistan – the codes we all still
inhabit were authored, at least in part, elsewhere.
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5 Blood in the codes
Liberal governmentality, democracy
and Pakistan
To paraphrase Michael Shapiro slightly, even to speak of Pakistan is:
to license a forgetting of the history of struggles through which such
entities have come to be domesticated within modern international space.
Such a forgetting is not a psychological but a textual phenomenon, for it
is a scripted or institutionalised forgetting.
(Shapiro, 1989: 15)
In this chapter, I examine those struggles.
In researching and writing this book, a question that has often arisen in
conversation and questions is how far I am able to account for the complex
and different postcolonial trajectories of India and Pakistan, in which India is
understood as “the world’s largest democracy” and Pakistan as its undemo-
cratic other. There is a literature on how a colonial history has led to very
different types of regime in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: for example,
work by scholars as diverse as Maya Tudor (2013), Ayesha Jalal (1995b) and
Matthew Nelson (2011). I agree with Jalal and Nelson that there is not a
simple dichotomy of democratic and authoritarian rule in these countries, but
rather complex patterns of different kinds of governance at a range of levels.
Nevertheless, an understanding of India as a successful democracy and a foil
to Pakistan is ingrained in common-sense understandings of the region
(Mohan, 2007).
My aim is not to revisit those debates, but rather to unearth the conditions
of possibility for their thinkability by examining the logic of Partition. In
doing so I make two related, overarching points. First, the emergence of
Pakistan in 1947 did not inaugurate democracy there for the first time.
Rather, the British had already been promoting liberal democratic institutions
in what is now Pakistan for a long time. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 4, the
beginnings of such institutions have their roots as early as 1833. Thus, the
struggle of British Indians for representative institutions was already coded
through a logic of democracy promotion: nationalist campaigners demanded
representative institutions because colonial ways of thinking had enabled an
understanding that that was what democracy was, even though politics in the
subcontinent had not been understood in these terms prior to the colonial
encounter.
Second, I argue that violence did not erupt in British India in 1945 because
of the failure or absence of democracy, but rather because violence was
inherent in its very practice. Representative institutions, broadly understood,
provoked the violence by constituting two communities, understood to be
separate, in the first place. This separation was made possible by a rigid
division of social life into public and private spheres that would have been
entirely alien to late eighteenth-century Indian jurisprudence.
The argument I make here about violence is extremely important because
one of the great selling points of liberal democracy is that it is understood to
be a remedy for violence. By talking and by voting, it is thought that citizens
can resolve their differences peacefully. Thus, when Larry Diamond talks
about military coups and democratic breakdown in Pakistan, he pins the
blame on the failure of the specific institutions of liberal democracy, such as
the justice system and the rule of law (Diamond, 2008: 58). By implication,
the function of all the institutions of liberal democracy is together to prevent
violence, and violence will only ensue if they are not working. This assump-
tion about democracy’s role in preventing violence is also inherent in Demo-
cratic Peace Theory: the theory – supposed to be the nearest thing we have to
an empirically provable “law” in International Relations – that democracies
do not fight each other (Russett, 1993). This is assumed to be because the
peaceful norms of tolerance and rational discussion, eschewing violence, are
understood to be incorporated into the Foreign Policy of states in their deal-
ings with one another (ibid.; Owen, 1994). Democracy is understood as the
opposite of violence.
Naturally, it is well known that in some highly divided societies, democracy
is not able to prevent conflict and that majoritarian voting systems may even
provoke it (Huntington, 1968; Chua, 2004; Hawksley, 2009). Thus much
effort has gone into designing institutions that would minimise this risk (Lij-
phart, 2004). Nevertheless, this understanding does not cover the possibility
that the logic of representational democratic practice creates a divided society
in the first place, by constituting divisions amongst people. It is the latter
claim that I make here, and I suggest that it should give us pause.
The argument in this chapter will proceed in three main sections. First, I
will trace the emergence of a separate Muslim identity as it was enabled
through British colonial practices of representation. Second, I will explain
how an election was in particular responsible for the disaster of Partition
because of the representations it produced and enabled. Finally, I will briefly
bring the story up to date, showing that the representative institutions and
practices inaugurated by colonial rule and democracy promotion continue to
have a malign effect on Pakistani politics. It is worth noting that although this
chapter aims to link the events of 1833 and 1945–47 with the present, it does
not provide an exhaustive history of the years in between which would fill
many volumes. Rather, it is my intention to license a remembering of the
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struggles that have constituted Pakistan. In doing so, I disrupt the story we
tell of ourselves about colonialism, rupture and the failure of peace
because of the absence of democracy, and show that the structures of colonial
governmentality are still felt in Pakistani politics to this day.
Coding religion
First of all, we need to explore how the constitution of a separate Muslim
identity was enabled by British colonial practices. In doing so, I will take
seriously Ian Hacking’s suggestion that “[t]he bureaucracy of statistics impo-
ses not just by creating administrative rulings, but by determining classifica-
tions within which people must think of themselves and the actions open to
them” (Hacking, 1991: 194).
Of course, Hindus and Muslims existed in India before the arrival of the
British. They understood themselves as having a religious identity and made
legal judgments according to the dictates of their religion. However, religious
commitments had existed alongside customary and tribal practices (Nelson,
2011), ties between people of the same class, linguistic and spatial commu-
nities, and intricate webs of patronage and loyalty that had always been
accompanied by mutual interaction and dialogue (Khan, 2008c: 20–22; Sen,
2006: 16–25). It is likewise notable that Hindus as well as Muslims offered
their loyalty to the Mughal Emperor, religion not being seen as the only
defining element of political life, but rather one element in its complex nego-
tiations (Dalrymple, 2006: 12). The pre-colonial workings of local law and
jurisprudence had never worked according to a strict separation of Hindu and
Muslim law, but rather relied on the resources of both and were continually
adapted to meet the demands of a specific present, rather than relying on
adherence to ancient texts (Wilson, 2008: 84).
With the new forms of colonial governmentality introduced by the British
in the early nineteenth century, however, religion became a particularly
important category. This was because – as described in Chapter 4 – the British
were both keen to govern according to local customs and traditions, and also
deeply uncertain about what these were. Consequently, great epistemological
hope was invested in religious categories. Religious laws and customs were
known to exist. Thus, by concentrating on them, East India Company servants
hoped to discern a set of procedures by which they could govern.
This focus on religion had three related consequences. Let us look in a little
more detail at each of them in turn.
Codifying identity
First, religion came to be the chief defining characteristic by which subjects
could be known and could know themselves. As particular communities were
understood to have the right to be governed according to their own traditions,
the colonial state took a particular interest in how Hindus and Muslims
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respectively constituted themselves as separate groups abiding by different
rules. The usefulness of this sort of sociological category for the British has been
extensively discussed by Bernard Cohn (1996), who shows how – through
myriad technologies including legal codes, the army, the collection of statistics
and census data and so on – the colonial state was able to manage the
population through practices of enumeration and bureaucracy. The existence
of religious categorisations also enabled the establishment of communal lea-
dership figures understood to speak for, or represent, that whole community
(as defined by the census): this representational technology supported colonial
rule, then, by working through the participation of the governed populations.
Muslims and Hindus were also understood to have emerged out of quite
separate histories: James Mill’s book, for instance, divides the history of each
into separate volumes (Mill, 1858). This assumption of a long-standing his-
torical division is reflected in the anxious search for a set of written legal
principles for each group, which tended to focus around a search for the
“pristine” ancient texts that would reflect practices that had been stable for
thousands of years and could yield an original source on which to base
legitimate law (Wilson, 2008: 93). The notion of the ancient civilisation of
India, which was historically Hindu, sat alongside a narrative of Muslims as
relatively recent conquerors whose rule was in decline.
Meanwhile, extensive questioning at the various select committees in the
early 1830s was not only organised around the specific religious and legal
practices of Hindus and Muslims, but also the differences in character,
population distribution and proportions of each group in the employment of
the British administrative system (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers,
1831d, 1831a, 1831c, 1831b, 1830b, 1830a). Understandings of India as fun-
damentally divided into Muslims and Hindus are shared by thinkers as dif-
ferent as Robert Rickards, James Mill, and conservative Company Director
Henry Tucker.
The impact of ideas about governance as analogous to the running of a
machine also intensified the drive to categorise populations. Nowhere was this
more true than in the part of the world that is now Pakistan. When the Brit-
ish finally took over the Punjab and Sindh in the 1840s, the annexation of this
territory created a huge administrative problem for the British, bringing the
familiar characters of the local barbarians: “a wild martial people”, who had
to be pacified (Stokes, 1959: 243). In response, John Lawrence set up the
“Punjab system of government”:
Control was achieved on the best Benthamite principles – personal
responsibility, accountability and inspectability. A rigid system of record-
ing and reporting was enforced […] The union of all judicial and execu-
tive authority in the hands of a single officer might seem to give him well
nigh arbitrary power, but […] he was obliged to adhere to a rough code
of criminal and civil law.
(Stokes, 1959: 245)
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Benthamite or not, the civilising and disciplining of the Punjab and Sindh by
the British was attempted through an almost frenetic mapping, surveying and
documenting, the filling in of standardised forms, which went into setting out
the categories by which Punjab could be governed and discerning how the
local population fitted into them (Nelson, 2011: chapter 1).
Codifying the law
Second, the codified law itself became a key principle of politics in a way that
it had not before. The point of all this careful categorisation was the aspira-
tion to master the uncertainty of how to govern in India for once and all, by
writing down some abstract principles. As has been established, the intention
was to “uphold native institutions and practices as far as they are consistent
with the distribution of justice to all classes” (Lord Dalhousie, Governor-
General of India, quoted in Nelson, 2011: 17), but only insofar as these could
form a stable and rational set of general principles. However, it is important
to note that stable and rational general principles were themselves unfamiliar
to Indian jurisprudence. W.H. Rattigan, attempting to codify property law in
Punjab in the late nineteenth century, was still of the opinion that, “Indian
customs are of a very flexible and bending character” and did not easily admit
of general rules (quoted in ibid.: 309, n.11).
Matthew Nelson is absolutely right to suggest that particular laws, such as
the disinheritance of women, were not “merely a legal fiction invented (or
exaggerated) by an array of inflexible imperial jurists” in colonial Punjab
(Nelson, 2011: 32), but rather emerged from accounts taken directly from
local people. Nevertheless, his claim leaves out something important, which is
that a particular fixed principle that women could not inherit property would
have been unintelligible in local traditional law, which was rather “rooted in a
complex, practical understanding of the specific context the dispute emerged
from within” (Wilson, 2008: 169). The resolution of disputes would, in this
way, entail a good deal of detail about ties of family, kinship and would take
the form of complex negotiations. The emergence of general abstract rules to
the effect that women did not have the right to own or inherit property in
India (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830a: 38, 68; Mill, 1858:
248) – which would have surprised Edmund Burke and the Begums of Oudh,
and is contrary to the provisions of Muslim shari’ah law – did not so much
reflect local customary norms, as ossify a principle that would previously have
been negotiable.
One important consequence of this is that it altered conceptions of how the
law related to everyday practices. The legislative framework of the state
became the main arena for political contestation: the goal of state activity, in
other words, was to produce a positive body of legislation. Thus the everyday
power relations of kinship, say, that might have been negotiated in court on
the basis of a complex set of local and specific circumstances, instead became
invisible to the law.
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Thus, whether the law is made by democratic representatives or by une-
lected administrators, law in this sense functions tactically in two related
ways. First, the law positively and actively regulates the conduct of conduct.
It does so not least by reproducing those categories and abstractions that
enable concepts like family and kinship to be understood, often reanimating
them in new ways. Therefore, inheritance patterns already existing in nineteenth-
century Punjab were made intelligible by reference not only to similar pat-
terns the British had observed elsewhere in India but also to entrenched ideas
about what constituted a “property right” that could be inherited in the first
place. The result of this encounter, as I show in more detail below, was para-
doxically both to preserve existing power relations, but also to transform
them. Indian men not only maintained but also strengthened their claims to
cultivate the land in preference to women. Furthermore, they also obtained
new claims to benefit from its commodification: specifically, the right to
mortgage it.
Second, the law functions negatively. The whole business of politics is
understood to be reducible to the question of lawmakers “[attempting to]
transform local economic and political demands into new or more appealing
laws” (Nelson, 2011: 5). This is a rather common way of thinking about what
the job of democratic politicians is. It establishes the legitimate sphere of
contestation as legislative activity in the public sphere, whilst marginalising
and privatising concern with other relations of power away from the democratic
domain. As such, then, we can think of law as a depoliticising tactic.
Although an abstract approach to the law was new, this did not mean that
local people did not take up these discourses and use them for their own ends.
Indian resistance to British rule was, on the contrary, regularly articulated
around demands for a uniform, textual criminal law and equality under it
(Kolsky, 2005: 682). Thus, Indian resistance to colonial rule began to take on
a distinctively liberal flavour, as local people participated in the new dis-
courses enabled by novel modes of governing. This impacted significantly on
the types of institutions that were ultimately demanded and acquired by the
struggle for Indian self-rule, and to understand this it is important to return
to the topic of the public and private spheres.
Public and private coding
Third, religion became not only a defining category, but also a key arena in
which Indians had some autonomy. Rammohan Roy, known as the “father of
modern India”, argued in the 1830s that “ancient” Indian (Hindu) society
had been governed by a fixed, stable and written set of rules (Wilson, 2008:
167), a proposition which would have been unimaginable a few years earlier.
He furthermore suggested that society had at that time been characterised by
a “sphere of unfettered social conduct autonomous from the dangerous and
corrupt realm of power politics” (ibid.: 168). He used this argument to con-
test the colonial legislation against sati – despite being vehemently opposed to
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the practice – on the basis that it was an illegitimate intrusion of the state into
the private sphere of family and religious practice. As such, he was appealing to
liberal ideas about a separation of public and private spheres which would have
been entirely incompatible with earlier forms of dispute resolution in their
emphasis on negotiation rooted in all the detail of domestic and familial ties (ibid.:
84). Roy was strategically using the space carved out by the codifiers who,
according to Elizabeth Kolsky, were from the outset keen to make a distinction
between a public sphere in which crime would be punishable and commercial
contracts enforced, and a “private sphere of difference”. It was by means of the
creation of this private sphere that Indians were subject to their own religious
or customary norms in matters of family and faith (Kolsky, 2005: 637, 660).
This is a notion that clearly informs John Lawrence’s vision for Punjab of
“a country thickly cultivated by a fat, contented yeomanry, each man riding
his own horse, sitting under his own fig tree, and enjoying his rude family
comforts” (quoted in Stokes, 1959: 244). Although the image functions
through an idealisation of a romantic past, it was also radical in its utopian-
ism and modern in its individualising logic. It aimed at the delineation of a
gendered private sphere, untouched by all that Benthamite bureaucratic con-
trol, in which the concerns of family and domesticity could be managed by
the male head of household. Not a description of an existing situation, this
seeming nostalgia is a future-oriented project.
The project was the creation of a separate economic sphere of activity and
regime of private property, understood as independent from government
intervention so that freely choosing landowners would maximise their revenue
and create wealth that could be taxed. As a revenue manual in 1844 put it,
“the first step […] towards the creation of a private ‘right’ in land […] was to place
such a limit on the demand of government as would leave to the proprietors a
profit which would […] constitute a valuable [right]” (quoted in Nelson, 2011: 15).
Thus, the threefold logics of the proliferation of categories, the codification
of previously unwritten law and the delineation of hitherto inseparable public
and private spheres intertwined and enabled Indians to think quite differently
about how to govern. Two communities were now understood to have
emerged from two different histories and religious traditions. Importantly,
these histories were taken to be antagonistic because Muslims were under-
stood to have conquered a much older Hindu civilisation. Two communities
were rigidly categorised and expected to abide by the laws of their own tra-
dition, in a world where the law was now framed in abstract general rules that
formed the key arena of political contestation and which were governed at
first by unelected British administrators. Thus, quite logically, Indians started
to campaign for the right to play a role in making those rules: legislative
power had become, as they say, the only game in town.
In the meantime, however, the newly created private sphere had become the
one arena for autonomy and self-government that Indians did have. Thus,
from Roy onwards, this division was not only accepted, but vigorously
defended. Roy’s conception of an autonomous civil society can be discerned
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in Mohandas Gandhi’s notion of “swaraj” (self-rule), for instance, which
advocated dismantling the bureaucratic apparatus of the state – a “soulless
machine” (quoted in Singh and Sundaram, 1996: 167) – in favour of village-
level organisation, self-help and community support. Again, the paradoxically
modern discourse of referring to an ancient, idealised past is remobilised
against British interference, precisely by invoking the private sphere that
colonial power had done so much to create.
Sir Alfred Lyall (former Lieutenant Governor of the North West Provinces
and Chief Commissioner of Oudh) sardonically remarks in 1910: “thus we
have the strange spectacle, in certain parts of India, of a party capable of
resorting to methods that are both reactionary and revolutionary […]
preaching primitive superstition in the very modern form of leading articles”
(in his introduction to Chirol, 1910). What is important to note here is that
both of these methods would have been unimaginable in late eighteenth-century
India, where appeals to a primitive past would have been perhaps yet more
alien than reading an editorial. The division of society into public and private
spheres, with democratic institutions like a free press functioning as a link
between the two, was re-written as a crucial aspect of Indian history and
identity. As ever, then, forms of resistance are highly delimited by the
relations of power in which they are intertwined.
Gender, the law and the private sphere: coding inheritance
To give another example of how these three logics of categorisation, legal
codification and the delineation of public and private spheres worked in
practice, it is useful to look in a little more detail at the disinheritance of
women that took place in rural Punjab under British rule.
It is difficult to know just how decisions were made about who should cul-
tivate the land in Punjab prior to British annexation. However, it is certain
that there was no such thing as a legally enforceable property right that
entailed, for instance, the ability to sell or mortgage the land. This is not to
say that no one had previously had the right to cultivate particular areas of
land to the exclusion of others in pre-colonial Punjab. However, the right to
cultivate land, the right to inherit it, the right to sell it and the right to borrow
money against it, these had not been thought of as bundled together into a
single “right to own” it (Nelson, 2011: chapter 1).
Rather, an emphasis seems to have been placed on keeping the land under
the cultivation by families – or the biraderi – who resided in the village,
including widows and women who had married endogamously (staying within
the village). Thus, rather than a regime of private property rights, there was a
complex set of negotiations about who would cultivate the land, based on
detailed knowledge of circumstance and kinship, which were not conceived of
as private matters beyond the purview of the courts. Rights of cultivation
might, for example, especially for women, be in the form of a “lifetime
interest” rather than any right to bequeath or sell it (ibid.).
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The colonial governors did not arrive with the intention of transforming
property relations. However, they did arrive with a set of assumptions – provided
by their own experience and set out on those ubiquitous bureaucratic forms –
that private property rights of the type described above must exist in an
abstract, enforceable and – above all – stable sense. The problem was not
framed in terms of asking how private property rights might be established;
rather, administrators wanted to know who already owned the land.
However, this turned out to be an extraordinarily complicated question:
Matthew Nelson quotes reports of British administrators on the annex of
Punjab having to march villagers in and order them to lay claim to the land.
This happened because they recognised that land ownership would lead to
taxation, but had not yet discovered the benefits of private ownership in a
British regime and the access to credit and, sometimes, legally enforceable
sale that it implied. This situation changed rather quickly, of course, as some
of the opportunities offered by the British property regime were rapidly
grasped in the Indian population, leading to some rather dramatic changes of
reports of custom, ownership and practice the next time the land was sur-
veyed, much to the consternation of the administrators, who were expecting
to find sets of stable practices (Nelson, 2011: 37–41, 53).
British attempts to codify property law had a particular impact on women.
As the British continued their detailed work of recording, codifying and
abstracting, village by village, Indians provided information about ownership
and inheritance practices, not according to religious law, but rather the
structures of tribe, or biraderi, that already prevailed in that area (Nelson,
2011: Chapter 1). These practices seemed to the British rather similar to
Hindu inheritance practices they believed they had encountered elsewhere,
with their prohibition on female inheritance.
This had consequences that had by no means been the intention of the
British colonial governors. First, the law that ended up on the statute books
related to tribal, rather than religious, custom and practice. This was not a
matter they found particularly troubling, as they intended to refer initially to
local custom and practice whatever that might be. However, it did have con-
crete consequences. First, contrary to some claims that, as we have seen, are
still made about shari’ah law, its adoption would in fact have significantly
advantaged women. Second, though, the new regime of property rights did
have communal consequences. Mortgaging land and risking its loss to
(Hindu) urban moneylenders had never before been an ordinary practice.
Nor, when that option was introduced, did it work in the rational way
expected. It had been anticipated that landowners would borrow to invest in
their land and increase its value. However, there instead transpired a worrying
tendency to spend the loans on such things as expensive weddings and other
status symbols. This created a political crisis, as British administrators wor-
ried in the late nineteenth century about a “crisis of rural indebtedness” that
might cause loss of land that had been cultivated by particular families for
centuries, rioting and huge rural poverty. The crisis was only exacerbated by a
114 Blood in the codes
concern that rural Muslim landowners were falling into debt to urban Hindu
moneylenders, causing worrisome social antagonism (Nelson, 2011: Chapter 1).
This is an antagonism, furthermore, that has to be understood alongside all
the other myriad ways in which Muslim and Hindu identities were set against
each other as never before.
To recap, then, the colonial state did not invent the two religious groups:
Hindus and Muslims. However, as part of an ongoing process of managing
uncertainty, colonial governors categorised individuals, codified the laws by
which they lived and created a separate private sphere. Indians in the Punjab
and elsewhere took advantage, as they could, of the novel practices of the
British to consolidate and transform their existing claims to land to their own
perceived advantage (short or long term), all of which altered relations
between the genders, between families and between religious groups. Overall,
the creation of particular categories of difference between religions did not
help the British produce knowledge that could describe Indian society. Rather,
it dynamically produced and reproduced the practices of religion, biraderi and
gender that divided society, in ways that offered important resources not only
to help the British solve their epistemological problems, but also to enable
Indians to resist colonial rule.
Coding Pakistan
We will next move on to how these new demands for the democratic right to
formulate the law played out in the Indian struggle for self-determination. In
this section, we will – necessarily rather briefly – remember those struggles to
show how they were structured by colonial ideas about governing and
democracy. There are very many good histories of the Indian nationalist
movement, the debates over the creation of Pakistan and the eventual Parti-
tion, and it is not my intention here to provide another one (for example, see
Khan, 2008c; Jalal, 1994; Talbot and Singh, 2009; Wolpert, 2006, for a vari-
ety of perspectives and approaches). Instead, the point is to show in a focused
way that the violence of Partition and the beginnings of democratic self-rule
were not ruptural, but rather were produced by and continuous with the
representational practices of colonialism.
The people of British India, of course, did demand the liberal representative
institutions characteristic of some parts of Europe as early as the 1830s. This
was partly as a function of the demand for greater autonomy in the private
sphere that emerged with a particular Indian liberalism. However, following
the final violent overthrow of the last Mughal Emperor – the last visible ral-
lying point for earlier modes of governance – in the rebellion of 1857 or,
perhaps, the “First War of Indian Independence” (see, for example, Dalrym-
ple, 2006 for a vivid account), resistance to British rule also became a matter
of obtaining representation through liberal democratic legislative institutions.
Through political parties, campaigning organisations and the relatively free
press, India’s nationalist movement gradually fought for and won increasing
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political representation. With the Indian Councils Act 1892 (House of Com-
mons Parliamentary Papers, 1892), a limited number of Indians could vote for
their representatives for the first time, and the franchise and scope of Indian
democracy was expanded, following Indian demands, in subsequent reforms
in 1909 and 1919 (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 1919).
Despite some resistance to these moves in Britain (see, for example, House of
Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1918), British administrators also found the
ability to gather information through electoral processes useful in governing
the population. For example, in early twentieth-century Punjab, it was agreed
that the best way to confirm and ratify local attempts to codify (and preserve) the
bafflingly diverse practices of property ownership and inheritance was to
put it to a “majority vote” (Nelson, 2011: 74).
Thus the introduction of democratic practices is best understood not as a
process of the gradual ceding of power in the face of principled resistance.
Rather, the very resistance itself was produced by the structures of colonial
power. Indian nationalism enabled the emergence of the freely choosing sub-
jects who could ensure that liberal democratic governmentality could func-
tion. This is not to downplay the courage or sincerity of those who struggled
for years in the Indian movement for self-determination, but to suggest that
this is an example of what Foucault calls the “strategic reversibility” of power
relations: “the ways in which the terms of governmental practices can be
turned around into focuses of resistance” (Gordon, 1991: 5). Power – rather
than violence, or oppressive force – requires individuals who are free to act in
one way or another. Nevertheless, although this means that there are always
new opportunities for novel resistance, and the position of subjects in the field
of power may very well change (British rule is transferred to Indian voters),
power relations will not cease to carry their history with them. This is evident
when we look at the history of the emergence of a Muslim majority state
called Pakistan.
Voting for Pakistan
The usefulness of electoral practices can be seen perhaps most evidently in the
important general election in India that took place in 1945–46:
how best to find out, at the end of empire, who to hand over power to?
[…] For those engineering the transfer of power, in keeping with the
British ideal of democratic decolonisation, the answer was an Indian
general election […] It was most useful to the British government who
needed to rubber stamp any future constitutional settlement.
(Khan, 2008c: 30–32)
The contest was thus quickly understood as a plebiscite on the constitutional
future of British India after independence, and local leaders immediately
understood that their strength in the contest would determine their
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negotiating position in regard to the final settlement, particularly whether
India would be divided. No province was more important than Punjab in
this process: without Punjab there could be no Pakistan (Talbot, 1980: 65;
Gilmartin, 1998: 420).
It is easy now that the entity called Pakistan is such a taken-for-granted
feature of our international scripts, to imagine that the election result in
Punjab was a foregone conclusion. The separation and distinctness of Muslim
and Hindu populations was inscribed everywhere in the colonial system:
separate canteens at railway stations and separate drinking taps co-existed
with an official calendar that revolved around separate holidays and festivals.
Government censuses, statistics, maps, rule books and the law all relied on the
notion of completely distinct religious communities (Khan, 2008c: 20–22).
Most importantly of all, on the basis of Muslim demands that – again –
would have been unthinkable a century earlier, the reforms of 1909 and 1919
introduced Muslim-only electorates and quotas for seats. From now on the
two religious communities would also have their “own” political parties and
politicians (Das, 1964).
Nevertheless, there was nothing inevitable about the Muslim League vic-
tory in 75 of the 85 Muslim seats. On the contrary, only in 1937 the Punjab
Unionist Party, which appealed to tribal ties of biraderi and gained votes
across communities from Hindu and Sikh, as well as Muslim, agriculturalists,
had won a convincing majority in these seats. By contrast, the Muslim League
had fielded only seven candidates and won just two seats (Talbot, 1980: 65).
What changed in 1945–46?
As David Gilmartin has convincingly shown using the pamphlets and pos-
ters from the 1946 elections in Punjab, the existence of separate electorates
was crucially important. However, his most startling insight is that it was “not
only that they were separate but also that they were electorates that defined a
new form of public arena” (Gilmartin, 1998: 418). In other words, not only
the specific voting system in place in Punjab, but also the very logic of elec-
toral democracy itself was crucially important in the election result that
inaugurated the violent partition of British India. This was because of the
way that quantification simplified and divided up a complex set of ideas and
preferences.
I am particularly concerned here to show how the structure of colonial
elections produced and interacted with three interlocking elements of Mus-
lims’ resistance to British rule. This interaction, I suggest, produced particular
tensions between liberal democratic practices, military rule, Muslim nation-
alism and the politics of biraderi that are characteristic of Pakistani govern-
ance even to this day. First, the existence of Muslim seats produced an
othering practice: Hindus were identified as foreign in ways that shored up a
Muslim identity. This discursive othering relied on the threat of Muslim dis-
unity in which “collaboration” with Hindus – long the absolutely normal
everyday way of living – was seen as a particular threat. Second, and relat-
edly, this othering practice depended upon a narrative of Islamic history as
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one of the coming of unity, which brought with it a particular conception of
time. Third, the articulation of these two elements depended upon, and
reproduced, the existence of separate public and private spheres. Let us look
in a little more detail at each in turn.
Coding Hindus: electoral practices and foreign policy
First, then, the structure of the electorate into separate religious blocks meant
that Jinnah’s All-India Muslim League was competing for votes with other
parties seeking to appeal to Muslim voters. This meant that the opposition,
by and large, were other Muslims. Thus the Muslim League was forced
overtly to campaign on the basis of a Muslim identity defined in opposition
to British and Hindu “others” that, by the same token, they produced. Both
the British and Hindus were cast as oppressors, adversaries and even enemies
of Muslims, and they were linked in the electoral rhetoric: voters were asked
“whether they wanted to trade slavery to the British for slavery to the
Hindus” (Gilmartin, 1998: 421). Activists were furthermore encouraged to go
to villages, find out what the local social and economic grievances were and –
whatever the matter – give the solution: “Pakistan” (Talbot, 1980: 75, 79–75,
80). By suggesting that Pakistan would be both Muslim and independent,
campaigners articulated social and economic problems with two linked
sources of domination: the Hindus and the British (Gilmartin, 1998: 421).
The Muslim League campaign also drew explicitly upon Islamic identities:
they recruited the influential pirs (holy men in the Sufi tradition thought to be
descended from saints) to their campaign, used mosques as campaigning
centres, attended Friday prayers and held election meetings directly after-
wards, as well as parading with the Holy Qur’an and asking voters to pledge
their support on it (Talbot, 1980: 77). These sorts of direct appeal to religious
identities and values constituted an “excruciating choice” for male agri-
culturalists. The choice seemed to be, on the one hand, “voting with their
purse strings”, that is voting for the Punjab Unionists who favoured tradi-
tional practices, particularly of inheritance, associated with biraderi-based
loyalties. On the other hand, they could vote in accordance their religious
commitments, which included some rather more generous terms of inheritance
for women (Nelson, 2011: 110).
So far so unsurprising, but what is less expected is that a rather different
“Other” is invoked even more prominently in the election literature: “the
specter of internal dissension and disorder among Muslims themselves” (Gil-
martin, 1998: 422). In particular, the Unionists’ politics of the biraderi were
characterised as divisive, putting ties of family and neighbourhood above an
over-arching Muslim solidarity. Crucially, the Muslim League linked the
Unionists to the two external enemies, Hinduism and colonial rule: Jinnah
suggested that they were “the primary enemy […] backers of naukarshahi
(oppressive bureaucratic rule)” (quoted in ibid.: 423). In another poster, they
are accused of preferring to work together with “bigoted sectarians and
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Mahasabhites [the Hindu nationalist movement]” (ibid.). Division amongst
Muslims, then, is understood to be linked to British strategies of divide and
rule, which privilege narrow interests and loyalties, as well as collaboration
with future Hindu oppressors, over a broader Muslim solidarity. Thus,
although not yet formally a nation, the structure of separate electorates
enables the Muslim League to identify internal threats to a solidaristic
Muslim identity and make them foreign, linking them discursively to the
supposedly external threats of Hindu and British domination. This move then
legitimates a separate Muslim nation, by constructing threats to it as alien
forces alongside which it is impossible to live.
The stories Muslims told of themselves
Within this othering narrative about Hindus, and the British, as foreign
oppressors, second, a particular vision of history prevails. The feared disorder,
confusion and divided loyalty amongst Muslims is linked to the time of
“fitna-i-jahiliyat”, or ignorance and moral chaos, before the coming of Islam
(ibid.). Gilmartin describes a poster telling the story of Musa (Moses) and
Harun (Aaron) from the Qu’ran in which Musa returns from receiving God’s
covenant, having left Harun in charge, and is furious to discover the people
have started to worship a golden calf. Asking why he had failed to put a stop
to this, Harun replies that he had not wanted to cause division; the poster
uses this story to suggest that division is even worse than idolatry (ibid.: 426).
Although, this cautionary tale is set in the ancient past, its invocation is
clearly rooted in the present, with division, disorder and, pointedly, cow
worship articulated in opposition to the moral clarity of a unified submission
to God. This intervention creatively marshals and rearticulates the discursive
resources of the British narrative of a pristine ancient Hindu civilisation that
had slowly degraded over time, as well as a reminder of Mill’s ruptural,
eschatological time. Even the name Pakistan (literally “land of the pure”;
Khan, 2008c: 39) resonates with the pristine connotations of swaraj, but
reinvents it not as a legitimation for a free India but rather for a separate
Pakistan.
However, the future-oriented and utopian narrative of Pakistan as a solu-
tion to all contemporary problems and a symbol of unity that would over-
come the dangers of fitna roots the community in a linear temporal trajectory
in which they are moving together towards an imagined future. This tempor-
ality is reminiscent of the teleologies of civilisation and thus rather different
from traditional, cyclical Muslim conceptions of time in which key events
from the life of the Prophet would recur and form the basis of an ongoing
struggle (Gilmartin, 1998: 433). This rewriting of history, then, is made pos-
sible by the colonial temporality of civilisation. Thus a temporal othering is
adopted and re-inscribed. Now it is cow worship and dissent that are under-
stood to be features of an undesirable past, legitimating a future-oriented
project in which Indian Muslims constitute a unified nation: Pakistan.
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Public and private coding (again)
Third, these two related modes of othering are appealed to in terms of a
clearly delineated public and private sphere and the freely choosing subject of
liberal democratic governmentality. Voting is characterised as an individua-
lised activity in which every citizen must interrogate his or her own private
and equal conscience before casting a vote. This vote, by aggregating the pri-
vate passion, faith and commitment of those thousands of individual con-
sciences, would constitute a transcendent, honourable and unified Muslim
community in the public sphere: Pakistan (Gilmartin, 1998: 430).
Thus, the constitution of the public sphere is made possible through
making legible the interests and desires of freely choosing, fully constituted
individuals in private. The structure of the election reinforced this public/
private dichotomy: although religious symbols were certainly mobilised, it
was forbidden to suggest that any particular choice of party or candidate was
divinely sanctioned. This would count as “corruption” under electoral law
(Gilmartin, 1998: 428). Thus, religion is understood as, first and foremost, a
private and individualised matter.
The Muslim League made full use of individualised understanding of the
Islamic faith, by putting forward their vision of a Pakistan made up of the
sincere, combined individual will of free voters as an attractive alternative to
the hierarchical and collective politics of biraderi. Jinnah declared that voters
should “vote according to the voice of your conscience; give your vote with-
out fear to those candidates to whom you want to give your vote” (quoted in
Gilmartin, 1998: 429), thus attempting to delegitimise a vote for the Unionists,
who made appeal to the traditions of biraderi, not faith.
In practice, electoral politics regularly operated through “matters of […]
connection, questions of family relations and disputes of faction”. However, it
was precisely these sorts of divisions that were understood to reside squarely
in the private and domestic sphere and had no place in the idealised public
domain of the utopian, idealised Muslim community (Gilmartin, 1998: 434).
Thus, the claims of the Unionists were marginalised on the basis that they
were engaged in a type of collective politics that simply had no place in the
public sphere. This now-familiar strategy is a common means of using
liberal democratic structures to rule certain issues out of contestation, as
the Archbishop of Canterbury found out in 2008. That this technique can
be used both to marginalise a discussion of shari’ah law in twenty-first-
century Britain and to marginalise opposition to an independent Muslim
state that would live by the provisions of shari’ah law in the twentieth, shows
the flexibility of this strategy of power – its contingency, but also its
pervasiveness.
The election in Punjab was won by the Muslim League. The specific dis-
cursive strategies that enabled this victory were premised on the technology of
an election. That is to say, a negotiation premised on more deliberative and
less quantitative techniques would have played out very differently. That is not
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only because the structure of the electoral system meant that Muslim identity
itself became a salient issue. Also, and more importantly, the delineation of
public and private spheres meant that individuals could be encouraged to set
aside their complex relational identities and instead consult their individual
preferences not only as Muslims, but also as voters. This stark individualisa-
tion was the culmination of many years of the forging of separate and indi-
vidualised subjectivities through colonial representational practices. The
consequences of this severing of a complex, relational, multi-layered sub-
jectivity in favour of a privatised individualisation that prioritised a religious
identity were dramatic and catastrophic.
Violence and Partition
The historian Yasmin Khan argues that a vote for the Muslim League in
1945–46 was often viewed by voters themselves as an expression of a desire
for protection for Muslim rights and solidarity with a broader Muslim com-
munity, rather than any explicit desire for a separate Muslim nation-state
(Khan, 2008c: 38). Whilst elections aim at making private interests legible in
the public sphere, there is often more than one reading available: “The British
thought in terms of territory. The grey margins between territorial national-
ism and other forms of patriotic, emotive expression – not so easily linked to
land – remained imperial blind spots” (ibid.: 39). Not natural and inevitable,
but rather produced by the contingent intersections of local and colonial
power, Pakistan would be created as an independent nation-state after
independence.
The tragic violence that accompanied Partition resulted in the loss of per-
haps a million lives (estimates vary wildly, but see Khan, 2008c: 6; Tunzel-
mann, 2008: 265), along with systematic terror and torture. It was a violence
that was horrifically gendered. As is not uncommonly the case (Okin, 1999),
women’s bodies were understood as vessels for religious, and therefore
national, identity, by virtue of their role in giving birth to and educating
future generations within the sacrosanct private sphere of the home. Women
were repositories of national identity, guardians of the private sphere of reli-
gion, family, kinship and honour, from which the nation drew its power and
identity. Their public violation, brutalisation and murder were ritually coded
in quite specific ways.
Systematic rape was widespread and at times accompanied rituals of forced
religious “conversions”. Women were abducted, killed, and their bodies
mutilated or sold on “flesh markets” (Khan, 2008c: 69, 76, 134). The slogans
“Jai Hind” and “Pakistan Zindabad” (“Long Live India/Pakistan”, still
shouted every day at the Wagah border that separates and links Indian and
Pakistani Punjab) were frequently branded on the faces and breasts of women
and girls, so that those who survived would be symbols of terror, the new
nations of South Asia literally inscribed on their bodies (ibid.: 134).
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Liberal democratic beginnings
In another sense, though, the violence of partition failed to effect a rupture: if
British shepherding of India towards freedom and democracy had had cata-
strophic consequences, Pakistan’s new leadership still nevertheless celebrated
liberal democratic ideals. In commonwith otherswho have noted the propensity of
electoral practices to flare into violence (such as Chua, 2004), Mohammed
Ali Jinnah’s response, in the midst of the crisis, was to propose more
thoroughgoing liberalism.
Indeed, Jinnah’s inaugural presidential address to the Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 contains several echoes of Macaulay’s words on
the Charter Act more than a century earlier. Like Macaulay, he begins by
suggesting that the new state of Pakistan is an anomaly: “there is no parallel
in the history of the world” (Jinnah, 1999). Thus ruling out any appeal to – or
analysis of – historical continuity that might form the basis of a critique of
liberal democracy as a mode of governing Pakistan, he draws instead upon
the history of Britain as a model to which to aspire. This is framed specifically
in terms of religious identity and draws upon familiar notions of progress:
The Roman Catholics and Protestants persecuted one another […] The
people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the
situation and […] they went through that fire step by step. Today, you
might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist;
what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great
Britain and they are all members of the nation.
(Jinnah, 1999)
Regardless of the dubious merits of this historical characterisation of Britain
(more on this in Chapter 6), what Jinnah is referring to here is not the desire to
eradicate religious belief and practice, but rather the continuing ideal of a separate
private sphere in which religion is a matter of the “personal faith of each indivi-
dual”, which has no bearing on their “political” life as “equal citizens of the state”.
Alongside the hope for “progress”, Jinnah also re-affirms the arena of leg-
islative and electoral politics as the key legitimate terrain of contestation: “the
first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life,
property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State”
(Jinnah, 1999). This invocation of the protective role of government, enabling
individuals to associate and accumulate property in the private sphere, then,
rearticulates the concerns of colonial governmentality as well as prefiguring
the efforts of democracy promotion in the years to come.
A democratic Pakistan?
In the narrative of the Muslim League in the 1946 elections, we saw appeals
to a national unity and homogeneity, which denied claims to particularistic
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loyalty and disavowed local power relations. These founding narratives of
Pakistan can be traced through the country’s subsequent long periods under
military rule (Gilmartin, 1998: 435; Jalal, 1995a). It is through a similar nar-
rative of a broader national interest that the army still legitimises its position
as a ruler capable of behaving rationally and instilling the order and discipline
alongside a commitment to national unity and homogeneity, still highly
valued in a country where identity constitution is generally articulated around
the identification of an other which is Indian (Cohen, 2004: 93). Meanwhile,
the constant refrain that the country’s civilian leadership are “squabbling
politicians” (see Masood and Rosenberg, 2011; Sethi, 2012a; The Economist,
2011), also characterises them as corrupt: incapable of putting aside the petty
disagreements and personal interests that should rightfully belong in the pri-
vate sphere. I suggest that this is not because of a failure of liberal democracy
in Pakistan. Rather, the way Pakistan has had liberalism coded into its very
constitution from the beginning has depoliticised everyday power struggles in
ways that have been deeply unhelpful to its politics.
However, in contemporary Pakistan, the possibilities for contestation in this
public sphere are even further severely curtailed by two intersecting logics that take
the law to be fixed in advance. For Muslims in Pakistan – as Matthew Nelson has
shown – the law is understood to be already fixed in advance by the provisions of
the shar’iah (Nelson, 2011). Meanwhile, the efforts of democracy promoters are
curtailed by an understanding that various legal provisions – particularly a given
conception of inviolable human rights – are also non-negotiable.
Returning to the specific issues of tribal ties, the politics of the biraderi, and
related gender inequality, in Pakistan these remain profound concerns. They
are understood by practitioners of Democracy Promotion as a way of inhi-
biting genuine public democratic participation. Attempts to cast the politics
of kinship and tribal loyalty into a private sphere so that they would not taint
the public process of elections in 1946, and the subsequent enactment of
shari’ah law with its more generous provisions for women, did not eradicate
the customary practices of biraderi: on the contrary, they remained “exactly
the same” (Nelson, 2011: 111). Thus, as Nelson has shown in detail, local
power networks now focus their efforts in electoral politics on getting leaders
elected who will enable them to evade the provisions of the law, particularly in
terms of women’s inheritance, rather than engage in making new law (ibid.).
For the purposes of Democracy Promotion, the crucial difficulty with this
is that it means votes are controlled by the collective, rather than the result of
individual decision making. This is perceived to corrupt the whole process.
The Department for International Development (DFID) is concerned that
“[s]ocial hierarchy and power structures [by which is meant ‘tribal’ organisa-
tion] especially in rural areas strongly shape the numbers and types of voters”
(DFID, 2006a: 9), and its country governance analysis states that:
it is the patronage of local leaders rather than responsiveness to public
opinion that generates votes for mainstream parties. Thus for the
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majority, electoral choice is less about selecting a suitable representative
than a means of purchasing goodwill and services from their customary
leaders.
(Coffey International Development, 2011: 5)
Here we have another attempt to police the divide between public and pri-
vate: patronage, goodwill, local affective ties of responsibility and obligation,
duties of kinship, family and honour are illegitimate concerns in an election,
belonging as they do in the private sphere. Instead, what needs to be established
is “public opinion”, so that a representative can act effectively as a legislator,
re-enacting the transparent will of the public in a fully legible code of law.
If elections are a problem in this context of the collapsing division of public
and private, however, the solution turns out to be: elections. The policy
recommendations in this report strongly privilege “refreshing the electoral
system”, including “using elections” to highlight issues of legitimacy and
“shape a democratic process that offers real potential for positive change”
(Coffey International Development, 2011: 9–11). Understandings of local
politics, then, continue to be articulated around the assumption that freely
choosing individuals are able to leave the intertwined power relations and
hierarchies that structure their everyday lives in the household and commu-
nity behind them as they fulfil their idealised and individualised duty in the
polling station, making legible their individual interests as though they could
be abstracted from the private sphere power relations.
They cannot. The assumption by democracy promoters (local and interna-
tional) that the everyday negotiations of kinship, religious duty and gender
relations are only relevant to democratic contestation insofar as they can be
codified by elections into individualised/totalised public opinion and trans-
lated into rational legislation paradoxically creates an undemocratic situation.
These collective norms are simply wished away in an insistence on more
elections as a solution to the problem created by the very logic of the election
and the public–private divide that it inaugurates. Crucially, what is never up
for democratic contestation is the very division into public and private on
which liberal governmentality depends and which it constantly reproduces.
This chapter has linked the story of the emergence of colonial govern-
mentality, which we saw in Chapter 4, with contemporary practices of
Democracy Promotion. Along with Chapter 4, it has left very little of the
story we tell of ourselves about democracy still standing. To recap, we have
seen that liberal democracy is not a guarantor of women’s rights against a
violent Islamic shari’ah law, but rather in Pakistan has been the opposite. We
have seen that democracy is not the remedy for violence, but rather that its
very individualising logic can be violently divisive. We have seen that the
inauguration of national self-rule in 1946/47 was not the rupture of colonial
rule nor the beginning of Democracy Promotion in Pakistan, but rather
entirely continuous with the structures of colonial representational govern-
mentality in all its detail. We have furthermore seen that those structures
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continue to this day with consequences that remain depoliticising. The only
rupture we have seen in these two chapters has arguably been the one that
took place in the early nineteenth century. This was a rupture that appeared
to sweep away forever the narrative, relational, contextualised political ethics,
which brooked no sharp divide between the public and private, that had
existed in both Britain and India.
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6 Twelve months that shook the world
1989 and the Salman Rushdie affair
[T]wo images – the burning book in Bradford, the crumbling wall in Berlin –
came in the following years to be inextricably linked in many people’s
minds.
(From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy, by Kenan Malik. ©
Kenan Malik, 2009, published by Atlantic Books Ltd)
In Salman Rushdie’s 1983 novel, Shame, the narrator says that: “[E]very story
one chooses to tell is a kind of censorship, it prevents the telling of other
tales” (73). Taking seriously this observation, in this chapter I want to ask
what other stories a triumphalist narrative about 1989 has prevented us from
telling about democracy and what significance they might have for our
understandings of democracy promotion.
To start with the telling of a tale: Hanif Kureishi was a prominent suppor-
ter of Salman Rushdie (BBC, 2009) and his darkly comic novel The Black
Album (1995) is a subtle and wide-ranging fictionalised account of the
“Salman Rushdie affair”. Written in the early 1990s, it is set in a 1989 in
which the fall of the Berlin Wall and revolutions in the former Communist
countries of Eastern Europe form a backdrop to a story of social dislocation and
upheaval in London. In the novel, the “third wave” of democratisation is a
matter of particular distress for Dr Andrew Brownlow, the “Marxist-
Communist-Leninist” history lecturer, who develops a stutter in response. As
one of his students describes it, “it come on since the Communist states of
Eastern Europe began collapsing. As each one goes over he get another syllable
on his impediment, you know […] By the time Cuba goes he won’t even
manage [to say hello]” (Kureishi, 1995: 32). The joke about Cuba underlines
the sense of teleological certainty that sooner or later (not “if” but “by the
time”) all Communist states will alight upon the end of history. For Brownlow,
however, this collapse of former certainties does not lead to a new commit-
ment to the values of liberal democracy. Rather, he involves himself in the
campaign by a number of British Muslim characters against an unnamed
blasphemous book, which is said to insult the Prophet Mohammed (ibid.:
169). For Brownlow, there is a clarity in the “combustible freedom” of the
struggle of British Muslims (ibid.: 214–215).
For Shahid, though, the principal character in the book and a young Brit-
ish Muslim student, the last thing 1989 seems to presage is any kind of clarity
or certainty:
He couldn’t begin to tell the sane from the mad, wrong from right, good
from bad. Where would one start? None of this would lead to the good.
But what did? Who knew? What would make them right? Everything was
in motion; nothing could be stopped, the world was swirling, its com-
passes spinning. History was unwinding in his head into chaos, and he
was tumbling through space. Where would he land?
(Kureishi, 1995: 220)
By unteasing these related logics of teleology and uncertainty, in this chapter
I make four related arguments. First, I show that far from being a time when
Britain was secure in its democratic identity by dint of having “won” the Cold
War, 1989 was a time of great uncertainty, in which a new “foreign” other
appeared to emerge for the first time: the British Muslim. Second, I suggest
that such understandings are a form of democracy promotion which asserts
the value to liberal democracy of a free press in a public sphere unencum-
bered by censorship. This argument is heavily reliant on an understanding of
earlier arguments about the repressive hypothesis of power and a division of
public and private spheres. It may be best read in conjunction with Chapter 2.
Third, I show that Muslims who supported banning or censoring Salman
Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses were accused of being foreign, undemocratic,
misogynist and violent, and that these characterisations are difficult to sus-
tain. On the contrary, as is now a recurring theme, the practices and institu-
tions of liberal democracy were fully implicated in silencing certain forms of
debate and objectifying women. Above all, the institutions of the liberal demo-
cratic state and society, such as the police and the free press, were engaged in
vicious violence, casting radically into doubt the notion that democracy is the
opposite of, or remedy for, violence. Finally, I argue that the usefulness of the
“end of history” narrative during this year was primarily not because it
described the present accurately. It did not. However, in a time of great
uncertainty, it did provide a much-needed guide to future action. It may be
worth noting that this is not a chapter about the philosophical issues raised by
the Rushdie affair about free speech and its limits, secularism, religion and
blasphemy (for a very good treatment of these issues, see, for instance Asad
et al., 2009), but rather a specific discursive analysis of the modes of othering
that emerged in 1989 in Britain.
The year that ended history?
1989 is an important year for the stories we choose to tell about ourselves,
particularly when it comes to stories about democracy. As we saw in some
detail in Chapter 3, 1989 heralded not only the “third wave” of
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democratisation (Huntington, 1991, 1996), but also – as Francis Fukuyama
(1989) would have it – the “end of history”. As one of the third wave of
democratising countries, Pakistan seemed domesticated at this time in a way
that it has not for a long time since. This was apparent particularly in the
election of Benazir Bhutto, the world’s first female Muslim leader, who was
noted not only for her aspirations for the “creation of a democratic and free
society”, but also – as Baroness Ewart-Biggs put it in the House of Lords –
for “fulfill[ing] her role as a wife, mother, politician and public figure with
distinction and elegance” (Hansard, 1989e).
Pakistan appeared to have made its entrance into history right on cue, then,
complete with a set of well-ordered gender relations in which a commitment
to democracy and freedom went alongside an unthreatening, feminised ver-
sion of Islam that was compatible both with a proper devotion to caring work
in the private sphere and Westernised norms of appearance (for more on
Bhutto as an idealised and gendered figure for democratic values in Pakistan,
see Elliott, 2009). Whilst there was still need for development and “social
reform” (Hansard, 1989e) in Pakistan, then, this seemed to be more in the
way of continuing the historical progress of what was no longer “savage” than
of taming and containing an enemy “barbarian”. The British High Commis-
sioner in Islamabad suggested that “the only issue causing me problems at
present” (Barrington, 1989a) was the widespread offence and anger amongst
Muslims at Muslim – and Indian-born, British novelist Salman Rushdie’s
novel The Satanic Verses.1 As various documents obtained from the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) using the Freedom of Information Act
reveal – many of them still tantalisingly redacted more than two decades later
in the interests of “maintaining trust and confidence between governments” –
the situation strained relations between Britain and Pakistan (FCO, 2012).
This situation was, of course, deeply exacerbated by the Ayatollah Khomeini
calling for a death sentence on Rushdie. Even more important, though, was
the way that the perceived threat to the core liberal democratic value of free-
dom of expression seemed to create threats to national identity within the
conventional borders of the UK.
Freedom of speech and the price of visibility
In a speech in Birmingham’s Central Mosque on 24 February 1989, ten days
after the Ayatollah Khomeini had issued his infamous “fatwa” inciting Mus-
lims to kill Salman Rushdie, UK Home Secretary Douglas Hurd laid out to
British Muslims why The Satanic Verses could not be banned under British
blasphemy laws and appealed to them to renounce violence:
It is not the job of ministers in this country to go about banning books. I
tell you that very strongly. Once you start on that I promise you it is a
slope you would regret having pushed us down.
(Seton, 1989)
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This was a speech that was particularly welcomed by the British High Com-
missioner in Pakistan, who felt that it was “likely to be appreciated by many
Muslims” (Barrington, 1989b) and encouraged its dissemination in Pakistan;
this appeal appears to be based on the explicit link made between the right of
Salman Rushdie to publish his novel and the rights of Muslims to practise
their own religion under the broader democratic category of the right to
freedom of expression. Hurd explicitly spells it out:
It is the law which permits freedom of worship for religious minorities
[…] It is the law which punishes racial attacks and harassment […] It is a
shield and a refuge, perhaps more for religious and ethnic minorities than
anyone else.
(Hurd, 1989)
The choice that lies before British Muslims, by the British government’s
account, is that they might either accept the liberal rule of law that acted as
the guarantee of their religious freedoms, or push for a repressive set of
powers that might one day result in their own beliefs, practices and texts
being outlawed.
As we saw in Chapter 2, liberal democratic governmentality operates with
the notion that the state’s role is to provide a guarantee for a public sphere
free of censorship so that individuals can freely reflect on their interests and
populations can become fully legible to governments. However, the sorts of
things that are, or are not, sayable are constrained by the very flows of power
that constitute the public space as neutral, secular, rational and divorced from the
concerns of the private sphere. Thus, by assuming that if they are not
actively – repressively – censored, then people have the right to say whatever
they like, the repressive conception of power foregrounds coercive relations of
censorship, but elides the productive power by which particular discourses
become possible, particular arguments count, particular types of claim are
taken seriously, particular stories are told.
It may be a fairly obvious point to suggest that the press do not present a
neutral version of events and therefore that to enshrine the right to freedom
of expression is not at all the same thing as equalising the relations of pro-
ductive power. In other words, the right to speak does not imply the oppor-
tunity to be listened to, nor yet – as we saw in the discussion about the silent
subaltern – that everything can be said. Obvious or not, when it comes to
discussions about censorship, it is a point worth exploring here, because it
illustrates how deeply the values of freedom of expression are implicated in
the production and reproduction of existing power relations. British Muslims
managed in 1989 to disrupt the relations of power that dictated that matters
of religion should remain in the private sphere, lest they threaten the very
secular edifice that protected those beliefs in the first place. To achieve this,
however, they had to pay the price of being understood as outsiders or even
enemies of that liberal state edifice.
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When news of the content of The Satanic Verses first became widely known
amongst British Muslims, in December 1988, 7,000 people from all across
Britain marched in Bolton to register their anger, an impressive display in a town
whose Muslim population numbered just 10,000 (Malik, 2009: 4; BBC, 2009). No
one paid any attention. The protest went unremarked in the press: the demands
of British Muslims were therefore unrepresented in the national public sphere.
The protest that took place in Bradford on 14 January 1989 was different,
however. Whilst news of the large march in Bolton did not reach me just five
miles away in Bury, I remember watching television with my family, aghast at
the images of a book on fire over the Pennines in Bradford. Kenan Malik
claims that the book had also been burned earlier in Bolton, although this is
difficult to substantiate, given the lack of press coverage, and the fact that he
does not provide a reference (Malik, 2009: 4). What is certainly true is that
the burning book created a story the press were eager to run. Furthermore,
the leaders of the Bradford protests were more “media savvy” and somewhat
better organised (Malik, 2009: 5): they understood that a burning book was a
good story and that it needed to take place right in front of a journalist.
This leads to a rather entertaining story, related independently both by
Liaqat Husain of the Bradford Council of Mosques and Peter Chapman, a
journalist from the Bradford Telegraph and Argus newspaper, to a BBC doc-
umentary in 2009 (BBC, 2009). As Husain puts it, “[b]ooks are very difficult
to burn”: the whipping Yorkshire wind “kept undermining us”. This was by
no means a relief for Chapman, despite the fundamental importance of the
right to freedom of expression for his trade and democracy more broadly, of
which a free press is such an important part. Rather, he recalls saying, “[c]an
you get on and do it so I can get it in the paper?” At his prompting, a helpful
demonstrator ran to buy some paraffin. The pictures were quickly transmitted
around the world and the rest is history.
The point is both that the press are fully implicated not in neutrally
reporting the news but in subjectively in creating it, and also that what counts
as a good story emerges from flows of power that far exceed any given
instance. In purchasing and then setting fire to a bound set of printed papers,
the demonstrators in Bradford were committing no crime. They were, how-
ever – several weeks before any threat to Rushdie’s life – doing something
astonishingly provocative. They were participating in a whole history of book
burning that enabled them to claim visibility in a regime where visibility is all.
Thus, Salman Rushdie was able to say on 30 January on Daytime Live on
BBC1: “There are laws in a civilised society that are not written on the statute
books. The point is the burning of a book always means the same thing”
(rebroadcast, BBC, 2009). The burning book in Bradford conjured up images
of books being burned through history by past enemies such as Nazi Ger-
many (The Times, 1989), Communist regimes (Garton Ash, 1989) and the
Catholic Church (Sardar and Wyn Davies, 1990: 14–19). It invoked the very
notion of a civilisation that had been struggled for against the forces of
oppression, a democracy that had been wrested from numerous threatening
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others, a struggle for freedom of expression that saw Enlightenment texts
prosecuted and books by free thinkers burned as “blasphemous” by the public
hangman (Nash, 2007: chapter 2). Douglas Hurd makes explicit reference to
this idealised history in his speech, remarking that freedom of speech and
expression are “ideals to which the British people are firmly committed, and
for which they have made many sacrifices over the years” (Hurd, 1989).
Peter Sissons perhaps put forward what is at stake here most clearly of all
in a Channel 4 News broadcast on 17 February that brought him some fame:
“[the freedom to express any opinion] is the bedrock of what we believe in just
as the Qu’ran is the bedrock of what you believe in. If you offend against that,
the offence to us is very great” (rebroadcast on BBC, 2009). In order to
obtain the attention of the world’s media, then, the Bradford demonstra-
tors are in a sense committing blasphemy against that most sacred of
Enlightenment – and Protestant – symbols: the book.
The protesting Muslims appear to be setting themselves against the liberal
democratic values that are constitutive of being British: proclaiming their
foreignness by disturbing the notional boundary that is supposed to keep
religion in the private sphere. This is a forced move dictated by the very terms
of liberal democratic neutrality. Because of the way that liberal democracy is
understood to have emerged from a particular history of opposition to organised
religion, religious claims are – on the face of it – questions of “personal pre-
ference and minor matters of conscience” (Sardar and Wyn Davies, 1990: 3),
relegated to the private sphere. They can therefore be made publicly only at
the cost of entering into an opposition to the liberal democratic order overall.
Indeed, Hurd may have been offering a form of advice in saying, “I have
read the book. In my personal opinion it is not a great book” (Hurd, 1989). If
Muslims had done the same thing to Salman Rushdie as the media had done
to them in Bolton – ignored his book – it would have been read, in private, by
a small and politically irrelevant readership. Public blasphemy against demo-
cratic values, he implies, is not the best way to obtain what they are
demanding. His plea to Muslims, then, is to “express your protests, peacefully
and with dignity” (ibid.), which appears to be a direct intervention against
both the book burning and violent slogans that had been the price of their
visibility. This shows a rather subtle understanding of the usefulness of rele-
gating dissent to the private sphere, where it can be quietly ignored. As
Sardar and Wyn Davies acidly remark, “you can have any belief you want, so
long as it is not useful in negotiating the future of society” (Sardar and Wyn
Davies, 1990: 12).
Foreign policy and civilisation
On the face of it, then, there is in 1989 a clear binary choice to be made, a
choice that comes down to an acceptance or rejection of civilised British
values and their insistence that religion, along with emotional and relational
ties, belongs in the private sphere. The protestors in Bradford were described
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in Parliament by MP Tony Marlow as “alien people with little commitment
to our country or way of life” (Hansard, 1989d), whilst the very citizenship
rights of some of Rushdie’s most stringent critics were also queried in Parliament
(Hansard, 1989b).
For some this is an explicit question of pitting civilisation against barbarian
outsiders. For the widely read and populist Sun newspaper, for instance, the
very integrity of Britain is understood to be at stake. Alongside calls physi-
cally to deport those making death threats against him, they also seek to
externalise the problem by focusing on Iran:
If we allow a blood lust hooligan like [British citizen] Sayed Abdul
Quddus [to] walk the streets, the Ayatollah will have beaten the British
race more surely than if he had dropped an atomic bomb on Westminster.
(Macdonald Hull, 1989: 9)
Note that democracy, as symbolised by Westminster is, as ever, at the heart of
understandings about Britishness. Similarly the News of the World (the Sun’s
then sister paper on Sundays) raises the stakes of individual Muslims breaking
the law by inciting murder, such that it becomes not an individual instance of
criminality, but rather a matter of national security and even survival:
“Fanatical Muslims breaking the law must stop. Otherwise it’ll no longer be
Britain” (The News of the World, 1989c: 8). Elsewhere, specifically invoking the
Second World War as “the last time Britain faced a wicked dictatorship”, the Sun
proposes that a bombing raid on Iran by the Royal Air Force (RAF) would be the
most effective means to “persuade the Mullahs of the wrongness of their
ways” (The Sun, 1989e: 6). Meanwhile, the externalised enemies of democracy are
characterised as “medieval crackpots” (ibid.), bringing in a familiar temporal
dimension alongside a distinction betweenWestern rationality and Islamic insanity.
Outside the pages of the tabloids, a temporal othering is likewise invoked in
the name of civilisation and democracy, with figures from the high-profile
cultural commentator Melvyn Bragg to the heroic figure of Václav Havel
proclaiming that Britain and the world could not be civilised if Salman
Rushdie could not be free to express his opinions (Winder, 1989; Havel,
1989). Casting the protestors as the barbarian other of civilisation is the
obvious corollary of this move, as happened most vehemently in the House of
Lords when Lord Stoddart rhetorically asked:
Is it not a fact that book burning, threats to publishers, threats to organisers of
proper and legal meetings, and incitement of a mob to murder a fellow citizen
is not Moslem fundamentalism; it is naked, brutal and primitive fascism?
(Hansard, 1989c)
In this conflation of legal book burning and illegal threats and incitement, a
primitive and violent imagined past and the more recent fascist (book-burning)
others of Britain, he brings together a whole complex of fears.
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Malise Ruthven, former professor of Islamic Studies, wrote one of the first
books to discuss the Salman Rushdie affair and, in an extract that seems to
sum up the complex web of modes of othering that are circulating around the
protestors, he opens with the following description of the large demonstration
that took place on 27 May 1989:
They came in their thousands from Bradford and Dewsbury, Bolton and
Macclesfield […] They wore white hats and long, baggy trousers, with
flapping shirt tails. Most of them were bearded; the older men looked
wild and scraggy with curly grey-flecked beards – they were mountain
men from Punjab, farmers from the Ganges delta, peasants from the hills
of Mirpur and Campbellpur. After decades of living in Britain, they still
seemed utterly foreign: even in Hyde Park, a most cosmopolitan part of a
very cosmopolitan city […], they were aliens […] they seemed like men
from the sticks, irredeemably provincial.
(Ruthven, 1990: 1)
The externalisation of these protestors is taking place on three inter-related
levels, here. They are, first, “foreign” by dint of their backgrounds in Paki-
stan. Second, they are out of step with the times, harking back to a rural or
traditional past that can be accommodated only uncomfortably in that icon
of the disorderly post-modern, the “cosmopolitan city”. This highlights the
third mode of othering, which is to suggest that they are “provincial” – here, I
mean not only that their concerns come from a distant, disconnected part of
the world, but also that they are redolent of an English industrial past that is
in decline in the face of modernising history. The northern mill towns of
Bolton and Bradford seem to be as much an anachronistic relic of Britain’s
colonial past as the Empire that bought their products, and so too do the
immigrants who came to work in their now derelict factories.
Such forms of othering populate perceptions of Bradford, the Yorkshire
mill town that hit the headlines in January 1989. Although the 1991 census
suggests that the city’s Muslim population (which was overwhelmingly of
Pakistani heritage) was significant but still very much a minority of around 13
per cent (Valentine, 2006: 9), Conservative MP John Townend caused con-
sternation among anti-racist activists by stating that the city had become
“another Pakistan” (Wintour, 1989).
The term “the Bradford book burners” quickly sprang up as a shorthand
for the more provocative Muslim protestors, as epitomised by the Bradford
Council of Mosques (see, for example Neuberger, 1989; The Independent,
1989; Rosenthal, 1989; The News of the World, 1989a: 8), whilst the Inde-
pendent suggested that “[r]eligious trouble involving Islam always has the
potential to become racial trouble. Ask Bradford” (Brown, 1989). Meanwhile,
the Sun criticises a decision by Channel 4 to dedicate six hours of broadcast
time to a dramatisation of the classic Hindu text The Mahabharata by spec-
ulating “it must have got them their highest viewing figures ever – in
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Bradford”, adding that “not even the maddest mullah” in that city could have
enjoyed it in its entirety (The Sun, 1989a: 17). Leaving aside a bizarre ignor-
ance about the different religions of the Indian subcontinent, this intervention
is particularly interesting for the remedy it suggests: “perhaps they could use
it as a springboard for a series closer to home – about King Arthur or the
Crusades” (ibid.). A reassertion of the more usual stories we tell of ourselves,
then, is the remedy for foreign practices of thought.
Anxiety about the Muslim protests, then, became focused on Bradford as a
site of foreignness threatening the very integrity of British borders with its
spectacular propensity for seemingly barbaric behaviour. Bradford appeared
to be located in a precarious position that seemed neither quite inside nor
outside. This is an important point because it once again demonstrates that as
concerns about identity became increasingly salient following the uncertainty
provoked by the “end of history”, the border between the UK and Pakistan is
increasingly understood to be located not in airports or even immigration
queues, but in the minutiae of daily life in the northern mill towns, including
the shared history promoted by television broadcasts.
It is also important to note that whilst it took a death sentence from the
Ayatollah Khomeini for the Sun to hail Salman Rushdie as a “genius” (The
Sun, 1989c: 6), support for him was not always so wholehearted. A certain
disapproval of bringing religion into the public sphere appears, at least for
some, to apply to Rushdie as much as to his Muslim critics. Thus Geoffrey
Howe, the Foreign Secretary, is able to state on the BBC World Service that
“we understand why people of the Muslim faith, which we respect, resent
what is said about their faith” (rebroadcast in BBC, 2009). Other politicians,
including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, joined in this distancing from
Rushdie, with Norman Tebbit (former Chair of the ruling Conservative Party
and prominent ally of Thatcher) going so far as to call Rushdie “an out-
standing villain” (Malik, 2009: 33). Whilst Kenan Malik views this reaction
from British Conservative politicians as a lamentable moral quiescence to
illiberal demands, in fact this ambivalence towards Rushdie is entirely in
keeping with the logic of liberal democracy. Blasphemy, like religion, is a
matter for the private sphere.
The consequence of this is that Rushdie is also caught up in the modes of
exclusion circulating at the time. Geoffrey Howe suggests that “[Rushdie] is a
man who comes from a world of which he was part [and therefore] must have
known what would happen” (rebroadcast on BBC, 2009). Tebbit went on to
ask: “How many societies, having been so treated by a foreigner in their midst,
could go so far to protect him from the consequences of his egotistical and self-
opinionated attack on the religion into which he was born?” (quoted in Malik,
2009: 33). This is an impression that appears to have been rather widespread, at
least judging by Andrew Brown’s observation in the Independent that:
One has only to look at the Salman Rushdie jokes circulating to realise
that the aspect of the affair which really appeals to popular humour is
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not that he is a writer, a blasphemer, or a standard bearer of free speech,
but that he is a Pakistani of some sort.
(Brown, 1989)
This suggestion that Indian-born Rushdie is Pakistani would appear odd to
any reader unfamiliar with the appallingly abusive racist term “Paki” – which
might refer indiscriminately to anyone of South Asian appearance or descent –
but the reference is immediately recognisable to anyone who lived in Britain
in the 1980s. Rushdie, too, is cast as an outsider, a foreigner, from a separate
“world” of Islam.
Democrats/Muslims
The binary opposition at the very core of the modes of exclusion we have
explored was that between Muslims on the one hand, and committed demo-
crats on the other. This distinction, however, was a deeply unstable one, even
leaving aside the possibility that not all Muslims were involved in protests
against the book. Although Salman Rushdie may have claimed that to burn a
book “always means the same thing”, there is good reason to believe that the
meaning of book burning is deeply entwined with the context in which it
takes place, as with any discursive performance. In general, the anti-Rushdie
protestors’ primary stated aim was to get the British law changed in order to
widen the scope of blasphemy laws that protected only the Anglican Church,
and to get the novel banned. It is worth noting at this stage that these blas-
phemy laws were far from anachronistic anomalies left on the statute by an
oversight: calls to repeal them were regularly rejected during the furore (see,
for example Patten, 1989), and they were used in 1989 to ban a film called
Visions of Ecstasy, which was allegedly blasphemous against Christ (Nash,
2007: 4674).
Muslim lobbying on this matter took place in a number of ways. For
example, as we have seen, large peaceful protests and marches were held
throughout the UK, including the large “march on Downing Street” on 27
May 1989 (Ruthven, 1990: 1); petitions were organised, signed and sent to
MPs (Wahhab, 1989b); public meetings were held in which the issue was put
to the vote (Roy, 1989) and a new political party was even set up avowedly to
provide conventional political representation so that British Muslims could
press their claims (Wahhab, 1989a). Many protestors were furthermore keen
to lay claim to Enlightenment and democratic credentials, brandishing ban-
ners that quoted Jean-Jacques Rousseau and George Bernard Shaw on the
merits of Islam (Ruthven, 1990: 1). Shabbir Akhtar, from the Bradford
Council of Mosques, is adamant, furthermore, that “[t]he book burning in
Bradford was not Nazi style. We merely burnt one of Rushdie’s books”
(Lister, 1989). The book burning, in other words, takes place not as any
attempt to institute an alternative, despotic form of governance, but rather as
a deliberately shocking, yet entirely legal, performance within a much broader
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set of actions that demonstrate not only a deep understanding of the rituals of
democratic representation, but also a genuine commitment to them.
Matthew Nelson argues, in respect of (liberal) democracy in Pakistan, that
“[d]emocracy is not about supporting or avoiding ostensibly inaccessible laws.
It is in fact about supporting or opposing the law – and, if opposing, seeking
perchance to change it” (Nelson, 2011: 230). If that is what democracy is,
then the actions taken by the Bradford Council of Mosques and other
Muslim protestors are quintessentially democratic. It may be that many lib-
erals would not agree with the changes to the law being proposed, but it is
part of a commitment to democracy that one sometimes has to engage with
others’ opinions in an atmosphere of profound disagreement.
Curiously, though, every attempt by Muslim protestors to obtain demo-
cratic representation for their attempts to extend already existing blasphemy
laws to cover their own beliefs met not so much with democratic engagement
and debate specifically on the merits of this deeply felt issue, but rather with
equivocation and the accusation that bringing this demand to the public
sphere at all was in its own way undemocratic. For instance, Max Madden
MP of Bradford West attempted to bring the demand to the House of Com-
mons to be debated in the ordinary way. Not only could no parliamentary
time be found for the debate, his proposal to discuss the matter in the primary
democratic deliberating chamber of the land in order to “see what fresh
initiatives can be taken to defuse this dangerous and difficult situation” is
dismissed by the Leader of the House in the following terms: “The Govern-
ment have made themselves very clear on this matter, and I am surprised that
the hon. Gentleman phrased the question as he did” (Hansard, 1989a). The
implication is that the matter is not up for debate.
The Sun newspaper, meanwhile, notes the reluctance of the Labour Party
to condemn the protestors and sarcastically asks: “Why so coy? […] Surely
they can’t be worried about the effect on the Muslim vote?” (The Sun, 1989d: 6).
In a curious paradox, then, it seems that the legitimate debate of particular
legislation and the public representation of particular voters and their stated
interests cannot be allowed in the very name of democracy. Here we have a
particularly clear example of the limits of democracy promotion: what is to
be promoted and defended is implicitly liberal democracy, with its con-
stitutive and necessary separation of the public and private spheres. This
issue, because it is assumed to belong in the private sphere, is put beyond the
reach of democratic contestation even as any kind of censorship is decried.
A further paradox is that the resistance that seemed to be posed within and
to the liberal democratic state and its current system of law by Muslim pro-
testors is not, on closer inspection, independent of that state itself. On the
contrary, the very existence of a population called “British Muslims” who can
exert themselves as a group is wholly dependent on the everyday practices of
governmentality. In the 1980s, in an atmosphere of racial tension, mistrust
and violence, the Conservative government operated through local authorities
to fund particularistic civil society organisations, often based on narrow
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ethnic or faith differences, in order to draw people from ethnic minorities into
the democratic process and develop a leadership with whom democratic
representatives could deal (Malik, 2009: 58–71). One of these state-funded
organisations, designed to be a “channel of communication” between Muslims
and the local authority, was the Bradford Council of Mosques (ibid.: 73).
This pursuit of a politics of “multiculturalism”, in which faith identities
were particularly privileged, was fully implicated not only in managing com-
munities, but also in creating attachments to particular kinds of identity,
which were by no means inevitable. On the contrary, an attractive alternative
source of identity in the 1980s for many Muslims and other ethnic minorities
was the politically inflected identity, “black”. This did not mean, as it does in
the United States, people who could trace their heritage at some point to
Africa. Rather, it was a self-consciously political call to arms, which attemp-
ted to bring people together in opposition to a state and society that was
understood to be profoundly and institutionally racist, discriminatory and
violent (Malik, 2009: 51).
The ultimate failure and eventual disappearance of this attempt to forge a
solidaristic identity based on politics rather than faith or ethnicity was not
only because of state-based multiculturalism, but rather owed something also
to a disquiet around the flows of power within this movement. “Two of us
were officially ‘black’”, says Karim, the narrator of Hanif Kureishi’s The
Buddha of Suburbia, “(though truly I was more beige than anything)” (Kur-
eishi, 2009: 167), betraying an anxiety that subsuming a range of histories
and commitments into a unitary politics might bring with it its own forms of
oppression and exclusions. Without idealising this political alternative,
however, it is important to note that:
It is difficult to get the council’s attention by insisting that your area is
poor or disadvantaged. But if you were to say that the Muslim community
is deprived or lacking, then council coffers suddenly open up – not because
the council is particularly inclined to help Muslims, but because being
“Muslim”, unlike being “poor” or “disadvantaged” registers in the
bureaucratic mind as an authentic identity. Over time, you come to see
yourself as a Muslim […] not just because [that identity] provide[s] you
with access to power, influence and resources, but also because those
identities have come to possess a social reality through receiving constant
confirmation […] It is how you are seen, so it is how you come to see
yourself.
(Malik, 2009: 69)
Not innocent of power, then, nor the neutral arbiter of demands made in the
public sphere by individuals and groups who might freely associate in private,
the liberal democratic state is fully complicit in the contradictory flows of
power which both enable the creation of a British Muslim identity and then
rule out of the public sphere the democratic demands made by this faith-based
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community, effectively censoring them. This leaves British Muslims in a
painfully difficult position which has nothing to do with being for or against
democracy.
Women’s rights/Islam
A familiar set of anxieties can be discerned in Malise Ruthven’s account of
the large London protest against The Satanic Verses on 27 May 1989:
the marchers suddenly saw a group of Asian female demonstrators hold-
ing aloft a banner proclaiming their membership of Women Against
Fundamentalism. History does not reveal what taunts or jibes the women
threw at the marchers […] What is certain is that the Muslim psyche was
bruised at a tender spot: relations between the sexes. Thereafter the
organisers, the stewards and the police lost control. Muslim youths tried
physically to assault the erring females. When the police went to protect
them, they started a running battle.
(Ruthven, 1990: 5)
The Asian women depicted here are perceived to be not “Muslim” them-
selves: women in all these accounts appear to be victims of Islam rather than
practising Muslims.
The group Women Against Fundamentalism was set up by Southall Black
Sisters and was actively interested in promoting a solidaristic “black” feminist
identity in contradistinction to the more communal Muslim identity that was
emerging so strongly through the process of these protests (Gupta, 2003: 17).
Nevertheless, the fiasco of a group of white police officers protecting “Asian
women” from “Muslims” seems an archetypal example of the colonial com-
monplace of “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak,
1987). This episode draws on one of the most regular anxieties expressed
about Islam, in 1989 as now, and as in colonial India: that it is a religion that
is somehow inimical to the women’s rights that have been hard won through
the civilising process of history in Britain and other Western societies.
The Sun meanwhile, depicts the Ayatollah Khomeini in a cartoon as sur-
rounded by women wearing veils: this cartoon shows him tearing up The
Satanic Verses in a rage and the caption runs: “This is nothing. You should
see him when he can’t find his car keys” (The Sun, 1989b). The uncontrolled
emotion in a domestic setting, with perhaps an undercurrent of domestic
violence, hints at a gendered ordering at the centre of Iranian power which is
out of joint and therefore laughable, whereas the outrage in the accompany-
ing article is played absolutely straight. The Iranians, we are told, are men
“WHO allow guards to rape girls in prison yet stone people for adultery;
WHOSE teachings force women to wear veils and be treated like animals”
(The Sun, 1989e: 6, emphasis in the original). Here, state and sexual violence,
religious modes of dress and the policing of sexual behaviour are woven
together in an intervention that seeks to externalise abrogations of “women’s
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rights”: the oppression of women is understood to be a matter that is foreign
and it further underlines Iran’s status as an enemy. Islam overall, then, is
portrayed as a foreign, violently masculine and intolerant religion, without the
gentlemanly restraint, the rational tolerance, or the autonomy and freedom
for women of the implied self, the rational, democratic West.
How useful is this caricature for a feminist approach to democracy pro-
motion, however? ManyMuslim women and men, of course, strongly contest such
caricatures and suggest that the practice of some more radical forms of Islam
are particularly attractive to women because they encourage education and
political participation for women (Mahmood, 2005), as well as opposing
arranged and especially forced marriages (Malik, 2010: 45). In this way, women
can escape some of the more patriarchal practices associated with the practices
of the biraderi, which we encountered in more detail in the previous chapter.
Ruthven oddly compares Islam to Christianity by suggesting that the latter
“gives some acknowledgement to the female principle in the Virgin”, but
suggests that “Islam tends to suppress it altogether” (Ruthven, 1990: 6). This
is curious not just because Jesus and his mother, Mary, are key figures in the
Qu’ran, but also because one of the particular scenes in The Satanic Verses
that caused great offence took place in a brothel in which the prostitutes were
given the names of the Prophet’s wives. Whilst one might argue about the poli-
tical usefulness of any of these figures for women’s everyday lives in the late
twentieth century, it is difficult to defend the view that the Virgin Mary is a
more emancipatory figure than the Prophet’s energetic and active wives,
whose autonomy was far greater than would have been expected by the stan-
dards of their time. There is no particular reason to believe that Islam is
particularly inimical to women and their rights.
Part of what is at stake, here, however, is as usual what counts as “women’s
rights” and how we might go about deciding. What is perhaps most perni-
cious about contemporary democracy promotion is that in comparing Islamic
practices with those of the Western liberal democracies, the values of the
latter are unreflectively upheld as an idealised model to which other societies
should aspire. As Ruthven’s remarks about Christianity – and the idealisation
of Benazir Bhutto’s Westernised gendered role as wife and mother – attest, we
run the risk here of shielding liberal democratic practices from proper critical
reflection if we divert attention onto the perceived oppressiveness of Islam.
To illustrate this, I want to look briefly at how the Sun newspaper, which
was so angry in its defence of women’s rights in Iran, saw fit to celebrate the
much vaunted third wave of democratisation in Europe. Delighted to be wit-
nessing the beginnings of a free press in the newly liberalising Czechoslova-
kia, the Sun prints a Czech-language edition, which is distributed amongst the
pro-democracy protestors in Wenceslas Square. This is the newspaper’s
expression of solidarity with the activists, and it is keen to remind its British
readers that by successfully obtaining liberal democratic reforms, Eastern
Europe is entering “our world, the world of freedom”, emphasising the
familiar story that “Britain has a thousand-year tradition of democracy” (The
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Sun, 1989f: 38). Czechoslovakia, then, is becoming altogether more civilised
and less foreign, a development that can only reinforce commitment to the
UK’s liberal democratic institutions.
The Czech edition is accompanied to Prague by none other than a “Page
Three girl”. Page Three, we may remember, is something of a dubious British
institution: another immediately recognisable phrase, it denotes the young female
models who pose topless on the third page of that newspaper – sold in every
newsagent on the bottom shelf – each day. The triumphant victory of democratic
values – which rely so heavily on the freedom of the press, for which reason
Rushdie is so vigorously defended by the paper – are summed up as follows:
For more than two decades, miserable Czechs have only been allowed
boring Communist newspapers. Instead of reading fun-packed stories
they had to wade through long tirades against democracy. Instead of
Page Three the sour Soviets made them look at pictures of party bosses.
(The Sun, 1989f)
The article is, of course, intended to be light-hearted, but nevertheless betrays
rather clearly the terms of the status quo that democracy promotion upholds.
Women’s rights, here, can be read off from the dress code and a “free” and
democratic society is almost parodically symbolised by the freedom, mainly, to
take one’s clothes off, especially if there is money to be made in the activity.
There is no space here to discuss in detail the politics of wearing the veil for
Muslim women, but in this context, one can perhaps feel much sympathy for those
who assert that this decision is a self-confident feminist statement that disrupts
the objectification and commodification of women’s bodies (Ahmed, 2011).
The broader point is that whether it comes to political representation, vio-
lence, modes of dress, poverty, equality or respect, there is plenty to criticise
in the liberal democracies when it comes to women’s lives, and the pitting of
democracy against Islam, as continually evoked by the image of white men
protecting brown women from brown men, positively inhibits a genuine
engagement with these issues by upholding existing freedoms as the best we
can do. As ever, this is effected not least by the repressive hypothesis of power,
which focuses the attention on “censorship” as the force that says “no” and
therefore detracts attention from the flows of power that produce the sorts of
things that do get printed as equally a matter for democratic concern.
Rationalism/violence
What may have appeared to be missing from my account up to this point is a
robust condemnation of violence. After all, the anxiety provoked by book burning
and the history that accompanies it is partly, but not only, that the regimes
that once burned books often did not stop there. As Rushdie’s supporter Lisa
Appignanesi put it, “first the book, then the man” (BBC, 2009).
A condemnation of violence is not difficult to provide. The Ayatollah
Khomeini’s pronouncement of a death sentence against Salman Rushdie
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(along with a reward for carrying it out) was reckless and dangerous in the
extreme. Salman Rushdie was put through many years of terror, humiliation
and extreme inconvenience, when he had committed no crime. His colleagues
were tragically yet more unfortunate: Japanese translator Hitoshi Igarashi was
stabbed to death, and Ettore Capriolo, the Italian translator, was severely
wounded in 1991, whilst in 1993 37 people died in Turkey in a fire that had
been targeted at Aziz Nesin, the Turkish translator, who himself survived
(Malik, 2009: 17). Also in 1993, William Nygaard, Rushdie’s publisher in
Norway, was shot three times and was seriously injured (ibid.: 15). These were
each terrible acts, for which there can be no excuse.
Against this horrifying backdrop of violence, the UK’s Conservative gov-
ernment of the time are rather to be admired for disdaining the advice of the
Sun newspaper pre-emptively to send in the RAF against a Middle Eastern
state, and rather expressing admiration for Islam and its enshrined values of
tolerance and mercy (Hurd, 1989), providing police protection for Rushdie at
no small state expense, and endeavouring to maintain some form of diplo-
matic channel of communication open with Iran, as well as with British
Muslims (ibid.; BBC, 2009). The values of liberal democracy look rather
attractive against the mob violence that might have directed itself against
Rushdie. Indeed, as Peter Mayer of Penguin, Rushdie’s publisher, put it when
first facedwith the distress caused by the novel: “One relied on the sanity of secular
democracy – that people met together, discussed their differences and sorted them
out” (quoted in Malik, 2009: 11). Democracy is again understood precisely as
the remedy for violence.
A condemnation of violence is not difficult. This is probably why the vast
majority of Muslims who were angered by The Satanic Verses did not resort
to or condone violence, but instead – as discussed above – protested in legal
and peaceful ways, using the democratic channels open to them. It is probably
why polling suggested that less than 30 per cent of Muslims – even in a highly
hysterical and polarised environment of great peer pressure and bravado –
would at any point even say to a pollster that they supported the death threat,
much less act upon it. Why such polling evidence was reported as “Muslims
back Rushdie action” by the usually responsible Guardian newspaper is
simply baffling (The Guardian, 1989).
A condemnation of violence is not difficult to provide. That is why it is so
distressing, even after all these years, to read about the story of “Ramesh K” and
his family, who were in 1989 hounded from their shop, livelihood and home as a
consequence of a degrading series of violent, racist attacks, which resulted in
broken bones and internal injuries as well as racist slogans and posters daubed
on their premises over the course of two years (Rose, 1989). Mr K showed great
courage and forbearance in continuing in his work: “We couldn’t let them win.
We could have put the shutters up, but they’d have said, ‘yeah, we got the
Pakis out’” (quoted in ibid.). The last straw came on 17 August 1989, when
two men entered the shop and insisted that Mr K display a photograph of
Salman Rushdie along with the slogan: “Rushdie in, Pakis out” (ibid.). “Would
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you stay there when you were getting attacked night after night?” asked Mr K
(quoted in ibid.). Meanwhile, a Mrs Bagwell from the local residents’ asso-
ciation and Chief Superintendent McLean of the Metropolitan Police were in
agreement that the ongoing attacks were not racially motivated, but rather the
result of a “personal vendetta”, on the basis that when told to “fuck off”, Mr K
had the temerity to “tell you to fuck off right back”, described by local police
officers as an “attitude problem” on Mr K’s own part (ibid.).
The detail about Salman Rushdie (perhaps) aside, this is not an isolated
story. The depressing, relentless, quotidian violence faced by British Pakistanis in
the 1980s is almost impossible to quantify, given the under-reporting that is
hardly surprising in light of this kind of police response. However, there were 2,366
recorded racially motivated incidents in the UK in 1988 and the vulnerability of
“Asians” in particular increased over the course of the 1980s, such that these
kinds of attacks were understood by the Home Affairs Select Committee to
be “a feature of the lives of Asians in Britain” (House of Commons Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1989: v–vi). This is more vividly evidenced by Kenan Malik’s
memories of mobilising with other young British Muslims to protect vulner-
able families in the face of police indifference. It is evidenced in the memories of
anyone living in the northern mill towns in the 1980s, as I did, who will be fully
familiar with the phrase “Paki-bashing”, from those who viewed perpetrating
racial violence as some kind of enjoyable and entirely normal “national
sport” (Malik, 2009: xviii).
It is evidenced in the press in the casual way that even television reviews
dismiss programming for people interested in the subcontinent with: “They’re
more likely to be planning Singh Something Simple or Curry-nation Street
[than programmes on ‘British’ history]” (The Sun, 1989a: 17). Or when the
Sunday tabloids condemn the Commission for Racial Equality for preventing
people of “Asian origin [from] understand[ing] they’re now supposed to be British”
(The News of the World, 1989c: 8). Or when the same tabloids suggest that
“coloured immigrants” should be given financial help to “return to their
country of origin [unless] they become genuinely British. Not like the book-
burning Bradford Muslims” (The News of the World, 1989a). With such racist
complicity from the democratic free press, little wonder perhaps that Mr K’s
neighbours felt he had no right to answer them back.
Lest we congratulate ourselves on how much better things became later,
Zaiba Malik tells the story of running a corner shop – a vulnerable and
exposed occupation undertaken by many British Muslims – for an undercover
film in 2001, and the constant racial abuse and intimidation she suffered:
pretty much all the abuse I got was from normal white people in the town –
men, women and children. So then I stopped liking and trusting white people.
Because I thought they all thought I was a piece of shit […] Even though
I had a security man with me, I was petrified the whole time.
(Malik, 2010: 258)
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A condemnation of violence is not difficult to provide. However, for Foucault,
“[p]racticing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult […] It is a
question of making conflicts more visible” (Foucault, 1988: 155–156). What is
difficult, but worthwhile, is challenging a story of ourselves as a rational,
evolved, civilised liberal democracy that has grown out of 1,000 years of
specifically British history.
When we focus on the productive power that flows through the institutions of
liberal democracy, rather than the repressive power of censorship that says “no”,
we can see that what can and cannot be represented in a liberal democratic polity is
dependent on the repressive hypothesis itself. Violence against liberal values is
vividly visible, because this is violence that appears to be repressive: the protesting
Muslims were demanding direct censorship. Peaceful democratic protests by a
beleaguered and invisible minority, violence against individuals in private
spaces, the pain caused by an endless litany of racist remarks that are casually
perpetuated and legitimised in the free press – these can be more difficult to see,
because they require us to take notice of the web of productive power in which we
are embedded and which makes some things more sayable than others.
Let us be particularly careful of the facile stories we tell about the violence
to which liberal democratic values are subjected, when it behoves us to tell a
more difficult story about the violence that is perpetrated against the “other”
that our liberal democratic institutions of the free press, civil society and the
rule of law are fully complicit in creating, upholding and perpetrating.
Democracy promotion and the end of history
Any confidence that 1989 was a year in which liberal democracy was dis-
covered as the one best way to govern is misplaced: the Salman Rushdie affair
makes visible a flux of uncertainties that affected more than just Marxist his-
tory lecturers like Andrew Brownlow in the weeks and months that followed the
collapse of the Communist regimes and the end of the Cold War. For many
commentators, it is the very pervasiveness of doubt and uncertainty that cre-
ates a serious problem in 1989. No less a mind than Edward Said’s diagnosed
“[t]he virtual exhaustion of grand systems and total theories” (Said, 1989).
This concern invaded even the satisfaction at the demise of an old enemy.
According to the Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge:
Our self-satisfaction has been confirmed at the end of the decade by the
sudden tottering of the East European regimes. We think we are in com-
paratively good shape; but we are not. We have our own spiritual crisis. We
may not like the fundamentalist diagnosis and remedy, – but it may prevail
over us, unless we get down to producing something better for ourselves.
(Cupitt, 1989)
What is the narrative that might provide a satisfying riposte to the “funda-
mentalist diagnosis and remedy”, that might re-galvanise Western forces and
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offer a certain moral clarity? For journalist Amir Taheri, it is democracy that pro-
vides an answer and an alternative. In an oddly haunting plea, he suggests that in
the absence of democracy, “[p]eople led into despair by an oppressive system are
always in danger of choosing something much worse, just as a man caught in
a skyscraper fire might jump out of the nearest window” (Taheri, 1989).
As a new “other” to liberal democracy is identified in English towns, as the
Salman Rushdie affair presented an opportunity – according to Inayat Bun-
glawala of the Muslim Council of Britain – “for the forging of a more con-
fident Islamic identity among many British Muslims” (quoted in Malik, 2009:
123), as Muslims offer up religious belief as a corrective for a world in which
“the supreme value of doubt” is epitomised by Rushdie and the kind of
artistic work that privileges “duplicity, truthlessness, doubt and ambiguity”
(Sardar and Wyn Davies, 1990: 10–11), the narrative available for a secular
alternative to doubt is that of liberal democracy.
The “end of history” narrative paradoxically came in useful in the way it
could recommend an answer to all this uncertainty. The teleological narrative,
then, is not the explanation of recent events; rather recent events make this
narrative particularly attractive: “Professor Fukuyama (whom God pre-
serve)”, suggests the Times, “has suggested that now the clash of ideologies in
the world has been resolved, history in the future will be a relatively anecdotal
affair [… But] new threats always hatch to keep life interesting” (Hill, 1989).
If the civilising course of history is now complete, leaving no more than
anecdotal events, and if threats are no longer really a matter of ideological
disagreement, then the uncivilised others of democracy can be easily under-
stood and dealt with: they are either barbarians to be contained or savages
who can be civilised through democracy promotion.
Although the Sun recommends the military destruction of liberal democ-
racy’s barbarian enemies, in the more sensitive hands of Douglas Hurd the
problem is rather how an unruly population might become civilised. He sets
out in some detail in his speech at the Birmingham Central Mosque how “the
Government wants a country where all citizens, whatever their origins, have a
sense of belonging to Britain”. This is to be achieved in a variety of ways of
which obedience to the law is the most important, but which also includes
learning English and “playing [a] full part in the mainstream of our national
life” (Hurd, 1989). What this means in practice is spelled out in some detail.
Muslims are to have “a clear understanding of the history and institutions of
Britain, of its democratic processes – at both local and national level, its
system of Government, its police and judicial system” (ibid.). Not only
knowledge of British democracy, however, but also participation is the ideal:
Whether you look at police officers, magistrates, local councillors or
Parliamentary candidates, men and women from the ethnic minorities
can now be seen in growing numbers. In both our economic and cultural
life they are making a welcome and positive contribution to the nation.
(Hurd, 1989)
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Democracy promotion, then, can be understood to operate through a series
of ethical practices. It operates through the stories we tell of ourselves in
which various undemocratic (and book-burning) others have been defeated
(Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) or civilised (the Catholic Church in Eng-
land, out-dated and undemocratic forces associated with despotism and
absolutism). It functions through history books at school, through the narra-
tive constantly reinforced by the television broadcasts and newspaper articles
the imagined community are understood to be reading together, through
participation in elections (as voters and candidates), through interactions with
the police and judicial system, through engaging with the capitalist economic
system and through speaking the national language. In all these detailed ways,
the precise practices that are required for belonging are laid out, with liberal
understandings of democracy pre-eminent amongst them.
It is important to note that Hurd expresses a perfect ease with the idea that
languages other than English might be spoken at home and also suggests that
“[n]o-one can or should object to those who come to settle in this country or
their children being brought up faithful in the religion of Islam and well-
versed in the Holy Koran” (Hurd, 1989). This is a sentiment shared by The
News of the World, which remarks that “coloured citizens […] can speak and
do as they like at home” (The News of the World, 1989c: 8). Hurd goes further
than this, indeed, and suggests that “[t]here is much to admire about the way in
which British Muslims centre their lives around their religious faith, and
about their continuing regard for family” (Hurd, 1989). However, in keeping
with the requirements of liberal democratic governmentality, the point is that
these religious and linguistic practices are to be confined to the gendered pri-
vate sphere of home and family, and are not to intrude into public national
life. Even then, the precise ordering of gender relations is considered to be a
legitimate matter for intervention for those who have not yet fully entered
history, with a clear emphasis put by Hurd on the entrance of both men and
women from ethnic minorities into public, liberal democratic life.
In a context of resistance and public blasphemy, then, the established order
of liberal democratic governmentality asserts itself firmly to establish, in a
number of social locations both through and beyond the state, that belonging
and inclusion are conditional on participation in democratic rituals and an
acceptance of the public–private divide on which liberal democratic govern-
mentality relies. The usual history of democratic Britain and its undemocratic
others is reinforced by a victory over the Cold War others who would limit free-
dom of expression. This is a version of history that both creates the protesting
Muslims as a new enemy and also provides the remedy.
After the end of history
The end of the Cold War gives the triumph of liberal democracy a particu-
larly victorious slant, but its intersection with a “1,000-year” imagined
national history and the tropes of civilisation that go with it means that it is a
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narrative that has considerable flexibility and appeal. Considering these
events 20 years later, Kenan Malik suggests that “the burning book in Brad-
ford to the burning towers in Manhattan on 9/11 and the burning bus in
London on 7/7” are intimately linked through the emergence of an Islamic
identity that is alienated from democracy (Malik, 2009: xii). In response, he
advocates a more robust liberal democratic narrative (ibid.: 130). If the pro-
blem is doubt and uncertainty, then the answer is democracy promotion. This
is a response that, as we have seen, offers a useful solution which entails
plenty to be done when disaster strikes in 2005. The end of history began as a
future-oriented civilising project, as it continues to be.
In this chapter, I have shown that democracy promotion is not innocent of
the power that makes certain things unsayable, that censors, that oppresses
women and that perpetrates violence, but is rather fully complicit in the power
relations that constitute these things. This has been an attempt “to escape the
dilemma of being either for or against”, as Foucault (1988: 154) would have
it, showing that a choice between a rational, liberal, civilised, secular British
democracy and an emotional, violent, misogynist, barbaric, foreign Islam is a
false one. This is a theme that will continue into the next chapter.
Note
1 For a discussion of why great offence was taken, see Sardar and Wyn Davies (1990).
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7 The art of integration
Representing British Muslims
A solitary image cannot testify to what is revealed through it, but must be
attached to another image, another piece of information, another assertion or
description, another grievance or piece of evidence, another broadcast, another
transmitter. An image is only ever another statement in a regime of statements.
(Ariella Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography)
In some ways, things did improve for British Muslims after 1989. The
common law offence of blasphemous libel was finally repealed in Britain in
2008, by which time a law against incitement to religious hatred had been
introduced, offering protection to Muslims as well as Christians and other
major faiths (Nash, 2007: 138). Racist violence against British Asians also
decreased somewhat (Malik, 2009: 236). From my long hours in the news-
paper library, I can also report that the tone of the populist tabloid press
became considerably less overtly racist in the intervening years: I have no
examples of crass jokes about curry or offers to send Muslims “home” from
these papers in the period of the London bombings.
At the same time, however, the circulating discourses that had emerged at
the time of the Salman Rushdie affair – the fears that Islamic religious identities
might be in some way incompatible with Britishness and its democratic values
that had been hard-won through the civilising process of its history – intensi-
fied. Following the bombings, increasing anxiety about belonging, identity
and fears about a divisive multiculturalism led to a reassertion of the impor-
tance of a commitment to British values, particularly liberal democracy. This
chapter shows how the practices of temporal othering that emerged in 1989
played out through democracy promotion and Democracy Promotion at a
time when a Muslim other once again became highly visible.
It makes three related points. First, the incipiently violent othering prac-
tices and teleological narrative of history that emerged in 1989 can still be
traced in media and political discourse. Second, however, these othering
representations have become the focus of political struggle on the part of
British Muslims. As such, there have been attempts to disrupt some of the
narratives that suggest Muslims are somehow foreign, by producing new
representations. The example I give here is a photography exhibition, The Art
of Integration (Sanders 2008, 2009), which was financially supported by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The representations in it attempt
to redraw the boundary between British and foreign, with Muslims firmly on
the inside. However, I suggest that this struggle has been conservative in its
effects by tacitly putting forward the view that the everyday practices of lib-
eral democratic governmentality and capitalism are the remedy for violence
and not a matter for contestation.
Third, I go on to demonstrate that despite the well-intentioned efforts of
the FCO to frame othering practices that include British Muslims, there has
been no thoroughgoing attempt to dismantle the civilising stories we tell
about ourselves, about the perfection of our institutions, about the savage and
about the barbarian. Consequently, violence is still deeply implicated in the
everyday ethical practices of British democratic lives. As ever, this is never
more so than when interrogating the division of the public and private spheres
and the related terrain of gender relations. I show this using Chris Morris’s
(2010) subversive film, Four Lions. Throughout, I will read these visual state-
ments in the way suggested by Ariella Azoulay in the epigraph above: as
always drawing on one another in a regime of statements.
They do not represent British Muslims
Some of the most shocking images of the bombers were those that suggested
they were thoroughly British in all sorts of recognisable ways. The Sun news-
paper printed copies of their birth certificates and there was great shock at
hearing the bombers’ voices – on pre-recorded videos – with their recogni-
sably broad Yorkshire accents. Once again, the northern mill towns were in
the spotlight. Perhaps most shocking of all, though, was the image of
Mohammed Sidique Khan in his caring role as a professional classroom
assistant. It seemed difficult to reconcile these young men, who appeared
thoroughly ordinary, with a threat to the national security and the democratic
values that constituted British life. If the foreign is identical to a particular
barbarian ideology, how was it to be recognised? If the border could not be
policed using passport checks, how might it be managed instead?
Democracy promotion continued to be used as a way of managing this
kind of epistemological uncertainty. It was widely accepted that not all Mus-
lims were terrorists, but if not, how might we tell the barbarian from the
democrat (or the savage)? A broad set of representations imply that it is
through ordinary practices of thought, the minutiae of daily life, through
which the border between the self and the other can be distinguished. These
representations are not describing the border but performatively producing
and reproducing it.
On 9 July 2005, before it became known that the four bombers were all
British citizens, the Sun published five pictures of people whom they implied
may be suspects, including Osama bin Laden. All five are identified as Mus-
lims, an identity which in four out of five pictures is inscribed physically by
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beards, a skullcap and other kinds of headgear. They are also identified by name
and as not British. Nevertheless, the accompanying article suggests “fears that
more and more young Muslims are being brainwashed to hate Britain – and
target their adopted country with terror strikes” (Hughes and Kay, 2005: 8).
This implies not only a dichotomy between Muslims and Britain but also an
association between Muslims (British or not) and terrorists. This sits alongside
the implication that even if they are born in the UK, Muslims are in some way
still “foreign”, that Britain may only ever be “adopted”. Such a condition of
difference is underlined by the proximity of the article to the pictures of
“known” foreign terrorists. Underlined in the way that an Islamic identity may
be inscribed onto bodies by modes of dress and appearance is the implication
that people who look like this might be foreign, suspicious, dangerous.
The supposed dichotomy between Muslims and Britons is echoed on the
day the announcement is made that the bombers were British; whilst the Sun’s
leading article itself insists that the bombers “do not represent Britain’s
Muslim community” (The Sun, 2005: 8), the opposite page is half covered by
a large headline which states: “200 more Brits are ready to blow themselves
up.” Anxiety resides in the uncertainty as to whether the bombers do repre-
sent a form of Britishness or not. It is not clear, when observing any given
individual Muslim’s practices, whether they are British or whether they are
displaying worrying signs of terrorism and a foreign, barbarian ideology.
The most poignant of representations of British Muslims at the time of the
bombings is that of Shahara Akhter Islam, a young Muslim woman of 20
who was killed in the bus bombing on Tavistock Square. Shahara Islam is
regularly invoked by the press as an exemplar of a British Muslim who man-
ages to embrace both “sides” of this identity, and in a particularly telling
article in the Sun, she is contrasted with Hasib Hussain, the bomber who
killed her. The photograph of her, presented here side by side with an impas-
sive Hussain, and which is reproduced numerous times in a wide variety of
newspapers, shows her smiling, wearing make-up, earrings, a shalwar kameez
and light dupatta covering her shoulders but not her head. Thus, unthreaten-
ing in her femininity, recognisably Muslim, she is said to have “straddled two
cultures effortlessly” whilst “Hussain struggled with both” (Hendry, 2005: 8).
She is an idealised representation of a “truly modern Muslim” (note the now-
familiar invocation of temporality) and her participation in consumerist
practices typical of economically developed societies, particularly a love of
fashion, is everywhere cited as proof of her “Britishness”: “[she] loved her
Burberry handbag as much as the shalwar kameez she occasionally wore at
home” (ibid.; see also Kurki, 2013 for a detailed discussion of the inextricable
intersection of certain forms of liberal democracy with capitalist economic
formations).
This is in marked contrast with Hussain, who “began dressing in tradi-
tional Muslim clothes and growing a beard” (Hendry, 2005: 8). Britishness
may not be incompatible with wearing clothes that are “traditional” or
“Muslim”, but the physical, visible inscription of identity and the way it
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represents a set of everyday and ordinary practices are important and can
constitute grounds not only for approval but also for fear and suspicion. This
is a point that was doubtless not lost on many Muslims in an atmosphere of
ongoing fear of a “backlash” (Dodd et al., 2005), and in which passengers on
London public transport were encouraged to police one another, keeping
their eyes open for “something suspicious” (Closs Stephens, 2008: 70).
If these representations of “good” and “bad” (Mamdani, 2002) “civilised”
and “barbarous” Muslims appear to reinforce the binary formulation of self and
other – domestic and foreign – they are also the point at which it begins to
collapse. After all, Shahara Islam and Hasib Hussain both occupy a liminal
space in which they enact the practices and conduct both of being British and of
being Muslim; they represent the possibility, and inevitability, of postcolonial
ways of being in which the domestic and the foreign are indivisible and inex-
tricable. Nevertheless, the presentation of their identities serves to discipline
performances of being a “Muslim”: such images establish an embodied norm
of commitment to British identity in the shape of Shahara Islam.
These kinds of representations do not stay in the tabloids, but are recom-
bined and rearticulated in political speeches: Kim Howells, at the time a
Foreign Office minister, invokes Shahara Islam’s memory by stating that “she
symbolises the multiculturalism that is so evident in London and in the UK”.
His speech goes on to articulate the attack that killed her as “an attack on all
of us who espouse the cause of openness and democracy” (Howells, 2005).
The binary oppositions of the barbarous and the civilised, backwardness and
modernity, violence and democracy are played out in inscriptions of the gen-
dered bodies of Shahara Islam and the bombers, enacting and embodying the
borders of the nation, rendering visible acceptable and unacceptable practices
and performances of being British.
As Andrew Gimson in the Daily Telegraph remarks at the strange sight of
Tony Blair and other government ministers becoming the unlikely interpreters
of the Islamic faith, “Mr Blair and his followers may claim to be saying
something about the true nature of Islam, but what they are actually doing is
laying down the conditions on which Muslims will be allowed to live in Brit-
ain” (Gimson, 2005). British Muslims are repeatedly encouraged by such
foreign policy representations to conform to the practices of Britishness in
their thoughts, values and “ideology” as well as in the minute details of their
everyday lives – what they wear, how often they shave – in order to demon-
strate a commitment to civilisation and embody its limits, including to liberal
capitalist democracy.
The art of integration
The Art of Integration exhibition explicitly sets out to disrupt tabloid images
of British Muslims and to deny that there is any incompatibility between
Britishness and Islam. The preface of the book that accompanies the exhibi-
tion (Sanders, 2008), and the website (Sanders, 2009)1 in English, Urdu and
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Arabic which is funded by the FCO (2011), states unambivalently that it aims
to make an intervention “[c]ontrary to the headlines and editorialising”
(Sanders, 2008: 6). It is deeply involved with both disrupting and reproducing
temporal narratives of Britishness.
There are photographs that focus on the detailed practices of the everyday
lives of British Muslims: “lives without fanfare, controversy or violence”
(Sanders, 2008: 7). We are presented with a variety of people whose lives are
generally to be understood by virtue of the work that they do – they can be
understood by means of the normal practices of production and consumption
in a liberal democratic, capitalist society. Here we have pictures of Muslims
who are fashion designers and businesspeople, bankers and scientists, (veiled)
beauticians and taxi drivers, shop assistants and rock stars. There is no
incompatibility, these pictures suggest, between the ordinary practices of
everyday modernity and development, and the practice of Islam as it is pic-
tured through the wearing (in some but not all cases) of the veil or beards,
skull caps or traditional robes, and through everyday religious practices such
as communal prayer.
Perhaps most striking is the picture that was used to publicise the exhibition:
a picture of a white woman with bright blue eyes wearing a Union Flag as an
Islamic veil. The accompanying caption states that she is: “British, actress,
mother and Muslim” (Sanders, 2008: 10). This picture intersects with and
contests a whole web of images that had been in circulation since 1989 por-
traying the gender relations mandated by some versions of Islam as incom-
patible with democratic British values. On the contrary, proclaims this
picture, Islam is not what you think it is. It can – though it does not need to –
be white, it can be passionately committed to Britain and its flag, it can be
beautiful and luminescent, it can be feminine, it can subject itself to visibility
and yet – by subtly disrupting conventional modes of representation – it will
not be found wanting in its congruence with Britishness.
Britishness in these photos is likewise performed through a commitment to
and participation in liberal democratic governmentality. This includes
employment in state and governmental institutions such as the police force,
state schools, the National Health Service, the legal system, the army and
London Underground. There are, furthermore, a number of photographs of
those all-important functionaries of liberal democratic governmentality:
journalists, newsreaders, film-makers.
Even more importantly, however, British Muslims are shown in a variety of
pictures that directly imply a commitment to the specific modes of governance
employed in the UK. For instance, Salma Yaqoob, the local councillor and
then vice-chair of the Respect Party is pictured wearing the veil; Lord Patel,
Baroness Uddin and Lord Ahmad are shown meeting in the House of Lords;
various people (some wearing the veil) are depicted celebrating Ramadan in a
party sponsored by the erstwhile London Mayor Ken Livingstone; and heir
to the throne Prince Charles is photographed talking to two very young,
veiled girls at an Islamic school.
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The wearing of a Union Flag as a veil is symbolic, then, of a much more
detailed participation in Britishness which is involved in mundane practices,
ordinary work and the everyday business of liberal democratic politics in
whichMuslims can be and are represented by otherMuslims in a parliamentary
democracy and constitutional monarchy.
Historical narratives of Britishness are likewise represented here, as the
photographs present a narrative of a British history that is fully intertwined
with Islam. The exhibition subtly disrupts the story we tell about ourselves by
implying that Islam has been part of Britain for almost as long as democracy.
The very subtitle of the exhibition, “Islam in our green and pleasant land”, is
a reference to William Blake’s poem “Jerusalem”, also a well-known hymn. It
thereby invokes an imagined history that brings together the joint Islamic and
Christian heritage of the Holy Land and the figure of Jesus, and a Romantic,
literary vision of Englishness that encompasses not only a rural idyll but also
the “dark Satanic mills” so familiar to many British Muslims. No satanic
mills are pictured, although we see plenty of textiles in the exhibition. How-
ever, the intimate connections between Islam and Britain’s industrial and
colonial past are underlined not least by a picture of a majestic-looking
mosque built in familiar local stone and blending seamlessly into its surroundings
in Bradford.
Meanwhile, in one of the most scenic and striking pictures (as also sug-
gested by some of the exhibition’s visitors in the evaluation they provided for
the FCO, 2011: annex B), ancient Llanbadrig Church on Anglesey is pictured
perched on a recognisably British stretch of coastline beside its little graveyard
dotted with Christian stone crosses. It is necessary to read the caption to work
out what this picture has to do with British Islam, but it – along with
accompanying pictures of Islamic-patterned stained glass and tiles – reveals
the church to have been restored and refurbished by a Muslim convert, Lord
Stanley of Alderley, in 1870. This sits alongside pictures of Muslims wor-
shipping in an old converted convent and examples of nineteenth-century
Islamic architecture in London, demonstrating the imbrication of British and
Muslim histories and faiths.
Finally, an image that draws on the most traditional brand of foreign
policy – the depiction of Britain as superior to France – shows three French
Muslim women wearing veils, with the British Houses of Parliament in the
background. The caption – “French Muslims – happy to be in London! In
Britain’s multicultural capital, few people take notice of what you wear” – is a
clever intervention: it strategically defends the multiculturalism that estab-
lishes the dress code as a matter of personal choice to be made in the private
sphere and exteriorises threats to this as foreign. The backdrop of Parliament
reminds the spectator that what is to be defended here is a particularly British
brand of liberalism and toleration that is rooted in the country’s journey
through time towards liberal democracy. However, it also invokes the broader
civilisational story that legitimates a particular set of gender relations and the
division of a public/private sphere as the end of history.
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These pictures do not disrupt the civilising story of Britain and its inexor-
able progress to a liberal democratic end of history. They do, however, co-opt
it and demand inclusion, in order to legitimate contemporary democratic
participation, multiculturalism and acceptance.
In the context of the – at best ambivalent – representations of British
Muslims in the mainstream media, it is not surprising that a photographer
and his subjects would attempt to claim inclusion for Muslims in the British
polity in this way. What is more intriguing is the fact that the FCO saw a
Foreign Policy opportunity in these photographs, and provided funding for
them to be viewed both as a physical exhibition – often physically sited in
British Embassies and High Commissions (FCO, 2011) – and as a website. I
attempted to obtain more information about FCO support for the exhibition
through the Freedom of Information Act, but unfortunately many of the
paper records relating to this exhibition cannot be sourced at present. Staff at
the FCO were therefore generous enough to offer me a short meeting in July
2012 in which they gave me as much information as they could remember or
surmise about why this exhibition had been funded and what the FCO were
hoping to achieve.2
Officials stressed that this exhibition was not part of the Prevent strand of
the Counter-Terrorism strategy, as it is not their intention to “securitise” the
work they do to promote “cohesion and integration”. Nevertheless, they
agreed that the timing of the project was not coincidental. Many of the pho-
tographs had been taken shortly before the London bombings, but the FCO’s
interest in them occurred as a result of increased interest in Islam, integration
and cohesion triggered by these events. Indeed, in a speech that launched the
exhibition’s tour, Baroness Scotland made explicit reference to the London
bombings (Scotland, 2007).
The FCO officials confirmed that the exhibition’s aim was to “challenge
stereotypes” about the daily lives of British Muslims, which might include
notions that Muslims are persecuted, forced to assimilate or – expressed with
a genuine embarrassment that such a stereotype might exist – “that we think
they’re all terrorists”. The point here is not to criticise the FCO for linking the
exhibition with the attacks, but rather to note that the photographs are
already embedded in a whole regime of statements and images that preceded
the London bombings but which were transformed and reconfigured by them.
The invocation of the attacks is unavoidable, given that what is at stake is the
set of modes of belonging and exclusion that exceed any particular state
institution, which enabled the bombers to be understood as “foreign” and
which thereby intensified the precarious liminality of British Muslims.
The officials claimed that the value of the exhibition was to “demystify
British Islam”: that it made something visible which had hitherto not been
grasped, particularly by an overseas audience. The power of the exhibition,
they claimed, was in the moment when a visitor said: “Oh, I didn’t realise!”
However, I suggest that this exhibition does not straightforwardly render
visible to a conventional Foreign Policy audience the objective fact that the
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UK’s community is not constituted in the way that stereotypes might suggest.
On the contrary, both this exhibition and the FCO’s involvement with it
themselves attempt to reconstitute the community and its boundaries, enacting
the possibility that Muslims can and should be included. Insofar as the exhi-
bition disrupted preconceived notions and stereotypes – including the artifi-
cial divide between the putative “we” of those who conduct foreign policy
and “they” who are Muslims – its logic was to be actively involved in chan-
ging bordering practices and to establish British Muslims as firmly on the
“inside”.
With this in mind, it is important to note just how “domestic” this example
of foreign policy was. The FCO officials noted explicitly that “the overseas
and domestic reinforced each other”. When Baroness Scotland launched the
exhibition, it was in her role as a Home Office minister, and the officials
mentioned that their aim was to involve the Pakistani diaspora in conversa-
tions about foreign policy because “democratically [they] have a say”. Peter
Sanders and his subjects are conceived in this way as “UK people in an
ambassadorial role”. The aspiration here is not only to provide a narrative
about Britishness and its liberal democracy that includes the “Muslim MPs,
Muslim members of the House of Lords and over 200 Muslim municipal
councillors” who are mentioned in the speech at the exhibition’s launch
(Scotland, 2007) Also important is that Muslims are democratically included
in formulating and reformulating that narrative. The project is to be sure not
securitising in the narrow sense that it is expected directly to prevent further
terrorism, therefore, but I suggest that it does function to secure a British
identity understood through a commitment to and participation in liberal
democracy.
The epistemological uncertainty intensified by the London bombings is
therefore addressed by providing in some detail – and with the full democratic
participation of British Muslims – a set of scripts, practices and narratives
that establish the sorts of practices that constitute belonging. The FCO are
actively intervening in building commitment to the nation by negotiating
the ways in which a particular form of Muslim identity can not only be
represented, but can represent itself and be interwoven with the familiar nar-
rative – without changing the narrative itself very much. This is democracy
promotion. The promotion of these democratic identities by making them
visible overseas is much less significant than the constitution and legitimation
of those identities as domestic in the first place.
The art of domestication
The democratisation of foreign policy and the well-meaning desire, on the
part of the FCO, Peter Sanders and the many Muslims in these photographs,
to make British identity more inclusive is a genuine improvement on the
spectacular and violent othering that we saw in the previous chapter and, to a
lesser extent, in the tabloid representations from 2005 that we saw above.
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However, they come at a cost. It is now more than half a century since
Roland Barthes’s famous critique in Mythologies of a photograph on the
cover of Paris-Match of a North African soldier saluting the French national
flag, which – he proposes – suggests that “there is no better answer to the
detractors of colonialism, than the zeal of this Negro to serve his supposed
oppressors” (Barthes, 2009: 139). Nevertheless, such images continue to be
reformulated. One consequence of portraying Islam in a patriotic veil is that
critique of liberal democracy and its articulation with Britishness is arrested
by a demonstration of commitment to British values by those who had
appeared marginal. By explicitly proclaiming that Islam can be identical to
Britishness, this image concedes to the flows of power that ask us to be “for
or against”. It therefore conceals the limitations of the liberal democratic
values that constitute Britishness, particularly the way they still enact a
violent othering.
It is important to note, then, that the exhibition not only makes Islamic
identities domestic, but also domesticates. This can be understood by looking
in more detail at the photographs themselves, in which there is a profound
conservatism. Thinking particularly about the depictions of governmental
institutions in this exhibition, there are many more photographs that show a
commitment to the unelected House of Lords and the monarchy than there
are even of the elected institutions. Not a single Muslim member of Parlia-
ment is pictured, whereas we see three Lords, two members of the Royal
Family and a portrait of Hafiz Abdal Karim, servant to Queen Victoria. The
accompanying book also contains a preface by Prince Charles. This sits
alongside a broader social conservatism, in which the Islam practised at elite
Eton College – far beyond the financial means of the overwhelming majority
of British Muslims – is celebrated in five pictures, whereas only one photo-
graph shows a state school (in which, perhaps somewhat unusually for a
British state school, all but one of the children seem to be white). The possi-
ble critique that Muslims might offer of the highly racialised inequalities of
British life (in which a Muslim can, for instance, be servant to a Queen but
never an elected head of state) is subordinated here to a commitment to
British institutions as they are.
Even such critique as can be discerned in these pictures is muted. In one
picture we see a huge pile of cast-off clothes – the waste generated by an
affluent consumer society – being patiently sorted by volunteers for Islamic
Relief. The havoc wreaked on local textile markets by Western cast-offs
(Rivoli, 2014), the environmental catastrophe of fast fashion (Siegle, 2011)
and the global inequalities (and their history) that led many Muslim majority
countries like Pakistan to a reliance on aid and development, is less visible in
this picture than the benign opportunity for depoliticised charitable giving.
Meanwhile, the very real grievance about British Foreign Policy that has
driven Muslim demands to be more involved in its formulation (UK Cabinet
Office, 2008: 26) – which is to say, British involvement in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan – is alluded to only obliquely as local councillor Salma Yaqoob
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and singer Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens) are both captioned as cam-
paigners for peace. In the latter case, this caption appears to be as much a
tacit disavowal of the violence of the Salman Rushdie protests as it is a
reference to violence perpetrated by the British state: Yusuf Islam gained
notoriety in 1989 by appearing to make a death threat against Salman
Rushdie on live television (BBC, 2009).
Meanwhile, Yaqoob’s well-known opposition to the invasion of Iraq is
rendered unthreatening by her feminisation in this smiling portrait, which
labels her as a “mother of three”, as well as by her participation in electoral
politics. This is not to criticise Yaqoob for pursuing her political objectives
through the institutional means at her disposal, but rather to show that this
exhibition is fully implicated in legitimating and promoting liberal democracy
(and its associated gender relations, including the importance of providing
care) as the incontestable mode through which politics can be pursued, rather
than disrupting or even approaching its limits. Even more importantly, whilst
liberal democracy is quite clearly fully implicated in violence in these wars,
the fact that Yaqoob’s struggle for peace is understood to be taking place
through the very same institutions reiterates the familiar idea that liberal
democracy is a remedy for violence. As we will see again, it is not.
However, it is particularly important for this exhibition to make explicit
Muslims’ commitment to peace because the representations of the foreign,
barbarian enemy that these pictures are implicitly dissociating from British
Islam are those of the London bombers and their violence. It is therefore
especially useful to look in detail at the one picture in the exhibition that
directly addresses the events of July 2005.
The photograph is of Muhammad Jamil, a bearded (and therefore visibly
observant Muslim) employee of London Underground, tending his garden at
Edgware Road Station with a Tube train in the background. It is only the
caption that makes this picture fully intelligible: “When a bomb exploded at
his station on 7th July 2005, he was among the first to rush into the tunnel to
help the victims.” This is a moving and memorable image, in which the sheer
ordinariness of Mr Jamil’s appearance seems to belie the great bravery of his
actions that day. Indeed, perhaps viewers cannot help but be prompted to
wonder whether they would have been able to respond in the same way, given
their own ordinariness.
It is this sympathetic move that perhaps enables us to wonder how we
might have felt had a Muslim employee understandably, humanly, run away
or frozen in terror or otherwise failed to act heroically on that appalling day.
When Muslims in particular are called upon to demonstrate and embody
commitment to the nation in their daily lives and practices – and are parti-
cularly scrutinised whilst they do so – we may set up a worryingly high stan-
dard for them to live up to. That Mr Jamil is extraordinary and courageous is
not in doubt, but this picture also reminds us that British Muslims occupy a
particularly precarious position in which their commitment to Britishness and
democracy is implicitly in doubt, posing to them a constant question that
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must be answered not only in their ordinary practices, but sometimes in
extraordinary ones too.
In Chapter 2, we noted the shift first identified by Foucault between the
spectacular violence of sovereign power and the everyday policing and inter-
nalisation of the most minute norms of everyday behaviour characteristic of
discipline and the freely choosing subject of liberal governmentality. At a
more modest level, a similar shift can be seen to be taking place between this
and the previous chapter. Whereas during the Salman Rushdie affair we had
seen the borders of the nation seemingly both challenged and reasserted with
spectacular and polarising violence, in the Art of Integration, and in images of
Shahara Islam, there is rather an internalisation of the norms of Britishness
on the part of British Muslims.
Whereas previously we have seen examples of white men protecting brown
women from brown men, in this chapter we see Mr Jamil. There is no need
for a civilising mission if brown men too can be relied upon to join with white
men in protecting brown women like Shahara Islam from brown men like
Mohammed Siddique Khan, because they have now entered history and
become civilised. In this exhibition, we see in minute detail just what is
required for the entrance of the savage into history under conditions of late
liberal governmentality.
An exhibition that initially seemed to be disrupting our expectations about
where the borders of the nation lie, turns out to reproduce the status quo in a
variety of ways.
Uncertain boundaries: misrecognition and violence in Four Lions
I argued above that these visible representations of British Muslims are a
means of trying to manage uncertainty in a situation where the national
border is apparently uncertain and unknowable. The photographs in the
exhibition attempt to redraw the border to solve this epistemological problem,
so that British Muslims can unproblematically be understood to be included,
and they do so by making visible the sorts of freely chosen practices that
secure a liberal democratic, civilised identity.
It is important to note that this attempt to manage uncertainty is not parti-
cularly successful on its own terms. Shahara Islam would by no means look out
of place in The Art of Integration. Neither, though, it should be noted, would
Mohammed Sidique Khan in his role as a classroom assistant in the years
before the attack. The public, visible practices of freely choosing Muslim
subjects are not reliable guides to their identities, interests and ideologies, fully
formed in the separate private sphere away from government intrusion.
Chris Morris’s satirical and meticulously researched feature film of 2010,
Four Lions (Morris, 2010), which won him an award from the British Acad-
emy of Film and Television Arts, engages directly with the problems raised
for liberal democratic governmentality by the British Muslim suicide bomber.
The film’s main character – Omar, the leader of the bombers – would also
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have looked at home in The Art of Integration with his ordinary job and life
and his friendships and manly banter with his white colleagues. He might,
however, have had to cede his place to his wife, Sofia – a Lady Macbeth
figure, although rather less troubled by conscience – who is beautiful, veiled
and feminine, a mother and a nurse. She offers endless emotional and caring
support to Omar in the private space of their modern, comfortable, ordinary
home in encouraging him to blow himself up and assume leadership of his
friends to do the same. From the visible everyday practices of their lives
(secretive bomb making notwithstanding), there is nothing to suggest that
they are not exactly what they are: British.
Is it – as Tony Blair suggested – in their “ideology” that they mark them-
selves as foreign, then? A detailed textual analysis of this film suggests that,
on the contrary, the difficulty in knowing where the border lies is precisely
located in the difficulty of separating a liberal democratic, British, set of
values from the violent ideology of the bombings. Once again, the values of
liberal democratic governmentality, with its sharply delineated and gendered
private sphere, turn out to be so fully implicated in violence that the ideology
animating the actions of the bombers appears to be almost entirely domestic.
Morris’s film has by and large been discussed mainly in terms of its por-
trayal of suicide bombers themselves and whether or not it is appropriate to
laugh at this subject matter, as ridiculed by the bungling and general idiocy of
the bombers themselves (French, 2010; Doggart, 2010). However, its target is
much broader (Basham and Vaughan-Williams, 2012) and demonstrates some
of the profound epistemological problems emerging from the difficulties of
establishing and policing the border between Britain and the outside, democracy
and violence.
The usual institutions of liberal democratic governmentality, then, appear
helpless in the face of the difficulty of recognising who is British, who is a
pious Muslim, who is a terrorist, and how these categories might intersect.
For example, Malcolm Storge, the local MP, shares a platform with Barry,
white Muslim convert and would-be suicide bomber, at a community meeting
of the type that reminds us of the way particular faith identities were con-
stituted by liberal governmentality in the 1980s (see Chapter 6). A banner
proclaims that the meeting is about “Islam: Moderation and Progress”,
reminding us of the ordinary teleologies that characterise understandings of
democratic life. The elected representative mouths platitudes that echo Tony
Blair and also The Art of Integration: “Most British Muslims don’t want to
be abroad, fighting UK Foreign Policy. They want to be getting on peacefully
with their daily lives.” This familiar othering of political opponents – which
equates an opposition of British Foreign Policy with violence and being
“abroad” and its rhetorical opposition to the ordinary practices of “daily
life” – fails to instigate any kind of democratic conversation, but rather an
antagonistic response from Barry. Nevertheless, it is not clear that Barry
speaks for or represents anyone at all – even his “jihadist” friends, led by
Omar, with whom he is in constant conflict.
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Meanwhile, Has, a young man in the audience, stands up and threatens to
set off a suicide bomb, leading to mayhem in which the MP is particularly
terrified, only to reveal that he is armed with just streamers. The appearance
of harmless and callow idiocy is itself undermined, however, when he is recrui-
ted to the “gang” after the meeting by Barry – though perhaps he was never a
real danger as he is killed by Barry just after attempting to give himself up to
the police in a telling exchange. The policeman asks Has: “You’ve got a bomb
but it’s not going to go off? How do I know that?” “Look!” says Has, and as
Barry activates the bomb, he promptly explodes. In other words, this is a film
that abounds with situations that simply cannot be read off from appearances.
The answer to the question, “How do I know?” is constantly in doubt and the
answer is never unproblematically available just by looking.
The very title of the film demonstrates epistemological anxiety about the
meaning of Britishness and how this might relate to Muslims. It refers to the
three lions emblazoned on the England football team’s emblem. This invoca-
tion seems to be a subtle reference to the “Tebbit test”: Norman Tebbit’s
rather gendered view that the test of whether someone was “really British”
depended upon their allegiance to the country’s national sports teams. The
bombers seem quite likely to pass the Tebbit test, but are they British? They
are planning a suicide attack, so they must be the enemy, yet their unre-
markable appearance, everyday lives and accents, their taste in English pop
music (which they clearly prefer to “Songs of Arabic Struggle”), their pre-
occupation with small debts, their failure to enact ordinary religious practice,
such as praying or going to the mosque, and the almost heartbreakingly
ordinary family life and job of Omar and his wife mean that they hardly
appear very different from anyone else in British society.
Small wonder, perhaps, that white neighbours and friends remain oblivious
to the danger, despite seeing the men acting in what can only be thought of as
a suspicious manner, buying industrial quantities of bleach from the same shop
in inept “disguises”, running with great care with bags full of explosives,
screaming in terror when one of these is thrown at them or occupying a flat full
of bottles of bleach and boxes of wires and nails. These episodes in the film
patently deride the poster campaigns that endlessly exhort citizens to police one
another, keeping their eyes open for “something suspicious” and report potential
radicalisation (Closs Stephens, 2008: 70; Basham and Vaughan-Williams, 2012: 1),
as if it could ever be clear what these things might look like. What is left is only a
profound confusion about what sorts of practices are really culpable. Can some-
one be both so British as Omar appears and yet so opposed to democracy, and
therefore foreign, as to perpetrate a suicide bombing?
Omar’s white friend, Matt, states at the end of the film, after the former has
demonstrably blown himself up causing death and destruction:
Omar had nothing to do with this. Because I knew him […] When we talk
about a so-called terrorist attack on the London marathon just remember
one thing. Most loud bangs are not bombs. They’re scooters backfiring.
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No one escapes ridicule in this biting film, but Matt’s defence of his friend in
the face of all the evidence is nevertheless rather touching. It echoes a certain
type of anti-racist discourse and underlines the ways in which the pieties of
political speech about “the vast majority of Muslims” intersect with the
everyday experiences of having Muslim neighbours. In the face of a seeming
contradiction between Omar’s deep familiarity, his ordinary lifestyle, his
engagement in the bantering mores of male friendship, and yet the foreignness
that makes him a suicide bomber, Matt can only deny the reality of what
has happened.
Even more seriously, the police too are in the grip of epistemological con-
fusion. This turns out to be deeply dangerous, as – in a comically virtuoso
moment – they shoot and kill the wrong man because of confusion about his
costume at the London marathon (“Is a wookie a bear, Control?”), echoing
the tragic death of innocent Juan Charles de Menezes at the hands of police
on 22 July 2005 (Vaughan-Williams, 2008).
There is, moreover, a moment when the film sets up an expectation that
Omar’s house and gang will be raided just the night before they bomb the
marathon. Any viewer who had followed, for instance, the police raid on
the home of Mohammed Abdulkahar and Abul Koyair on 2 June 2006 – the
former being shot and injured and both receiving an apology when no char-
ges were brought against them (BBC, 2006a) – might be unsurprised when, in
the film, the wrong house is raided.
What is particularly noteworthy is that the house that is raided is occupied
by people who appear to be rather foreign. Ahmed – unlike Omar, who is his
brother – is a pious and observant Muslim and that is why he firmly believes
that violence is wrong. He has a distinctly Pakistani accent, wears shalwar
kameez and a long beard (like Abdulkahar and Koyair), attends the mosque
and prayer meetings, and irritates everyone with his saintly expression. He
also refuses to enter a room when Sofia is in it and his own female relatives are
heavily veiled and confined to a separate small room that used to be a toilet.
Here appearances would suggest that what we have is an alien ideology, most
particularly in the gender relations that are always at stake in establishing what
is domestic and what is foreign.
This is perhaps why Ahmed’s innocence can do little to save him: his posi-
tion when we last see him seems hopeless. “We know more than you think we
do”, says a police interrogator to him – a formulation that by now causes the
heart to sink – as he inexplicably brandishes a Weetabix (breakfast cereal).
Minding your own business: the British private sphere
Here, as ever, it is useful to note how the particular (very dangerous) deli-
neation of public and private spheres functions. A certain tendency to mind
their own business – the sense that what goes on in private is not a matter for
undue interference – pervades the attitudes of the white characters. Matt asks
Omar about one of the gang’s preparatory misadventures: “It’s not jihad,
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though, is it? Blowing up a crow?” Omar replies, “No. It’s a cultural thing”.
Matt shows no further curiosity and this is taken to be a satisfactory answer.
Meanwhile, Alice – a neighbour – not only does not view it as appropriate to
ask any questions about the explosive material lying around, but also mis-
understands why the men want her to leave their flat in a hurry, taking them
to mean that they intend to indulge in sex together. She happens to disapprove
(traditional masculinity being more vigorously policed than exploding crows),
but removes herself anyway.
Culture and sexuality, then, along with what is contained in the private
space of a man’s flat or his bag, are not readily understood to be of public
concern and are therefore of interest only insofar as they extrude into the
public sphere in outward bodily practices. Meanwhile, although public spaces
are relentlessly policed by endless surveillance cameras – some watched by
Omar in his job in the shopping centre along with the hapless Matt – there is
little sense that anyone knows quite what they are looking for. Thus, Ahmed’s
refusal of violence and criminality, his sincere attempts to persuade Omar of
the error of his ways, these are not enough to make him British; but his out-
ward, public appearance (and that of his wife) visibly bespeaks a foreign
ideology and constitutes him as a risk. Publicly visible manifestations are
taken to make a fully formed private identity legible in ways that reveal
themselves as perilous.
Liberal democratic governmentality and violence
The difficulty with knowing the difference between British democratic ration-
ality and foreign despotic violence, is that they are not separate in practice
and do not map onto each other. Indeed, it is Britishness and liberal democ-
racy that is more complicit in violence than any portrayal of what is
“foreign”.
Victoria Basham and Nick Vaughan-Williams are right to suggest that one
of the principal dangers to which this film calls our attention is that of
“blundering, inept police officers, armed with live ammunition pointed at
large crowds of people” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams, 2012: 14): govern-
ment institutions are implicated in violence and terror as police shootings of
the innocent and the apparent “rendition” of Ahmed make apparent. It is
perhaps unsurprising that a panicked policeman would say, “He must be the
target; I’ve shot him”. Possibly more worrying, though, is when Malcolm
Storge MP states: “The report makes crystal clear that the police shot the
right man, but as far as I’m aware the wrong man exploded”. This parodies
the fact that, following his calamitous death, Jean-Charles de Menezes’s
family called in vain upon “the public and their representatives” to instigate a
“public discussion” in order that “lessons should be learned and officers held
to account” (Jean Charles de Menezes Family Campaign, 2009). The demo-
cratic institutions that are meant to make violence unnecessary because of
their ability to manage conflict between diverse interests not only fail utterly,
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but are actually involved in perpetrating violence and then denying it and
covering it up.
However, there is a violence associated with British everyday life that is far
more diffuse and widespread than that practised by the state authorities. It is
precisely in the ordinary rituals of British private life that violence can readily
be discerned in the film. Omar and his gang are painfully inept at articulating
the scripts of their “jihadi video” and their political and spiritual position on
why they are blowing themselves up in the first place is riven with contra-
dictions (Basham and Vaughan-Williams, 2012: 13–14). What comes through
much more coherently, though, is the way they are indebted to violent films
and video games. “Look at me, I’m Paki Rambo!” shouts Waj, filming him-
self on his mobile phone whilst firing a large gun. This is a scene that causes
horror amongst the Pakistanis running the training camp he is attending in
Swat, and identifies Waj and Omar as utterly British: nothing less than an
archetypal “Mr Bean”.
Furthermore, the men’s repetition that they are “four lions” re-invokes not
only the (sometimes violent) masculinity and national allegiance of the foot-
ball crowd but also the still-familiar number-one song (twice: in 1996 and
1998) Three Lions, by The Lightning Seeds along with comedians David
Baddiel and Frank Skinner whose television collaboration was an early epi-
tome of “laddish” behaviour on British screens (The Independent, 1999). The
bombers appear to demonstrate their Britishness in their adherence to pre-
vailing forms of masculinity, with their laddish humour, underlying desire to
“bang white girls” (also referred to as “slags”, not an especially Islamic word),
macho initiation rites – and violent fantasies (Basham and Vaughan-Williams,
2012: 13). Violent narratives weave themselves into the conventional British
masculinity of the men. Violent games form the basis of conversations and
analogies: jihad will be “just like” Mortal Kombat or Xbox Counter-Strike.
This narrative brutalisation is a process that obviously begins in early child-
hood. It may seem a little odd that Omar’s young son talks openly about
people blowing themselves up to get to heaven – why has no one in his (pri-
mary) school noticed this? – but there is nothing strange in playing with toy
guns at home or in watching Disney film The Lion King, whose story only has
to be tweaked a little to be perfectly suited to explain the complexities of
“jihad” to a young boy at bedtime.
I want to emphasise that I am not here advocating more surveillance of the
private sphere, more searches of homes or sports bags, more suspicion of
British Pakistani neighbours, more reporting of primary school children to the
authorities under the Prevent agenda. The logic of my argument should make
it abundantly clear what the consequences would be, given the broader con-
figurations of power that currently exist: Omar and his family would probably
escape attention because they look so British, whereas foreign-sounding
Ahmed and his wife would be searched and humiliated, yielding such suspi-
cious material as the Holy Qu’ran and its message – as he takes it, anyway –
of non-violence. Rather, any meaningful response will need to involve new
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narratives and practices of what it means to be British, including a trans-
formed relationship with time and history. It is best to be cautious about spelling
out alternatives, which cannot emerge from the patterns of thought they aim to
transcend. Nevertheless, in the final pages of this book, I begin to elaborate on
ideas hinted at by Four Lions about how things could be different.
Time for intimate knowledge?
The only people who suspect what Omar is planning are the ones who love
him: not just his wife and son, but also his brother. It is the latter who is well
aware that blowing up a crow is not “a cultural thing”. However, this is not
something that it would be beyond Matt’s ability to learn. An understanding
of and imbrication in one another’s stories, a curiosity about cultural prac-
tices, based not on suspicion and violence, but genuine relationships and
negotiation grounded in love and mutual concern might give us cautious
grounds for optimism.
We see two moments in the film when death and destruction might genu-
inely have been avoided. One is the desperate last-minute attempt that Omar
makes to save his friend, Waj. This ends in death and more confusion thanks
to the gung-ho actions of the police, but Omar still warns Matt – with genu-
ine affection – to stay away when he does finally explode. The other is when
Omar approaches his brother for advice. In the latter case, it is just a shame
that Ahmed has such an irritatingly pious face.
There are no transcendent virtues in which we can ground a politics. Sofia’s
love of Omar (and superior face) is what persuades him to blow himself up.
Nevertheless, this comic film has a touching and poignant ending because of
the love between Omar and Waj: a love that ends up being tragically mili-
tarised in the service of incoherent violence. The only moments of possible
redemption – although always compromised and riven with power – are the
ones where people get to know, and care for, one another.
This film is a fiction, of course, so the good end unhappily and the bad end
up in heaven. Nevertheless, it is hardly far-fetched to suggest that ways of
living in which we pay genuine attention to one another’s stories and care
about one another’s lives might be a remedy to violence. Anecdotally, Maajid
Nawaz (2012) provides a telling story about his life as an “Islamist radical” in
which he was instrumental in setting up “terror cells” and ended up in an
Egyptian prison. He states that whilst violence had initially seemed a
response to constant police harassment and racist violence, his eventual refu-
sal of terrorism came down to Amnesty International’s letter writers, who
took him on as a “prisoner of conscience”. This provoked a realisation of the
humanity of the other, which made continued violence seem an impossible
option. These kind of caring practices, then, offer possibilities for remaking
the world and they do not have to be as dramatic as Nawaz’s story.
More broadly, we will only be able to imagine different ways to live if we
are fully cognisant of the ways that our stories, films, photographs, games and
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songs produce our practices and identities as part of a web of power relations
that saturate our lives and cut across the artificial divide between public and
private, domestic and foreign. Insofar as we accept these divides and under-
stand others’ private practices to be none of our business, we are ignoring this
crucial dimension of productive power and thereby enabling it to flourish as it
is. As long as democracy is viewed as the liberal business of voting in repre-
sentatives and maintaining the freedom of the press, the flows of power
that constitute the identities and interests that end up being represented in
legislatures and in newspapers will remain invisible.
Yet only by making them visible can we hope to change them. In my
detailed readings of the photographs that are used to promote democracy, I
have shown one way of doing this. Chris Morris’s Four Lions is yet another
kind of intervention. He demonstrates the way that chaos, uncertainty and
casual brutality pervade our everyday lives. He shows that the categories of
domestic versus foreign, private versus public, secure versus dangerous,
democratic versus violent, Islamic misogyny versus Western women’s rights,
barbarism/savagery versus civilisation are always on the verge of collapse and
therefore require constant policing and reproduction. He suggests the ways in
which disaster might have been averted and, crucially, these are all ways that
involve love and intimate involvement, ways that take time. In doing so, he
enables us also to see glimpses of how life might be different.
Notes
1 All the pictures and captions from the exhibition are still available on this website at
the time of writing.
2 I took detailed notes during this meeting and the statements made form the basis of
my analysis below, unless otherwise referenced. Words in quotation marks are direct
quotes as I noted them at the time.
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Conclusion
Democracy promotion, time and the
“radical ordinary”
This book started with the puzzles and problems I encountered in my life as a
professional development manager and “Democracy Promoter”. It has taken
me a long time to understand what I was involved in in that other life. We
began with the bombings in London on 7 July 2005. The narrative we have
become used to hearing is the one offered by Tony Blair and the other G8
leaders that these bombers were opposed to democratic values, civilisation,
development, progress and women’s rights. Although they were British, they
had espoused a foreign, violent, barbaric ideology characterised by its hyper-
masculine refusal of women’s rights and which advocated a return to a med-
ieval past. This version of the terrorist ideology re-emerged in responses to
the then Archbishop of Canterbury’s lecture on shari’ah law. The mainstream
media turned on the Archbishop in fury because in defending shari’ah law,
they believed he was an apologist for this very anti-democratic, out-dated and
terrorist ideology.
The bombers themselves were no strangers to a version of this narrative
about ideology. Mohammed Sidique Khan, whose very exploding body came
so violently to symbolise the limits of British identity, left a videotaped mes-
sage explaining his motives for perpetrating the London bombings, in which
he suggests that the government wishes “to scare the masses into conforming
to their power and wealth-obsessed agenda” and contrasts his own “driving
motivation [which] doesn’t come from tangible commodities”. He furthermore
explicitly defines himself against “[y]our democratically elected governments”
(BBC, 2005b). Mohammed Sidique Khan was a product of the same dis-
courses and practices as the political leaders of the UK, and by taking the
very categories of democracy and economic development and positioning
himself against them, was availing himself of the same discursive resources
later used by Tony Blair.
The problem of considering why this young man – who had a job, a family
and seemingly everything to live for – decided that there was no space for his
voice to be heard within the institutional setting of the democracy in which he
grew up is difficult and there are no simple answers, however we may wish to
condemn him as simply “uncivilised”. There is a grave danger at the heart of
the insidious cruel choice that asks us to opt for either a domesticated liberal
democracy or an alien despotism, either civilisation or barbarism, either
women’s rights or violent masculinity, either development or backwardness,
either the future or the past. We can only hope that the answer never again
comes back, as it did from Mohammed Sidique Khan: “This is a war and I
am a soldier” (BBC, 2005b).
I have been less interested in these pages in the spectacular violence of sui-
cide bombing, than the everyday dispiriting violence that is enacted in the
name of liberal democracy. When the Archbishop of Canterbury was pillor-
ied, it was done in the most personal and belittling of tones. He is called the
“Great Mufti” (White, 2008) or the “Ayatollah” (Hitchens, 2008) of Canter-
bury as well as “a dangerous threat to the nation” and a “silly old goat” (The
Sun, 2008). The point is not that a senior public figure should be immune to
criticism, but that the bullying name calling is unlikely to stop there. As a
young Muslim woman put it when interviewed by a newspaper in the middle
of the controversy, “once again it is us being demonised” (Doward et al.,
2008). Positing a choice between a liberal democratic, modern secularism and
a despotic, backward, religious authority invites demonisation and puts
faithful Muslims into a painfully difficult and vulnerable position.
Furthermore, the separation into public and private spheres – as we have seen
in accounts of domestic violence, racist crime and epistemic exclusion – makes
some acts of violence more visible than others. Book burning in Bradford and
suicide bombing in London are decried and condemned, but violence in the
private sphere is often difficult to see and absent from democratic debate. From
Partition to the corner shop, from suicide bombing and rendition to the daily mis-
eries of “Paki-bashing” and racist insults, liberal democracy is not a remedy for
violence, then, but is fully complicit in its practice. This is not only because of
its structure, but also because of the exclusionary practices of thought, the
teleological narratives, through which we come to know who belongs, who
counts as democratic, what sorts of arguments we are allowed to make – about
faith, about community, about belonging, about violence – in the first place.
Meanwhile, in his much-awaited speech in Munich in February 2011
(Cameron, 2011), in which he first addressed the subject of terrorism and
security, Prime Minister David Cameron spelled out the now accustomed view
that what is to be combated when we think about terrorism is a particular
“ideology”. This ideology is defined as “a real hostility to western democracy
and liberal values”. The solution to the problem of terrorism and insecurity,
therefore, alongside surveillance and intelligence gathering, is – he proposes –
a “muscular liberalism”: “[a] genuinely liberal country […] believes in certain
values and actively promotes them.” Lest there be any doubt, he spells out
what these values are: “Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy.
The rule of law. Equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality […] To
belong here is to believe in these things.” So far so familiar.
Alarmingly, Cameron also makes explicit what Blair had only hinted at. He
argues that “non-violent extremists” need to be combated, thus making it
absolutely clear that modes of belonging are premised entirely on practices of
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thought and belief related to a commitment and loyalty to a highly specified
set of liberal institutions, not on whether or not a particular violent crime has
been committed, or even advocated, by an individual (Basham and Vaughan-
Williams, 2012). This is the logic that runs through the controversial Prevent
agenda which defines the “extremism” that is to be monitored, disciplined
and ideally eradicated as “opposition to British values, including democracy,
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual tolerance and respect” (HM
Government, 2015: 12).
Intriguingly, though, David Cameron attempts in this speech to distance
himself from the “war on terror” discourse by denying that Democracy Pro-
motion or development overseas are viable solutions to the problem of ter-
rorism. He points out quite correctly that “extremists” can emerge in liberal
democratic societies and that people convicted of terrorist offences are often
middle class, thus denying any causal link between “poor governance”, lack
of development and terrorism. He also avoids drawing explicitly on a parti-
cular narrative of history, eschewing the civilisational narrative favoured by
Tony Blair. There are no doubt good political reasons for this, as Cameron
can hereby distance himself from the politically unpopular invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq (which he and his party supported at the time) by
avoiding both the explicit civilisational discourse and the logic of Democracy
Promotion that implicitly underwrote them.
However, like any subject of a discourse, Cameron is not in control of its
terms and therefore cannot entirely avoid its logic. He is obliged to say:
“Yes – we must tackle poverty.” He cannot avoid supporting “[h]undreds of
thousands of people demanding the universal right to free elections and
democracy [in Cairo and Tunis]”, particularly given that the value of these
things must be taken for granted for his policies to be legitimate. His inter-
ventions within conventionally understood UK borders involve promoting “a
common culture and curriculum”, which inevitably reminds us of the familiar
narrative of British institutions and their ineluctable, democratic evolution.
Thus, in response to the so-called “Trojan Horse” scandal, in which Bir-
mingham schools were said to be promoting “radical” and “un-British” ideas
to pupils, Cameron responded that British values must henceforth be promoted
in schools. How might this be put into practice?
We are bringing proper narrative history back to the curriculum, so our
children really learn our island’s story – and where our freedoms and
things like our Parliament and constitutional monarchy came from.
(Cameron, 2014)
As the ongoing so-called “history wars” attest (Evans, 2013; Robinson, 2012:
100–109; Cannadine et al., 2011; Bowen et al., 2012), stories about national
identity that draw on narrative history, continue to play a particularly
important role in this ongoing reproduction of the nation under Cameron’s
government.
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Meanwhile, under the Coalition government, the Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) was spending around £30 million per year on
“government and civil society” (DFID, 2014) in Pakistan. The rationale for
this was as follows:
The UK has deep family, historic and business ties with Pakistan. That’s
why we are committed to Pakistan for the long term, to help millions of
people lift themselves out of poverty, and to help Pakistan become the
stable, prosperous, democratic country it has the potential to be.
(DFID, 2012b)
The work that we have done so far in understanding the genealogy of
Democracy Promotion makes these two sentences easy to read. The “stabi-
lity” of Pakistan is important because Pakistan and the UK are deeply
imbricated: “what happens in Pakistan matters on the streets of Britain”
(Blair, 2007b). The family ties of people like Mohammed Sidique Khan mean
that danger in Pakistan can spill over into danger to Britain’s very identity.
Not only this, of course – family and historic ties quite rightly mean that
many British citizens care particularly about Pakistan, and may be outraged by
the poverty and undemocratic rule to which its people are subjected. Moreover,
the only legitimate future that can be envisioned for Pakistan is underwritten
by a notion that its trajectory needs to mirror the past of countries like Brit-
ain. It is hard, then, within prevailing discourses, to imagine alternatives to
poverty and military rule that do not include economic development, liberal-
ism and elections. This gives the government something to do, as democrati-
cally mandated by its own population, not least the Pakistani diaspora: a
whole range of projects continue to attempt to know and domesticate Paki-
stan by supporting the institutions of liberal democratic governmentality
(DFID, 2012a). There is a clear endpoint in mind, underwritten by pictures
on the website of people (mainly women) voting, and as implied by the word
“potential”, which bears with it the teleological reading of history that always
assumes that a better future will imply liberal democratic institutions and the
capitalist economic development that is assumed to come with them.
Although the language of the “war on terror” is no longer de rigueur, the
elision of these words does notmean that a new politics has been crafted. As Louise
Amoore (2008) has eloquently argued, a forgetting of the “war on terror” and its
discourses permits us to accept the categories and modes of othering it has
bequeathed us as if they were natural and inevitable, rather than the result of
long histories that could have been different. If we are going to be able to grasp the
logic of democracy promotion, and the policy discourse that goes with it, then an
understanding of its history is as urgent as ever. That is why the history of the
modes of othering that I have uncovered in this book and their relation to the
promotion of highly specific democratic identities remain crucially important.
It is by understanding the function of narratives about democracy that we
are able to discern the logic of the democracy promotion that is constantly
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re-inscribed in temporal modes of othering. Stories about history, teleology,
development and the inevitable spread of liberal democracy are reiterated in
newspapers, in Cameron’s “common curriculum and culture”, in political
speeches, on television and in our daily lives in ways that seem so automatic,
we can sometimes find it hard to see them. However good our intentions, they
can make it difficult to recognise that our contemporary liberal democratic
practices may not be the endpoint of history, nor yet the best we can do. The
ability to recognise these narratives, to understand where they came from and
to contest them is particularly important if we value democracy and perhaps
want more of it.
Democratic temporalities and the “radical ordinary”
Is democracy something we value and want more of? A report (Wind-Cowie
and Gregory, 2011), by the think tank Demos, on Britishness and a sense of
belonging, patriotism and pride in the nation – based on qualitative focus-
group research with a representative sample of over 2,000 British people –
suggests that despite the best democracy promotion efforts by politicians, the
media and photographers that we have seen in the preceding chapters, a
commitment to the institutions of British liberal democracy is not a pre-eminent
source of identification for British people. They argue that loyalty to Britain
does not flow from allegiance to democratic values, the specific institutions of
British governance (such as the monarchy or Parliament) or a progressive
narrative about British history. Rather:
[f]or most people, patriotism is an equation that travels in the opposite
direction – they begin with a sense of pride in their country, which pre-
disposes them to identifying things about their country, its history and
institutions which reinforce that pride.
(Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011: 75)
This makes sense when considering the preceding pages. There would be little
need for the never-ending reinforcement of democracy promotion practices if
a sense of belonging based on liberal democracy were fixed and stable.
Rather, a relatively inchoate desire for belonging is both incited and given
form by democracy promotion practices.
More intriguingly, the authors argue that a sense of Britishness “is founded
in a profound emotional connection to the everyday acts, manners and kind-
nesses that British people see in themselves” (Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011:
112). One of the quotations from their focus groups that they offer to support
this conclusion is worth quoting in full:
I think of being British as being about littler things, more boring, I sup-
pose. Like doing your bit and manners and helping out. The thing about
British people is that we do things for each other, you know? Being
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British is more about the way we are than things like Buckingham Palace
or Parliament.
(quoted in Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011: 22)
Somewhat similarly, another participant – aware of the logic that British identity
is only possible insofar as it is marked by difference from others – remarked:
You said about democracy and the law in your examples, but they’re not
just British are they? If you asked an American what was good about
America they’d say the same thing, and the French.
(quoted in Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011: 23)
A form of foreign policy with such a serious flaw that it cannot distinguish
Britain from France, the notion of democracy as a universal value appears
not to have caught contemporary imaginations. Locally rooted, everyday
relational and caring practices, perhaps located in the private or domestic
sphere, appear to offer forms of belonging that are more compelling than the
familiar institutions of liberal democracy. In all their imperfections and pos-
sibilities, perhaps they remind us of the Edmund Burke we encountered in
Chapter 4, the practices of the biraderi we saw in Chapter 5, the solidaristic
attempts to defend friends and neighbours against violence in Chapter 6, the
potentially life-saving (if ultimately, in this instance, tragically thwarted) love
between Omar and Matt, Ahmed and Waj, or the Archbishop of Canter-
bury’s careful exposition of how different forms of law and belonging
might be talked about, accommodated, compromised upon. It reminds me of
the young Muslim woman interviewed by a newspaper in a market in East
London who said of the Archbishop, “Rowan Williams was trying to be
kind” (Doward et al., 2008).
The relational forms of belonging alluded to by the focus group partici-
pants do not imply a rejection of democracy – at most, they demonstrate a
vague indifference to the symbols and rituals of liberal democracy. However,
must we read this research as a worrying sign that British everyday lives are
not as democratic as we thought? Are we bored of democracy? I suggest that
this would only be the right analysis if we were to accept that liberal democracy
is the only form of democracy.
For political theorist Romand Coles, however, this would be the wrong
approach. In his work, the “radical ordinary” – the everyday practices of
caring, listening, sharing a meal, ceding one’s place in a queue, sitting talking
on a porch – is a form of democracy (Hauerwas and Coles, 2012). Rejecting
as “too obvious” democracy as “the sheer existence of ‘representative’ insti-
tutions that incant a virtually unquestionable ‘yes’ to ‘democracy’” (ibid.:
113), he instead asks us to consider it as a complex relational set of practices.
Importantly, by their very nature, such practices require a temporality that
is not progressive or teleological, but rather privileges the present over the
future. They are going to take time and to require us to take our time. This is
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a slow, pulsing time in which a democratic ethics may play out, always with
difficulty, always involving negotiation, always ungraspable in its entirety,
costing not less than everything:
a sense of the world as immanently shot through with fugitive democratic
possibilities, gifts, scattered shards of light calling us to receive, gather,
and carefully engage each other in relationships that slip beyond the
oblivion of anti-democratic cages to initiate better things.
(Hauerwas and Coles, 2012: 115)
This is a democracy that cannot be achieved quickly, that will not be reached
inevitably or through an ineluctable, unconscious evolution. Rather, it
requires never-ending work that takes place not so much in statements in
academic books or political speeches about how the world should be, but
rather in patient engagement in the everyday practices of how the world now
is: the dense fabric of our radically ordinary lives, the constant opportunities
to enact kindness, manners, hospitality that already exist in the subjectivities
in which we manoeuvre.
A radically ordinary democracy requires a temporality that is a “compli-
cated ever-changing pulse” rather than a “flow” (Hauerwas and Coles,
2012: 85). It is incompatible with democracy understood as a shortcut to
knowledge or a linear forward march straight to the future. This is because
the intimacies of a radically ordinary democracy take time: not long historical
time, but the everyday rhythmic and recursive time of listening and caring,
strolling and wondering, teaching and telling stories, relearning and re-
remembering, refictioning our histories and our modes of belonging. The
radical ordinary can accept no separate public and private sphere, but
instead insists that democracy exists and can be practised in all locations of
our lives together. It must inevitably refuse the injunction to leave our
emotions, our relational commitments, our religious faith, our passion, our
anger, our care for others at the door when we enter the public sphere.
Instead of wishing these things away, it takes these arenas of life – riven with
power and oppression and the desire to exclude others as they may be – as
the starting point of a democratic engagement which must always deal with
them.
We should be careful. Radical ordinary democracy does not banish power
and does not pretend, in all its messiness, that the world could be made
perfect. There is a chauvinism, for instance, in proposing that British
people are uniquely able practitioners of such things as good manners.
Unspoken but familiar notions of a quintessentially British “fair play” appear
to underwrite some of the modes of belonging identified in the Demos focus
groups; these require a whole genealogy themselves. Then there is the whole
set of modes of exclusion underwritten by the focus group participant who
describes a worry about lack of integration by immigrants in the following
terms:
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They don’t queue up – some of them – like in the Post Office; they just
march up to the counter. And it makes me think, what is this country
becoming? When there are people who live here but don’t know, or can’t
be bothered with, normal manners?
(Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011: 32)
Ordinariness can be depressingly non-radical, as we have seen throughout this
book. Ordinary life is generally the locale where othering practices are per-
formed and they can be as exclusionary in their insistence on good manners
as they are in their emphasis on voting. Any model of democracy we might
like to imagine will always carry with it the limits of our discourses, the power
relations that have crafted our own subjectivities, the possibilities of multiple
practices of exclusion in the execution.
Nevertheless, in his explanation of democracy as an ongoing ethics that
makes no distinction between theory and practice and which values the inti-
mate temporalities of faith, friendship, love, emotion and relationships, Coles
offers us a way forward in re-thinking democratic time. Thus, we can perhaps
be attentive to the spaces, or moments, that open up when democratic sub-
jectivities are caught between conflicting loyalties to the rational public sphere
of voting and reason giving, and to passionate emotional commitment to the
practices of good manners and kindness; or when the speedy, quantifying
logic of the election comes into confrontation with deliberative practices and
relationships that require more time and patience; or when an encounter with some
other time or some other subject teaches us that our contemporary practices are
not as non-violent or rational or neutral as we had thought. These are the inter-
sections that offer us glimpses of other ways to live, that collapse the familiar dis-
tinctions between the future and the past, self and other, teacher and student,
rationality and violence, civilisation and barbarism, so that we must make
them anew and, in doing so, change them.
Each time the practices of democracy promotion are contested or called into
question, each time we redirect our gaze onto the invisible violence – physical
or epistemic – that had gone unnoticed, each teacher who provides an alter-
native narrative in a history lesson, each film-maker or photographer who
reminds us that things are more uncertain than they look, each novelist who
crafts chaos out of order, each veil worn in defiance of Page Three, each
Archbishop who dares to question the secular neutrality of the law, each little
act of hospitality to a foreigner, each patient smile at an errant immigrant queue
jumper, each time we question what democracy is and try to locate it at the level
of the radical ordinary – each of these acts and practices enables a certain work
at the borders of democracy, these sets of borders that mutually reinforce one
another in their articulation, and each attempts to remake them all.
Nor are any of these actions parochial endeavours. As we have seen, the
Foreign Policy that mandates Democracy Promotion is simply a manifestation
of the foreign policy that establishes certain practices as foreign, dangerous and
alien in the first place, and attempts to control, contain and domesticate
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them. Thus, re-making the borders that establish what democratic practices
are at a local level inevitably disrupts the practices of Democracy Promotion.
If democracy could be thought of as a relational, everyday practice located
in the radical ordinary that denies the existence of separable public and pri-
vate spheres, then three consequences would follow. First, the actual practices
that are recommended and enacted in Democracy Promotion would no
longer seem so self-evident, but rather politically motivated, historically con-
stituted and therefore changeable. Second, the relational ethic that could be
seen to constitute democracy itself would disrupt the teacher-pupil rela-
tionship such that it might seem possible to ask questions about how the
imperfect yet, in principle, alterable deliberative practices of the jirga might
enhance lives not only in the North West Frontier Province but also in Brad-
ford. This curiosity and the radically ordinary relationships that might
develop over slow, pulsing time might also enable a conversation about some
of the abuses, violence and exclusions committed by jirgas and by biraderis
and by shari’ah courts. This in turn might enable changes in subjectivity more
profound than would be effected simply by banning or ignoring these deeply
rooted institutions. Third, the very practices of state sovereignty that rely on
the distinction between the domestic and the foreign would themselves be
called into question. The limits to this unravelling would be set only by how
far we might call the limits of our individualised and totalised subjectivities
into question.
Genealogy as democratic ethics
The photograph from the Art of Integration exhibition that I cannot stop
thinking about is the picture ofMr Jamil. Not the caption with its extraordinary
story of heroism and courage; just the radically ordinary picture.
Mr Jamil is a figure who appears to participate fully in the ordinary flows
of productive power that make life possible. He wears his uniform and his
high-visibility jacket ready to participate in the modern, capitalist, developed
economy that London Underground keeps running whilst it keeps the Tube
trains running in turn. Meanwhile, his beard quietly denotes his private, reli-
gious identity, fully formed in some separate private sphere. Yet his back is
turned to the train that powers London forward into the future and instead
he is tending a garden. An Englishman’s garden – that most private and
domestic of symbols of everyday life – springs up there with irrepressible
exuberance into the public sphere and is nurtured and cared for by this public
servant for the benefit of London’s public transport users in all their strange-
ness and diversity. The rural invades the urban here, transforming both. Per-
haps even more extraordinary than the spectacular, lightning-fast act of
saving a stranger’s life, is the radically ordinary, slow, everyday practice of
growing flowers for the enjoyment of the people he might tangentially
encounter each day. Could the ethics of these two acts even be connected, as
Mr Jamil lives a radically ordinary, democratic ethic of caring and kindness in
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his everyday life that trains and forms his subjectivity, ready to do the right
thing in an extraordinary moment? Could anything other than this photo-
graph more beautifully illustrate the way that the boundary between the
public and private is more or less impossible to police, so many are the tem-
poral and spatial locations at which it incipiently threatens to collapse, leaving
us with our passionate emotions, our religious devotion, our manners and
kindnesses and care for one another, all painfully and vulnerably exposed in a
public gaze that is all-encompassing?
This is a reading of a photograph that differs from the one put forward in
the caption and from the one encouraged by the photographs that surround it
and the context in which they have been displayed. A reading of a photo-
graph is never fully determined by the photographer or the subject or the
spectator (Azoulay, 2008). As with any meaning-making practice, it eludes
attempts to fix its meaning and offers the possibility for multiple interpreta-
tions. Reading a photograph in this alternative way is itself a political inter-
vention, which seeks to question the narratives that first present themselves.
Narratives about history are likewise indeterminate. The stories we tell of
ourselves can always be re-told: they are never fixed but always contestable.
In this book, I have discussed an influential story that has been told about
Britain and Pakistan in lots of different places for quite a long time. Britain,
the story goes, is a country that through a 1,000-year process of history has
evolved civilised democratic institutions like elections and the freedom of the
press which enable the community to manage and reconcile conflicting opi-
nions rationally and without violence, to know and foster life in its whole
population, to distribute power neutrally in the form of a ballot paper, and to
provide women and minorities with important rights.
The story, as it goes on, is a little more unfortunate for Pakistan. The same
civilising process that brings democracy was inhibited for a long time by
British colonial power. However, by providing electoral institutions in colo-
nial times and by supporting development and Democracy Promotion ever
since decolonisation, Britain has been attempting to aid Pakistan to make its
entrance into the same history that Britain has been through. By 1989 – the
end of history – it became obvious that democracy was the one best way of
governing and that this should ultimately motivate British support for
Pakistan, despite the temptations of military dictators, who offer the main
imaginable alternative mode of governance to liberal democracy.
This same history, the story continues, has brought us repeatedly up against
others, at home and overseas, who attack democracy, burn books and people,
bomb Britain and its capital city. These enemies have had to be civilised or
contained. If they choose democracy and its accompanying narratives and
institutions, we can help them to civilise. If not, they are foreigners, barbarians,
enemies, who must be contained and destroyed.
Against this smooth narrative of history, I have provided some detailed
fragments that contest everything about it. I have shown that this teleology is
not a description of the driving force of history, but is rather a discourse that
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enables a messy historicity to be managed: teleology does not produce his-
tory; rather, history produces teleology. I have shown that it is possible to
disrupt the authoritative story that British people tell about themselves: that
as a postcoloniser, the UK too is a postcolonial country. I have shown that the
clear choice between democratic rationality and despotic violence, violent
masculinity and women’s rights, liberal delineation of the public and private
sphere versus irrational chaos is not only cruel, but false. I have discerned
violence, misogyny and also glimpses of radical ordinariness in Britain’s lib-
eral democracy. I have demonstrated that the borders and oppositions we
might have taken for granted collapse at every turn, that democracy may not
be quite what we think it is, that the ways we know democracy – and the ways
we use democracy to know – are not neutral, but entangled with deeply
troubling flows of power.
In doing this, I have used aesthetic productions by artists, novelists and
film-makers to show the scattered shards of possibilities of other ways to live.
I have not described history in a valid, reliable or objective way, but I have
attempted to make a radically ordinary, deeply political, passionately committed
intervention into its telling. That is what I mean when I say that genealogy is
a way of practising radically ordinary democratic ethics.
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